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Abstract  
 
The thesis investigates to what extent Norwegian and German complaints systems secure 
procedural justice for welfare claimants. Complaints systems are important mechanisms for 
protection of citizen’s welfare rights. The large number of welfare claimants affected by 
decisions made in the welfare administration and the significance of these decisions to the 
individual are important motivations for this thesis. Moreover, the presence of procedural 
justice, or lack thereof, may have broader consequences in terms of systemic legitimacy.  
The theoretical framework is based on theories of procedural justice. Seven criteria are 
deduced from the literature which together constitute an ideal type of procedural justice. The 
criteria include consistency, independence, voice, quality, transparency, timeliness and 
financial risk. The thesis is a case study of Norway and Germany, including both within-case 
and between-case analysis. Data is drawn from public documents, existing research, as well as 
expert interviews of officials from complaints agencies in Norway and Germany. Three goals 
are addressed: (1) In terms of theory, the objective is to systematize existing research on 
procedural justice and present a coherent framework applicable to empirical evaluation of 
real-world institutions; (2) Empirically, the aim is to present the Norwegian and German 
complaints systems in a comprehensive manner; (3) By merging these contributions, the 
systemic characteristics are discussed in terms of criteria of procedural justice in order to 
illuminate strengths and weaknesses of the systems given the theoretical assumptions.  
The discussion concludes that: (1) The Norwegian case secures procedural justice with 
regards to timeliness, and to a large degree on the criteria quality, transparency and financial 
risk. However, the criteria of geographical and systemic consistency, independence and voice 
are not fulfilled; (2) For the German case, the ideal of procedural justice is secured with 
regards to systemic consistency, independence, voice, quality and transparency. The answer to 
the criteria of geographical consistency and financial risk are more ambivalent, while the 
timeliness is far from attaining an ideal of procedural justice. The question remains whether 
there are inherent practical trade-offs in the fulfillment of some of the criteria. Prioritizations 
of some aspects of procedural justice on behalf of others might prove inevitable and perfect 
attainment of procedural justice thus infeasible. Further research can broaden knowledge 
through larger comparisons including more cases within the same universe. The empirical 
effects of the complaints systems should also be further investigated, implying the acquisition 
of more knowledge in depth.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Theme of the thesis  
The fundamental idea of the modern welfare state
1
 is the belief that it is the responsibility of 
the state to ensure all citizens a minimum economic standard. Laws on economic welfare 
started out as a form of gratuity furnished by the state, but the development has been towards 
legal rights to economic welfare. Implementation of these rights takes place through the 
welfare administration, and decisions made here often imply administrative discretion, with 
inherent danger of arbitrary treatment.  Although the quality of decision-making in the first 
instance of the welfare administration is extremely important, the large amount of decisions 
made here implies that mistakes are inevitable (Calvert 1975: 193). Hence there is a need for 
complaints systems. Justice is central in this regard, as it is a fundamental value of modern 
democracies (Marshall 1950, Rawls 1999: 3, Scherer 1992: 2). While distributive justice 
addresses the substantive welfare schemes and the final distribution of resources, procedural 
justice is achieved through fair administration of these schemes. This is important because the 
framing of welfare benefits as legal rights imply the necessity of appropriate procedures for 
protecting these rights. Procedural justice requires that the procedures satisfy several aspects, 
which in this thesis are operationalized through the seven criteria consistency, independence, 
voice, quality, transparency, timeliness and financial risk.  
The research question in this thesis is: To what extent do Norwegian and German 
complaints systems secure procedural justice for welfare claimants? The question is 
examined through a comparative analysis of the complaints systems in the welfare states of 
Norway and Germany. The complaints systems investigated are those of social assistance and 
disability benefits in the Norwegian welfare administration (NAV) and the fused benefit of 
social assistance and long-term unemployment payment in the German Hartz IV. The 
overarching research question raises several sub-questions: How are the complaints systems 
organized? Are different ideals and goals prioritized in Norway and Germany? What are the 
consequences of these eventual differences in terms of procedural justice?  
 
                                                             
1
In this thesis, the term welfare state refers to all welfare benefits related to citizens’ economic security, 
excluding, however, the public responsibility for health and care services. The concepts of social security and 
social insurance are used interchangeably to refer to rule- and insurance-based benefits, corresponding to the 
German concept of Sozialversicherungen and the Norwegian concept trygd. Finally, social assistance refers to 
an economic safety net based on means-testing, accessible only when all other sources of income are exhausted. 
In Germany and Norway this refers to, respectively, Sozialhilfe and sosialhjelp.  
2 
 
1.2 Contributions to existing literature 
The thesis has three main goals. Firstly, in terms of theory, the goal is to systematize existing 
research on procedural justice and present a coherent framework applicable to empirical 
evaluation of real-world institutions. Further, empirically, the aim is to present the Norwegian 
and German complaints systems in a comprehensive manner. Finally, by merging these 
contributions, the systemic characteristics will be discussed in terms of criteria of procedural 
justice in order to illuminate possible strengths and weaknesses of the systems given the 
theoretical assumptions. The latter constitutes a substantial contribution to the field of 
research. A further contribution to existing research is the use of the methodological 
procedure of applying normative theory on empirical cases. Normative and empirical research 
is often kept separate, but the combination has several advantages. While the normative 
theories can be developed and adjusted to what is practically feasible as suggested by 
empirical research, normative theory can give empirical research purpose and structure. These 
points make up the academic motivations behind the research question. There are, however, 
important real-world aspects which also justify the topic of this thesis. Firstly, the large 
number of welfare claimants affected by the decisions made in the welfare administration and 
the importance of these decisions to the individual, as welfare benefits often constitute the 
claimant’s only source of income, points to an important motivation for this investigation. 
Secondly, the presence of procedural justice, or lack thereof, may have broader consequences 
in terms of systemic legitimacy.  
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organized in eight chapters. Chapter two presents the background of the research 
question and the reasoning behind the choice of theoretical framework, starting with a 
discussion of the welfare state. Esping-Andersen wrote in 1990 that: “The welfare state has 
been a favored topic of research for many years now” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 1). The 
interest in the welfare state, as well as the number of different approaches to the study of the 
welfare state, has only increased since. The more specific area of research in this thesis is 
welfare rights and their enforcement, namely the administration of welfare benefits. 
Administrative decisions are often characterized by discretion, implying a danger of 
arbitrariness. It is discussed how the importance of welfare decisions to the citizens, as well as 
the high degree of power held by welfare bureaucrats and the mentioned dangers of 
arbitrariness, make mechanisms for complaints handling necessary. Finally, the theme is 
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situated within existing research, and the choice of theoretical approach is discussed and 
justified. The third chapter presents the theoretical framework which forms the basis of the 
thesis. The chapter starts by discussing concepts of justice, making an initial distinction 
between distributive and procedural justice. Further, procedural justice is defined more 
carefully, including the discussion of neighboring and overlapping concepts. The chapter ends 
with the deduction of criteria of procedural justice. In the subsequent chapter, the 
methodological choices of the thesis are presented and discussed. This includes the choice of 
a comparative case study, methods of data collection and operationalization of procedural 
justice criteria. Chapter five contains data and discussion of relevant contextual factors of the 
cases studied. This is followed by a chapter presenting the complaints systems of the 
Norwegian and German cases. Within-case as well as between-case discussions of the 
complaints systems in terms of procedural justice criteria are provided in chapter seven. The 
eighth and final chapter contains a summary of the findings and contributions of the thesis, as 
well as suggestions for further research.  
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2. The study of welfare state complaints systems 
The main motivation behind the research question is the importance of justice in the 
administration of welfare benefits. A short introduction to welfare state theory constitutes a 
necessary background. Theories of the welfare state have in various ways tried to describe and 
explain differences between welfare states, as well as suggesting what effects these 
differences might have for citizens. The classic contributions of Titmuss and Esping-
Andersen are useful heuristics to categorize the Norwegian and German cases, as well as 
describing and explaining the welfare benefits discussed. Further, theory on welfare rights 
explain how the development of positive rights to welfare, in contrast to welfare as a 
privilege, also implies a duty for the state to provide and administrate these rights in a just 
manner.  
Although it is very difficult to provide a neutral definition of the welfare state 
applicable across different contexts (Kuhnle 1983: 23), and many different definitions of the 
welfare state are used in existing literature, a central hallmark of the welfare state agreed upon 
by most scholars is that the state has undertaken significant responsibility for the economic 
welfare of its citizens (Ohnstad 2011: 18). Welfare includes the public responsibility for 
income security. The existence of national laws that guarantee a minimum income or 
minimum benefits for all citizens in the case of illness, disability, old age, unemployment and 
so on is fundamental to the idea of the welfare state (Kuhnle 1983: 29). The welfare state 
concept thus alludes to the fact that all citizens are ensured a minimum level of economic 
welfare by the state, although the exact level and form of these welfare benefits vary between 
countries and over time (Kuhnle 1983: 27). The variation in materializations of the welfare 
state is captured in the following quote by Briggs (1961: 231): “Welfare states can and do 
employ a remarkable variety of instruments, such as social insurance, direct provision in cash 
or in kind, subsidy, partnership with other agencies (including private business agencies) and 
action through local authorities.”   
 
2.1 Welfare regimes 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) regime theory is a well-known theoretical framework for 
discussions of the welfare state.
2
 The theory is based on the observation that there are 
qualitatively different institutional arrangements between the state, the market and the family 
                                                             
2
 See Kemeny (1995) and Arts and Gelissen (2002) for objections to and modifications of the regime theory.  
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in different countries, and that these differences are clustered in what Esping-Andersen terms 
regimes. The three overarching welfare regimes are the liberal regime, the conservative 
regime and the social democratic regime. The liberal welfare state is characterized by means-
tested benefits, modest universal transfers, as well as a reliance on residual welfare and social 
assistance, thus implying a great importance of the market for people’s welfare (Esping-
Andersen 1990: 22, Titmuss 1974: 141). Benefits are low and often associated with stigma. 
The United States is considered to be the classic example of this regime (Esping-Andersen 
1990: 76). The conservative regime type, associated with Germany, France and Austria, 
among others, is predominated by a focus on status preservation. This means that rights are 
attached to class and status (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). The regime is typically formed by 
ideas emanating from the Catholic Church, and thus seeks to maintain traditional family 
values. Compulsory state social insurance is central (Esping-Andersen 1990: 22). 
Universalism is the hallmark of the social-democratic welfare state, associated with the 
Scandinavian countries (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). According to Arts and Gelissen (2002: 
142), social policy within this type of welfare state is “aimed at a maximization of capacities 
for individual independence.”  
Esping-Andersen’s regime theory builds on the work of Richard Titmuss. Titmuss 
(1976: 130) suggested a framework for analysis of the welfare state. He states that regardless 
of the nature of welfare service one discuss, three issues are of central relevance: (1) the 
nature of the entitlement, that is, whether the entitlement is legally, contractually, financially, 
discretionary or professionally determined, (2) the rules of entitlement, i.e., who is entitled to 
the benefit and on what conditions, and (3) the methods employed in determination of access, 
utilization, allocation and payment.  
A central distinction in the discussion of different principles of welfare is between 
universal and selective benefits. Universalism in welfare policy is a distributive principle 
associated with equity and redistribution (Kildal and Kuhnle 2005a: 13-14). The principle of 
universalism implies that the right to social security is guaranteed to all citizens (Andersson 
and Kangas 2005: 112, Esping-Andersen 1990: 25). This is contrasted with selective policies 
which are normally targeted at the poor (Kildal and Kuhnle 2005a: 13-14). The fact that 
selective benefits concentrate help on those whose needs are greatest implies the necessity of 
a test of need, a means-test, in order to prove eligibility (Titmuss 1976: 132). Selective 
policies also, however, include insurance-based, reciprocal welfare programs; they include 
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programs targeted at individuals who cannot provide for themselves, as well as programs 
restricted to the working population (Kildal and Kuhnle 2005a: 13-14).  
 
2.2 Rights to welfare  
Historically, laws on economic welfare grew out of a conception of welfare as a privilege or 
“gratuity” furnished by the state, and welfare claimants could thus be made subject to 
whatever conditions the state, in practice the local community, found fit (Reich 1965: 1245). 
However, the development has been towards clear conceptualizations of a right to public 
assistance (Reich 1965: 1246). There has, in other words, been a “legal reconceptualization of 
welfare recipients as rights-bearing citizens entitled to quasi-judicial processes for the 
protection of their rights” (Mashaw 1985: 34). Such rights are based upon the fundamental 
idea of the modern state that society should take responsibility for those citizens who are not 
able to take care of themselves (Ohnstad 2011: 17). When benefits are framed as a right rather 
than a privilege, mechanisms for protecting these rights become necessary (Lens 2007: 384). 
This implies that there must be a possibility to bring disputes about these rights before an 
external agency (Hatland 2011a: 154).  
Traditionally, there is made a distinction between “negative rights” to be free from 
state interference and “positive rights” to state assistance (Noonan, Sabel and Simon 2009: 
525). Arguments against positive rights to public assistance are that social rights are 
indeterminate (Noonan et al. 2009: 560), and that they cannot be enforced in a court “because 
their enforcement requires the courts to make decisions that have large-scale consequences for 
government budgets” (Tushnet 2003-2004: 1896). This refers to the view of determination of 
welfare benefits as resource allocation disputes. Such disputes are considered part of the 
jurisdiction of democratic politics, and hence should not be determined in the judicial sphere 
(Palmer 2000: 74). However, when a welfare benefit is framed as a positive, legal right, it is 
no longer a matter of competition for scarce resources; a legally based rights claim cannot be 
rejected because of budget concerns (Kjønstad and Syse 2008: 103). An important distinction 
can thus be made between welfare benefits that only provide the right to fight for scarce 
resources, on the one hand, and positive welfare rights where this competition is not relevant, 
on the other hand (Kjønstad and Syse 2008: 102-103). When positive welfare rights are 
established by law, a concomitant entitlement is “to have one’s interests in a public program 
considered in a process that is responsible and accountable” (Noonan et al. 2009: 561), and it 
is to this end this thesis is focused.  
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2.3 Administrative welfare decisions  
Distribution of resources according to entitlement lies at the heart of administrative decision-
making within the welfare state (Palmer 2000: 73). Decisions are made regarding eligibility 
and requirements of welfare claimants. Administrative discretion is an important component 
of these decisions. Discretion implies that the administrative decision-maker can select from 
more than one option (Handler 1986: 45). When more than one option is possible, the 
question is whether the correct criteria are used in making the decision or whether the 
decision is “arbitrary”. Discretion is apparent in somewhat distinct forms in the determination 
of different welfare benefits. A dichotomy between discretion and rules is often presented 
(Arts and Van der Veen 1992: 169-170), where rules are assumed to limit or exclude 
discretion.  In the determination of social assistance benefits, decisions are often based on a 
means-test; services are “tailored to need” (Handler 1986: 51). With social security benefits, 
on the other hand, the eligibility criteria are rule-based. However, the dichotomy between 
discretion and rules might be overstated, as “elimination of all discretion by a rule is rare” 
(Arts and Van der Veen 1992: 169). Rules can leave room for discretion if they are vague or 
ambiguous. Also more rule-based social security benefits like disability benefits include room 
for discretion, as they are based on medical assessments. Calvert (1975: 185) stresses that the 
task of decision-making in both cases is “the same in kind, even if it differs markedly in 
degree.”  
It is generally argued that discretion in the administration of welfare benefits must be 
accepted as a necessary evil, as it is unrealistic to believe that all aspects of public policy can 
be regulated through rules (Allan 2001: 15). Discretion in welfare delivery allows for 
decisions adjusted to individual circumstances (Brodkin 1997: 4, Terum 2008: 72). There are 
nevertheless inherent dangers of unfair and arbitrary treatment when discretionary decisions 
are made (Selznick 1980: 14). Adequate safeguards against the misuse of discretion are thus 
necessary, as “officials, like claimants, are people” (Titmuss 1971: 127) – they are prone to 
make mistakes. Leventhal (1980: 43) emphasizes the need for mechanisms to modify and 
reverse allocative decisions, as “even the most well-informed and competent decision-makers 
commit errors or oversights.” Complaints systems are meant to provide such safeguards 
through a second look at the decision. The dangers associated with discretion are also thought 
to be minimized by the stricter requirements to the procedures of the complaints organ than 
the initial decision-making agency.  
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2.3.1 The importance of welfare decisions 
Mashaw (1985: 12) illustrates the importance of decisions made within the welfare 
administration to citizens by this quote: “Our basic support may depend on the favorable 
determination of administrators in a host of programs providing income maintenance and in-
kind distribution of essential goods and services.” Reich (1965: 1253) also argues that 
decisions about eligibility for welfare benefits are among the most important a government 
can make, because such a large portion of the population is dependent on the welfare state. 
The numbers of recipients of the three benefits discussed in this thesis underline the 
significance of these decisions: In 2011, there were 118.000 recipients of social assistance in 
Norway throughout the year, which constitutes 3.6 per cent of the population. About one per 
cent of the population received social assistance at any given point (Kann and Naper 2012: 
84). In December the same year, 306.700 people in Norway received disability benefits. This 
constitutes 9.5 per cent of the working age population
3
 (Bragstad, Ellingsen and Lindbøl 
2012: 33). In February 2011, 4.700.000 German residents received Hartz IV benefits, which is 
7.2 per cent of the working age population (The Local 2011). Decisions regarding eligibility 
for and the size of welfare benefits affect all aspects of the lives of welfare claimants as they 
determine their economic basis of existence (Redlich 1971-1972: 58-59). Welfare bureaucrats 
have a de facto monopoly on the administration of individual welfare rights (Hatland 2011a: 
166). The professions of the welfare state thus have a large degree of power over citizens. 
They act as gatekeepers and decision-makers, and determine whether individuals are eligible 
for welfare benefits or not. Complaints procedures offer an important possibility to challenge 
this exercise of discretion (Handler 1986: 45).  
 
2.4 Positioning the topic within existing research 
This thesis builds upon former research in the endeavor to answer the research question. The 
following sections situate the thesis relative to former research in order to highlight the 
specific contribution of this thesis to the research field.  
 
2.4.1 Complaints within administrative systems 
The characteristics of administrative welfare decisions discussed thus far cover all stages of 
the decision-making process. In the literature, a distinction is drawn between decision-making 
                                                             
3
 Working age is defined as age between 18 and 67 years in Norway and  between 15 and 65 years in Germany.  
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process and application of rules and discretion, on the one hand, and processes of grievance-
handling, appeal and review, on the other (Halliday and Scott 2010: 470-471). Although both 
are concerned with the exercise of administrative powers, the division can be useful in 
situating the thesis within the field of research. While Ison (1999) argues that the emphasis on 
mechanisms for complaints and redress is misplaced because the focus should be on the initial 
decision-making process, this thesis follows the argument made by Calvert (1975: 193) that 
the initial decision-making level is characterized by mass production to such a degree that we 
can only afford a fairly unsafe system of decision-making at the lowest level. An obvious 
argument against this is that the standards applying to the part of the decision-making system 
that most citizens encounter should be prioritized, but the fact remains that competing goals 
like efficiency and scarce resources nevertheless lead to a need for higher-standard systems to 
take a second look (Calvert 1975: 193). The “review- part” of the welfare system is thus the 
topic of this thesis. 
Further divisions can be found in the literature on complaints systems. Felstiner, Abel 
and Sarat (1980-1981) made a seminal contribution to the research on complaints and disputes 
in their investigation of which conditions contribute to the emergence and transformation of 
disputes in society, namely that injustices must be perceived (naming), attributed to another 
individual or social entity (blaming), and voiced (claiming). Existing research on citizens’ 
decisions about whether to file a complaint or not can be further divided between studies 
addressing practical barriers such as cost, procedural complexity, ignorance and physical 
accessibility, on the one hand, and studies emphasizing attitudinal barriers such as fatigue and 
faith in the rectitude of rules and satisfaction, on the other hand (Halliday and Scott 2010: 
477). This thesis follows Redlich (1971-1972: 60), however, and takes as point of departure 
that “a decision has been made to challenge the position of the welfare department.” Two 
strands of research have departed from this starting point. Firstly, some researchers have 
focused on users’ experiences with various complaints mechanisms (Halliday and Scott 2010: 
477, e.g. Adler 2006, Lens 2007, Tyler 1988). Secondly, other researchers have investigated 
how different mechanisms of administrative justice operate (e.g. Partington, Kirton-Darling 
and McClenaghan 2007, Richardson and Genn 1994). While the focus of this thesis is more in 
line with the latter approach, it seems useful to draw on findings of studies of users’ 
experiences as well when establishing criteria for evaluation of the complaints systems.  
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2.4.2 What constitutes a complaint? 
Several distinctions are made in the literature regarding what constitutes a complaint. 
Seneviratne and Cracknell (1988: 183) present a broad definition of complaints as including 
“allegations to injustice caused by maladministration”, as well as approaches to the authorities 
for “advice, information or to raise an issue which, if not handled properly could turn into 
complaints.” On the other hand, Dunleavy, Loughlin, Margetts, Bastow, Tinkler, Pearce and 
Bartholomeou (2005: 7) make a clear and narrow distinction between complaints and appeals. 
They conceive of complaints as concerning the personal treatment by officials, a field that has 
been considered a part of internal organizational arrangements, while appeals concern the 
actual decisions made and form part of the administrative justice sphere. Appeals are 
conceived of in terms of legal rights, natural justice and related quasi-judicial criteria 
(Dunleavy et al. 2005: 7). Following this understanding, appeals is clearly the topic of this 
thesis. However, these concepts are not used consistently in the literature. In this thesis the 
concepts complaints and appeals both refer to grievances related to substantive decisions, not 
including service complaints. Following the separation between service claims and rights 
claims made by Thompson (1999: 475), the thesis addresses rights claims and excludes 
service claims. The distinction between complaints and appeals in this conceptualization is 
between a complaint on an initial decision and an appeal on the subsequent review. The kind 
of complaints discussed is objections to decisions made within three different welfare 
benefits. The nature of such welfare complaints is overwhelmingly economic, which follows 
from the income-dispensing function of welfare benefits (Redlich 1971-1972: 60). Complaints 
may arise because claimants have been found ineligible for a benefit, the grant may be too 
small, or there has been a termination of or reduction in the size of the benefit. 
 
2.5 About complaints systems 
Complaints systems refer to mechanisms for “resolving disputes between citizens and the 
government that arise from decisions of officials and agencies” (Cane 2010: 426). The 
following sections present some dimensions of variation between different complaints 
systems. 
 
2.5.1 Internal review 
In most countries, the first step in a complaints process is an optional or required internal 
review. If this is required, it means that the agency responsible for the initial decision must 
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review the decision before an appeal to an external complaints organ can be filed. A review is 
“a re-appraisal of a primary decision within the administrative area responsible for making 
that decision” (Harris 1999: 43). In this sense it can be seen as a continuation of the primary 
decision-making process; it is a reconsideration of the decision. However, whether an internal 
review is required or not is an important aspect of the complaints system, as it has several 
consequences for the overall process.  
 
2.5.2 Tribunals and courts 
There are further two main modes of adjudication of administrative decisions, namely through 
tribunals or courts (Cane 2010: 426). These are arenas for external review. A tribunal is an 
adjudicatory body that is not a court (Cane 2010: 426). It can be defined as a “body set up by 
statute to adjudicate disputes arising under that statutory scheme” (Dunleavy et al. 2005: 20). 
Administrative decisions may alternatively be subject to judicial review in the courts. Palmer 
(2000: 70) asserts that the purpose of judicial review is “the control of discretion in 
accordance with the rule of law.” There is further a distinction between ordinary courts and 
specialized courts. In a majority of the continental European countries a system of specialized 
administrative courts is established (Ziller 2007: 172). These systems are more closely linked 
to the activities of the public administration, and the judges are specialized in administrative 
law.  
 
2.5.3 Ombudsman 
The Ombudsman in the Scandinavian conception is a parliamentary commissioner who will 
investigate complaints from citizens with any kinds of grievance against the state (Wade 
1963: 95). The task of the Ombudsman is to determine if maladministration has caused 
injustice (Thompson 1999: 465). This institution is not part of the specialized complaints 
systems regarding welfare benefits, but is rather an institution meant to provide citizens an 
objective control instance against the administration more generally. 
 
2.5.4 Other aspects of complaints systems  
Several aspects that vary between complaints systems are not necessarily related to the 
tribunals-court distinction. These are whether the case is considered “de novo” or “on the 
record”, whether the adjudicative body has authority to make a new decision, that is, how 
much one can achieve with a complaint, and whether the style is adversarial or inquisitorial. 
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In a de novo consideration of a case, the appellate organ reexamines all the evidence 
and arguments that were advanced in the first decision (Shapiro 1980: 645). An on the record 
consideration, on the other hand, only includes a review of questions of law, leaving the facts 
out.  
Regarding the authority of the complaints agency, a complete displacement by the 
tribunal or court may be seen as a remedy that immediately eliminates a violation of the 
citizen’s right (Tushnet 2003-2004: 1909).  A weak remedy, in contrast, can be a requirement 
that the government officials hold a promise and develop a plan of how to correct the 
violation of a welfare right within a “reasonably short, but unspecified time period” (Tushnet 
2003-2004: 1910). Leventhal (1980: 43) argues that procedural justice will be reduced if the 
complaints agency does not have authority to render a final judgment and thus bypass the 
original decision-maker. 
A broad dichotomy of adjudicatory systems is between those based on the adversarial 
principle and those following the inquisitorial principle. This dichotomy is often linked with 
the counterposition of formalism and informalism (Allars 1991: 381). The essence of 
adversarial systems is to allow the parties to challenge each other (Titmuss 1971: 123). This 
involves each party presenting his or her case orally, while the judge has a passive role (Bell 
1992: 128). The inquisitorial model, in contrast, assigns the judge a greater role in bringing 
forth the facts, and the evidence are normally presented in writing (Bell 1992: 128). In a pure 
inquisitorial model both the decision itself and the process of investigation that precedes the 
decision is under control of a third party. In an adversary system, the decision is still in the 
hands of a third party, but the disputants and their representatives control the provision of 
information in the process preceding the decision (Lind and Tyler 1988: 17).  
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3. Theoretical framework: Procedural justice 
3.1 The normative concept of justice 
Theories of justice are normative. A normative statement expresses a judgment about what 
ought to be. Such statements are contrasted with positive statements, which are statements 
“about what is that may be right or wrong without any indication of approval or disapproval” 
(Kildal and Kuhnle 2005b: 3). Normative theory is concerned with the justification of 
principles for the design of basic institutions of society (Kildal and Kuhnle 2005b: 4). 
Normative approaches to the welfare state are important, as welfare systems are “expressions 
of norms, values and social goals, such as ideas of justice and freedom, and norms of 
solidarity and responsibility” (Kildal and Kuhnle 2005b: 2). According to Rothstein (1998: 1), 
no discussion of welfare policy can be complete unless normative questions of social justice 
are raised. Justice is a normative concept in that it can be regarded as “a measure of the 
acceptability of certain outcomes of human relationships or situations” (Bell and Schokkaert 
1992: 237). Much has been said about the importance of justice in society. A famous 
quotation of Rawls (1999: 3) claims that justice is “the first virtue of social institutions.” 
Further, Marshall (1950) pointed to justice as one of the basic rights necessary to achieve 
individual liberty, which forms the foundation of the civil element of citizenship. He claims 
that justice is different from other rights because “it is the right to defend and assert one’s 
rights in terms of equality with other and by due process of the law” (Marshall 1950, cited in 
Sommerlad 2004: 346). The point is further underlined by Scherer (1992: 2), who claims that 
justice can be viewed as containing fundamental and indispensable principles for any kind of 
human organization.  Related to the topic of this thesis – welfare state complaints systems – 
the accomplishment of justice is a central goal. Complaints systems are meant to secure 
justice in welfare bureaucracies by providing a mechanism for the users to challenge 
administrative decisions and to correct mistakes (Lens 2007: 383). Wade (1963: 2) points out 
that fair administration to a large degree depends on the procedures applied. Procedural 
justice addresses exactly the fairness of decisional processes. 
This chapter deals with the theoretical framework and the deduction of criteria for 
empirical investigation. The concept of justice is addressed firstly. Secondly, the two 
overarching research traditions within justice, i.e., distributive and procedural justice, are 
presented briefly. Further, the focus is narrowed down to procedural justice, and an attempt is 
made to clarify this concept and its relation to the neighboring concepts of rule of law, 
administrative justice and natural justice. Next, criteria for procedural justice derived from the 
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literature are discussed, including the question of weighting of and inherent trade-offs 
between the criteria.  
 
3.2 Theories of justice 
There is a generally accepted divide within justice theory between distributive justice and 
procedural justice.
4
 The idea of justice is complex, and many definitions and conceptions have 
been promoted throughout history (Cohen 1986: 4). This is so partly because several 
academic disciplines have theorized on the subject of justice. Most prominent besides 
philosophy, which provides the foundation of all justice theory, are the traditions within law, 
economy, sociology, and social psychology. Lawyers have generally been more concerned 
with procedural justice, while economists have studied distributive justice in income and 
welfare considerations (Scherer 1992: 12-13). Sociological approaches to justice often 
emphasize the consequences of different justice principles on the social structure of the 
society concerned (Scherer 1992: 13). The social psychological approach to justice studies the 
perception of injustice by individuals and groups (Scherer 1992: 2-3).  
There are different intakes to justice caused by theorizing from different disciplines, 
and an interdisciplinary approach to justice might be useful. Cohen (1986: 3) argues that an 
understanding of justice requires attention to concerns derived from different disciplines. An 
attempt is made in this thesis to follow this advice. The thesis draws, firstly, upon the tradition 
within legal writing, which provides analyses of the operation of existing institutions and the 
values they enforce (Bell 1992: 126). Within this field, the values of a fair procedure in the 
handling of claims and in the resolution of disputes, as well as equal access to legal 
institutions are seen as central concerns in the administration of justice (Bell 1992: 127). The 
approach adopted here is also, however, in line with what can be termed “sociology of law”, 
which maintains a similar focus but with a social science perspective, and includes the study 
                                                             
4
 A third, less theorized perspective of justice is interactional justice (Blodgett, Hill and Tax 1997: 189, Nel, 
Athron, Pitt and Ewing 2000: 6). This perspective focuses on inter-personal treatment, which would in the 
context of this thesis refer to the inter-personal treatment of claimants by personnel in adjudicatory agencies. 
There has been disagreement, however, as to whether this can really be seen as a third form of justice distinct 
from distributive and procedural justice, or whether it is best viewed as a “social form of procedural justice” 
(Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter and Ng 2001: 427). It is nevertheless distinct from the kind of procedural 
justice addressed in this thesis, which emphasizes the formal procedural aspects of the complaints system.  
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of administrative agencies as key institutions in the administration of justice (Arts and Van 
der Veen 1992: 163-167).
5
   
A further contribution utilized is a macro-theory of governance promoted by Bo 
Rothstein (2011) within the field of public administration. Rothstein argues that the goal 
should be high “Quality of Government” (QoG). The basis of QoG is impartiality, defined as: 
“When implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take into consideration 
anything about the citizen/case that is not stipulated beforehand in the policy or the law” 
(Rothstein 2011: 13). While the aspect of impartiality is essential to the topic of this thesis, 
and will be discussed further as a criterion of procedural justice, the operationalization 
presented by Rothstein (2011: 30-31) is arguably underdeveloped for the purposes of this 
thesis. It is also infeasible to utilize with the methods applied here, as it is originally created to 
serve in expert surveys.  
To sum up, the framework of this thesis accommodates an interdisciplinary approach 
as it is situated in the cross-section of several academic disciplines. In addition to theories of 
law, sociology and public administration, findings from studies of user experiences within 
social psychology are also included.  
 
3.3 Traditions within distributive and procedural justice 
The two main branches of justice theory, i.e., distributive and procedural justice, study 
different aspects of decision-making and adjudication. Distributive justice deals with the 
fairness of outcomes, while procedural justice emphasizes the fairness of the procedures used 
to arrive at a decision. The policies resulting from distributive justice considerations are 
important parts of the foundation of the welfare policies adopted in modern democracies. 
These policies require a just implementation, and hence a focus on procedural justice. The 
main contributions within distributive justice and procedural justice are presented in the 
following sections before a discussion of the relation between distributive and procedural 
justice.   
 
3.3.1 Distributive justice 
According to Blodgett et al. (1997: 188), distributive justice refers to “the perceived fairness 
of the tangible outcome of a dispute, negotiation, or decision involving two or more parties.” 
                                                             
5
 Some of the sociological approaches are, however, more micro-focused, emphasizing the important role played 
by “street-level bureaucrats” in the administration of public policies (Arts and Van der Veen 1992; Lipsky 1980).  
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This theoretical approach has its origin in social exchange theory, which emphasizes equity in 
relations of exchange. According to Lind and Taylor (1988: 10), the most influential of these 
theories was promoted by Adams (1963). The theory assumes that an individual perceives the 
fairness of an award in terms of a contributions rule, which implies that justice exists when 
rewards are in proportion to contributions (Furby 1986: 155, Leventhal 1980: 28). A critique 
of this is that people often use other standards of justice than the contribution rule (Furby 
1986: 155). Accordingly, other distributive rules have been suggested, namely need and 
equality (Blodgett et al. 1997: 188). The needs rule dictates that persons with greater needs 
should be prioritized, while the equality rule states that everyone should have similar 
outcomes regardless of needs and contributions (Leventhal 1980: 29).  
Another prominent theoretical tradition within distributive justice is utilitarianism, 
associated with theorists such as John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick and Jeremy Bentham. The 
basic premise of utilitarian theories is the proposition that the fundamental objective of 
morality and justice is that utility should be maximized (Wacks 2012: 213). In terms of 
practical policies, utilitarianism can be used both to justify sacrificing the weak minority for 
the benefit of the majority, but also to attack those who hold unjust privileges at the expense 
of the majority (Kymlicka 2002: 45). John Rawls’ theory of “justice as fairness”, a famous 
contribution rooted in the idea of a social contract, was developed in opposition to 
utilitarianism (Wacks 2012: 222).
6
 He claims the deficiency of utilitarian theories is that they 
would accept “the situation in which the benefit attained by some could compensate for the 
misery suffered by others” (Cullen 1992: 18). The basic conception of justice underlying 
Rawls’ theory is that all primary social goods should be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution would favor the least advantaged members of society (Kymlicka 2002: 55). This 
egalitarian theory is often presented as a philosophical justification for the modern welfare 
state, as the welfare state can be seen as a compromise between the values of liberty, i.e., 
capitalist freedoms, and equality, i.e., egalitarian welfare policies (Kymlicka 2002: 88). 
Libertarianism, a fourth approach within distributive justice theory, argues in favor of 
individualism and for “limiting the power of the state to protecting our security and 
administering justice through the courts” (Wacks 2012: 227-228). This implies that coercion 
may only be used to prevent or punish the infliction of physical harm or fraud, and to enforce 
contracts (Buchanan and Mathieu 1986: 34). Robert Nozick presented an “entitlement theory 
                                                             
6
 Rawls’ theoretical approach is also termed liberal equality (Kymlicka 2002: 53).  
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of justice”, which is a “hands-off” theory of individual possessions. He asserts a just 
distribution to be the result of people’s free exchanges (Kymlicka 2002: 103). The theory has 
conservative implications for social and fiscal policy, as libertarians argue that the state has no 
obligation to remedy unequal circumstances (Cullen 1992: 31, Kymlicka 2002: 159). Related 
are those theories which claim that justice is essentially a matter of respecting individual 
rights (Cullen 1992: 29), most famously developed by Ronald Dworkin (1981, 1985).    
The theories of distributive justice have different political and practical implications. 
All, however, with the possible exception of the libertarian view, supports some kind of safety 
net for citizens through the existence of a welfare state. Theories of distributive justice present 
different principles for the distribution of public goods and these distributive principles 
constitute the substantive framework of the welfare state. These ideas have to be implemented 
in practice. This implementation, which is conducted by the administration of welfare 
benefits, relies on other principles of justice, that is, procedural justice.    
 
3.3.2 Procedural justice  
Procedural justice addresses the fact that every organization and society has procedures that 
regulate the distribution of rewards and resources (Leventhal 1980: 34). Walker, Lind and 
Thibaut (1979: 1402) define procedural justice in the context of trials as “the belief that the 
techniques used to resolve a dispute are fair and satisfying themselves”, in opposition to 
distributive justice which is “the belief that the ultimate resolution of the dispute is fair.” They 
define justice in terms of involved parties’ perceptions of fairness. Folger and Greenberg 
(1985), on the other hand, consider justice in the context of personnel and human resources 
research. In accordance with Thibaut and Walker (1975), Folger and Greenberg (1985: 143) 
define procedural justice as “the perceived fairness of the procedure used in making 
decisions.” In sum, the study of procedural justice addresses the means by which ends are 
attained.  
Although questions and ideas about procedural justice are old (Solum 2004: 1), 
explicit theories of procedural justice were first formulated by social psychologists in the 
1970s (Folger and Greenberg 1985: 143, Lind and Tyler 1988: 7). The two main perspectives 
on procedural justice developed in this era were advanced by Thibaut and Walker (1975, 
1978) and Leventhal (1976, 1980). A convergence between these two conceptualizations of 
procedural justice is the argument that an important aspect of procedures is that they offer 
involved parties some control over the process affecting their outcomes (Folger and 
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Greenberg 1985: 148). Further, their approaches converge regarding the topic of this thesis; 
procedures for complaints handling in welfare cases. While Thibaut and Walker study dispute 
resolution, Leventhal emphasizes the relevance of procedural justice in allocative processes. 
Welfare complaints encompass both these dimensions, as they are disputes over resource 
allocations.  
Thibaut and Walker (1975, 1978) focus on the degree of control held by disputants in 
different dispute resolution procedures. Their emphasis is consequentialist, as it views 
procedural justice as a means of achieving a just outcome (Thibaut and Walker 1978: 542). 
Based on the contributions rule of distributive justice, procedural justice is seen to require a 
procedure that “facilitates the fullest possible report of inputs prior to determination of the 
distribution” (Thibaut and Walker 1978: 542). The necessary inputs to the transaction in 
question are achieved for the involved parties by process control and decision control. 
Process control is defined as “control over the development and selection of information that 
will constitute the basis for resolving the dispute” (Thibaut and Walker 1978: 546). Decision 
control is the disputants’ amount of control over determining the outcomes directly.  
In contrast to Thibaut and Walker, who studied procedures of dispute resolution, 
Leventhal was the first to point out how procedural aspects could be applied to distributive 
decision-making situations (Folger and Greenberg 1985: 144). His definition of procedural 
justice as “an individual’s perception of the fairness of procedural components of the social 
system that regulate the allocative process” (Leventhal 1980: 35) reflects this focus. The 
fairness of procedures may be evaluated according to the following procedural rules: (1) 
consistency rule, (2) bias suppression rule, (3) accuracy rule, (4) correctability rule, (5) 
representativeness rule, and (6) ethicality rule (Leventhal 1980: 39-45).  
 
3.3.3 The relation between distributive and procedural justice  
Although addressing different aspects, distributive and procedural justice is closely 
connected. In the social psychology literature, where focus is on perceptions of justice, it is 
asked how the perception of a fair process affects the perception of a fair outcome (Walker et 
al. 1979: 1403), that is, to what extent a satisfying process contributes to the belief that the 
outcome is just. Walker et al. (1979: 1415) find that perceptions of procedural justice 
sometimes affect the perception of distributive justice, but not the other way around. Thibaut 
and Walker (1975: 3) argue that procedural justice and distributive justice can be independent, 
as “it is possible for distributive justice to be achieved without application of any special 
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procedure” (Folger and Greenberg 1985: 147). In opposition to this, Leventhal (1976: 230) 
asserts that procedural justice is a necessary requirement for distributive justice. According to 
Mashaw (1985: 5), the questions of substance and process are functionally inseparable. 
Procedural justice and distributive justice are in this view reliant upon each other. These 
positions are not necessarily incompatible, however. Just procedures are important to the fair 
implementation of distributive principles, but they also have inherent value in promoting fair 
treatment of citizens.   
 
3.4 Does procedural justice matter? 
3.4.1 Importance of procedural justice  
Several scholars (e.g. Edelman 1967, Scheingold 2004, Tyler and Caine 1981, Tyler and 
Folger 1980) have found that the fairness of procedures contributes more to the perceptions of 
fairness than the outcomes of these procedures (Folger and Greenberg 1985: 149, Tyler 2007: 
26). Tyler (1988: 104) argues that it is clear from existing research that procedures are in 
themselves important for perceived justice. Studies of legal settings suggest that the impact of 
procedural justice is twofold. Firstly, it has an impact on whether people accept decisions that 
are made, and secondly, it affects the way people evaluate the judge and court in point, as 
well as the overarching court system and the law (Tyler 2007: 26). Even though no one likes 
to lose, people recognize that they cannot always win. A loss will be accepted more easily if 
the process by which the outcome is produced is seen as fair (Tyler 2007: 26). 
There are several possible reasons why procedures matter. Dolan, Edlin, Tsuchiya and 
Wailoo (2007: 159) suggest three such reasons. Firstly, a consequentialist or distributive 
position would be to argue that procedures matter because they promote the best outcomes. 
Secondly, a pure proceduralist view would argue that procedures have an inherent value in 
their own right, and that citizens should be able to enjoy procedural protections as a right 
(Mulcahy 1999: 76). Thirdly, following an instrumental view, procedures can be important 
because they promote some factors other than the outcome that individuals value. Dolan et al. 
(2007: 159) assert that: “any particular procedural characteristic may be justified using a  
combination of these three reasons.”  
 
3.4.2 Broader implications of procedural justice  
The extent to which complaints systems available to welfare claimants can be deemed just is 
expected to have important consequences at both individual and systemic level. The 
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importance of procedural justice in determination of welfare benefits and welfare adjudication 
on the individual level is discussed in section 2.3.1. While a detailed investigation of the 
broader implications on the macro level falls outside the scope of this thesis, they will be 
indicated as they serve to further underscore the importance of the research question.  
General theories of procedural justice are often founded in social psychology, being 
defined through the perceptions of individuals. These theories imply a cognitive sequence in 
the minds of citizens (Grimes 2006: 286). On the macro level, the perceived procedural 
justice can be argued to affect the trust in and legitimacy of institutions (Grimes 2006, Lens 
2007, Rothstein 1998), which further affect the individual’s contestation or deference with the 
decision: “If citizens judge decision processes to be unfair and the decision institution to be 
less legitimate, they may see fit to contest, or simply attempt to circumvent or evade 
decisions” (Grimes 2006: 286).7 Whether complaints systems are seen as fair and deemed to 
satisfy due process requirements will arguably have consequences for the public system as a 
totality because of the state’s need for legitimacy. Several studies have documented this 
correlation between perceived procedural fairness and institutional legitimacy (e.g. Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse 2001, Tyler 2007). Eckhoff (1966: 196) addresses this interconnection by 
pointing out that while criticism against the legislature rarely affects the institution itself, this 
is different with the public bureaucracy. If a decision within the public bureaucracy is claimed 
to be incorrect, it is often presented as a sign that something is wrong with the entire system; 
with the organization and management, with case procedures, and even with public workers. 
This, in turn, can create a vicious circle, because, as Brewer (2007: 551) asserts: “The long-
term viability of any public complaints handling system rests on confidence in its fair 
operation.” Legitimacy is essential for public sector organizations, and for the welfare state in 
particular, to function the way they are intended (Rothstein 1998: 222).  
The perspective focused on welfare claimants’ legal protection adopted in this thesis 
can be criticized for ignoring competing concerns, such as the efficiency of public 
administration (Sainsbury 1999: 445).
8
 It can be claimed, however, that these concerns are not 
isolated from each other, exactly because of the welfare administration’s need for legitimacy 
in order to function effectively. Wade (1963: 129) asserts that no one “stands to benefit more 
                                                             
7
 These modeled sequences do, however, contain a host of under-explored empirical questions (Grimes 2006: 
287), which it is beyond the scope of this thesis to test.  
8
 See section 3.8.2 for a discussion.  
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in the long run from just administration than the administrators themselves, because the state 
is permeated from top to bottom with the truth that government depends upon the approval of 
the governed.”  
 
3.5 Concepts related to procedural justice 
The concept of procedural justice is situated within a bewildering theoretical field where 
many concepts are left vague, overlap each other in subtle ways and are applied differently by 
different scholars. This calls for a conceptual overview and some clarifications. The rule of 
law can be seen as an overarching ideal behind the quest for procedural justice, while the 
concepts of administrative and natural justice, which are often used interchangeably with 
procedural justice in a confusing manner, are here seen as constituent parts of the concept of 
procedural justice.  
 
3.5.1 Rule of law 
The rule of law can be viewed as an overarching ideal to the conception of procedural justice 
in developed democracies. The concept is controversial and widely discussed. According to 
Eckhoff (1966: 200), the rule of law has a positive connotation in line with “democracy” and 
“freedom”. It is an ideal almost everyone supports, and yet precisely what it means is rarely 
made clear. Chesterman (2008: 332) argues that the degree of consensus surrounding the rule 
of law as an ideal stems exactly from the disagreement as to its meaning. According to 
Barendrecht (2011: 284), the rule of law is more like a field of inquiry than a coherent 
concept.  
Most modern scholars build their conception of the rule of law on the core ideas 
articulated by A.C. Dicey (Rose 2004: 457-458). These ideas are (1) the absence of arbitrary 
or wide discretionary governmental power and the presence of regular law, (2) that no 
individual is above the law, and (3) that everyone is subject to the ordinary law and general 
constitutional principles including individual rights. The core of the concept of the rule of law 
is according to Tamanaha (2007: 3) the requirement that “government officials and citizens 
are bound by and act consistent with the law.” This conception is wide and ambiguous, and 
several attempts have been made to specify the concept. George Fletcher identified a “modest 
version” as well as a “more lofty ideal that incorporates criteria of justice” in the rule of law 
concept (Rose 2004: 258). This distinction has also been captured by other scholars in the 
separation of formal and substantial understandings of the rule of law (e.g. Ehm 2010: 3, 
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Tamanaha 2007: 3). The formal view, also termed the “thin” theory (Chesterman 2008: 340), 
is procedural and emphasizes the prevention of arbitrary state action and the protection of 
individual rights (Rose 2004: 459). “Thick” theories of the rule or law also incorporate 
substantive notions of justice (Chesterman 2008: 340-341). These theories are built on top of 
the formal conception of rule of law.  
The content of the rule of law concept remains contested (Chesterman 2008: 340). 
While one could argue for the application of a substantive version of the rule of law including 
for instance rights to a minimum of welfare in developed democracies, procedural justice 
contained within the formal conception offers a more coherent and narrow focus for this 
investigation. Whether there are made guarantees for individual welfare is, however, a 
fundamental issue that will be raised. 
 
3.5.2 Administrative justice and natural justice  
A concept closely related to procedural justice, specifically addressing public administration, 
is administrative justice (Sainsbury 1999: 454). Adler (2003: 323-324) defines administrative 
justice as “the principles that can be used to evaluate the justice inherent in administrative 
decision-making.” Whether administrative justice is interpreted as including only procedures 
or also distributive justice varies in the literature, but the contributions of the administrative 
justice literature utilized in this thesis are exclusively the procedural aspects. Mashaw (1983: 
24-25) defines administrative justice in the context of a statutory disability program as “those 
qualities of a decision process that provide arguments for the acceptability of its decisions.” 
According to Adler (2003: 325-332), Mashaw has an internal approach to administrative 
justice. This implies an emphasis on how administrative justice and adjudication can be 
solved within a public organization through internal administrative practice and routine 
activities (Mulcahy 1999: 79). This contrasts with the more common external approach, 
adhered to in this thesis, which highlights the need for courts, tribunals, and Ombudsmen 
external to the locus of administrative decision making in order to achieve administrative 
justice (Adler 2003: 328).  
Another neighboring concept is natural justice. The principles of natural justice, 
which have their origin from English court procedures, are often viewed as fundamental to 
administrative and judicial procedures. The concept is sometimes used interchangeably with 
procedural justice. Christensen, Day and Worthington (1999: 201) apply the following 
definition of the principles of natural justice: “the rules and procedure to be followed by any 
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person or body charged with the duty of adjudicating upon disputes between, or the rights of 
others.” No person should be a judge in his or her own case because neutrality and 
independence is required. Another aspect of natural justice is the requirement of proper 
reasons for any decision (Harris 2007: 597).  
The principles of administrative justice and natural justice are considered parts of 
procedural justice in this context of investigation, and consequently, these principles are 
brought further in the discussion of criteria for procedural justice. The rule of law, on the 
other hand, constitutes an overarching value, but is not operationalized or discussed directly in 
the analysis.  
 
3.6 Criteria of procedural justice  
It is well established that procedural justice matters, but it is contested what it is about 
procedures that lead to a perception of justice (Tyler 1988: 104). Theories of procedural 
justice offer several different criteria for the evaluation of concrete systems. Such criteria can 
never be conclusive. Sainsbury (1999: 453) points out that: “There is scope for differences 
which, ultimately, cannot be resolved by rational argument.” This thesis, however, follows 
Sainsbury (1999: 453) and Rothstein (1998: 4-5) in drawing on different perspectives and 
suggesting a “best fit”. The thesis adheres to Leventhal (1980: 39) as well, in that he defines a 
justice rule as “a belief that allocative procedures are fair when they satisfy certain criteria”, 
but also notices that the research field does not offer any conclusive criteria. It is better, 
however, to suggest and discuss such rules than to have none at all (Leventhal 1980: 39).  
Leventhal (1980: 39) suggests the following six procedural criteria: consistency, bias-
suppression, accuracy, correctability, representativeness and ethicality. The consistency rule 
refers to the requirement that allocative procedures should be consistent across persons and 
over time. The bias-suppression rule states that: “blind allegiance to narrow preconceptions 
should be prevented at all points of the allocative process.” The accuracy criterion asserts that 
decisions should be based on relevant and sufficient information. The correctability rule 
refers to the need for complaints mechanisms, while the representation rule dictates that all 
relevant subgroups, such as welfare claimants in a decision about an individual welfare 
benefit, should be involved in the decision process. The ethicality rule requires procedures 
compatible with fundamental moral values.  
Based on a review of the theoretical literature on procedural justice within legal and 
organizational settings, Dolan et al. (2007: 160-161) present a list of what they claim are the 
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six most important procedural characteristics. These are voice, neutrality, consistency, 
accuracy, reversibility and transparency. Voice refers to the degree to which the affected 
parties are given an opportunity to contribute to the decision making process. This relates to 
Thibaut and Walker’s emphasis on process control. The neutrality criterion requires that those 
making the decisions do not have any self-interest in the outcome. For consistency to be 
satisfied, the same criteria for decision-making must be applied both across time and across 
comparable contexts. The need for proper information to be retrieved and applied in the 
decision making process is captured within the accuracy criterion. The reversibility 
requirement demands that there must be a right to complain on a first-instance decision. 
Finally, the transparency criterion implies that involved parties must have access to relevant 
information. This is important as it gives the involved parties an opportunity to scrutinize the 
case information and judge how the information is applied in the decision-making process 
(Dolan et al. 2007: 162).  
These criteria suggested by both Leventhal and Dolan et al. are formulated considering 
processes of decision-making in general. The focus of this thesis is more limited, and in their 
conceptions this aspect is only captured within the reversibility and correctability criteria. 
However, as pointed out by Leventhal himself, all the criteria are also important to the 
complaints procedure per se; “the appeals procedure must itself meet the standards set by the 
other rules” (Lind and Tyler 1988: 132).  
Franks report (Franks Committee 1957) is considered a great contribution to the 
British literature on and practice of complaints handling and administrative justice. The 
mandate of the Franks Committee was to evaluate the functions of British tribunals and to 
provide suggestions for reform. They promoted three “watchwords” for complaints systems: 
openness, fairness and impartiality (Wade 1963: 70-71). Openness includes publicity of 
procedures and the reasoning behind the decision (Adler, Burns and Johnson 1975: 113). The 
fairness concept requires a clear procedure, that all parties have knowledge of their rights, and 
that they have an opportunity to present their case (Adler et al. 1975: 114). Impartiality 
requires the freedom of tribunals from the real or apparent influence of the administration 
(Lister 1975: 171).  
According to Tyler (2007: 30-31), the most important aspects of procedural justice are 
voice, neutrality, respect, and trust. The voice aspect refers to the fact that people want to tell 
their side of the story before decisions are made. This criterion largely overlaps with the voice 
criteria suggested by Dolan et al. (2007) and the necessity of process involvement emphasized 
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by Thibaut and Walker (1978). The neutrality principle promoted by Tyler encompasses both 
the neutrality and consistency principles presented by Dolan et al., as well as a partial 
inclusion of their transparency principle. Tyler, however, emphasizes transparency of how 
rules are applied and decisions are made, as opposed to Dolan et al.’s focus on the disclosure 
of case documents. These are largely two sides of the same coin, however. The unifying idea 
is that the involved parties should have information about procedures and the facts of the case 
so that he or she is capable of making a judgment of the fairness in the decision-making 
process. The respect criterion suggested by Tyler points to the way decision-makers treat the 
involved parties. This is arguably more an interactional than pure procedural factor. Lastly, 
the trust principle refers to an assessment of the character of the decision-maker. This is not a 
pure procedural aspect either; although respect and trust are likely to affect judgments of 
procedural justice, these are not procedural elements in themselves. These criteria will thus 
not be discussed further in this thesis.   
Nel et al. (2000: 15) find in a qualitative analysis that the most pervasive element of 
procedural justice is speed and timeliness. Sainsbury (1999: 455) also emphasizes speed of 
decision making. In addition, he points to the importance of the quality of decision-making, as 
well as independence, impartiality, participation and value for money.  
A final contribution within the procedural justice literature is provided by Solum 
(2004: 111-113). He argues in favor of two clusters of criteria for procedural justice. These 
are the participation principle and the accuracy principle. The participation principle should 
extend to all persons who will be subject to the final decision (Solum 2004: 111). 
Participation ought to include, firstly, notice and information and, secondly, an opportunity to 
be heard. If necessary, the complainant should be provided with an adequate legal 
representative, including the “right to reasonable attorney’s fees in suits for relief from 
violation of such liberties” (Solum 2004: 112). The accuracy principle implies that the 
procedural arrangements for adjudication should be structured in such a way that they 
maximize the likelihood of achieving the legally correct outcome in each proceeding (Solum 
2004: 112).  
 
3.7 Discussion of criteria  
It is necessary to sum up from these contributions, and discuss which criteria capture similar 
factors, as well as which criteria actually fall within the scope of procedural justice and which 
criteria do not.  
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3.7.1 Consistency 
The consistency criterion is mentioned by Leventhal (1980) and Dolan et al. (2007). This 
criterion points to the problematic aspects of welfare administration stressed by Reich (1965: 
1252, italics added): “Absent challenge, welfare administrators are permitted broad areas of 
discretion in which they make the law by administrative interpretations under the pressures of 
public opinion – interpretations that may be neither consistent from one jurisdiction to 
another nor in accord with the original purposes of the legislature.” Consistency is an 
important aspect of justice, as like cases should be handled alike. This is valid both regarding 
time and geography. Consistency is based upon a comparison of the procedures utilized to 
other procedures used either at different times historically, or across space (Tyler 1988: 107). 
Practically, the consistency criterion is satisfied when “all parties believe they have the same 
rights under the procedure and are treated similarly” (Lind and Tyler 1988: 131). This 
criterion can be justified as having an inherent value, that is, the criterion has a pure 
procedural justification.  
 
3.7.2 Bias-suppression, neutrality, impartiality and independence 
Leventhal emphasizes bias-suppression. This criterion can be seen as part of a cluster, which 
also includes criteria for neutrality, impartiality and independence. Impartiality is discussed 
by Sainsbury and Franks Committee. Dolan et al. and Tyler emphasize neutrality, while 
Sainsbury also mentions independence.  
The independence criterion is a matter of principle, derived from natural justice theory 
(Sainsbury 1999: 458), namely that “neither individuals nor authorities should be judge in 
their own cause” (Braye and Preston-Shoot 1999: 244). Independence can be understood as 
distance from the original decision-maker (Sainsbury 1999: 459). Several dimensions of 
distance can be identified: (1) accountability for decisions; (2) financial responsibilities; (3) 
responsibilities for appointments; and (4) managerial responsibility. Independence is 
important to avoid a situation where complaints procedures are local and informal, because 
this “may result in the complainant having to speak to staff who are either the subject of the 
complaint or are involved with those staff who are” (Braye and Preston-Shoot 1999: 242). If 
the complaints systems is organized such that the decision is reviewed by a more senior 
employee, higher in the hierarchy but within the same organization, the process may be 
hamstrung by the same organizational culture or loyalty to the other employees in the same 
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organization (Swain 2009: 89). In a study of the behavior of welfare complainants, Lens 
(2007: 401) found that those who chose not to appeal considered the hearing system as 
indistinguishable from the rest of the agency, “which they viewed as inflexible and 
intractable.”  
Impartiality implies the absence of bias and prejudice in decision-making (Sainsbury 
1999: 458). As such, it overlaps completely with the bias-suppression criterion of Leventhal. 
This is not an aspect that can be investigated merely by looking at procedures, as impartiality 
is a functional rather than institutional characteristic; it “refers to the adjudicator’s approach 
to his task” (Harlow and Rawlings 2009: 489, see also Sainsbury 1999: 458), and is therefore 
beyond the reach of this thesis to evaluate. The independence criterion is, however, an 
important premise for impartiality and absence of bias to be satisfied. The independence of 
the complaints organ will function as the concept for measurement of this cluster. This 
criterion can be justified procedurally, as this is a value derived from natural justice. It can 
also be justified in a consequentialist argument, because a lack of independence may lead to 
biased decisions.  
 
3.7.3 Voice, representation and participation 
Another cluster is constituted by the criteria voice mentioned by Tyler and Dolan et al., 
representation, emphasized by Leventhal, and, finally, participation, which is mentioned by 
Sainsbury and Solum. Thibaut and Walker’s process control, which brings focus to the 
complainant’s role in providing the information necessary to make a decision, also 
corresponds to these criteria. Bell (1992: 127) emphasizes the importance of participation as 
an aspect of procedural justice: “The right to participate in the process of decision about one’s 
entitlements under justice may be seen as a way of ensuring that all relevant considerations 
are brought into the conclusion.” In addition to increasing the accuracy of case information, 
participation in the complaints process may foster satisfied complainants, as they get the 
opportunity to tell their story in a meaningful way (Solum 2004: 83). Further, Solum (2004: 
84-85) argues that participation in the adjudicatory process is fundamental for the normative 
legitimacy of this process and the decisions resulting from it, i.e., those who are bound by the 
final decision must be afforded a right of participation in the adjudicatory process. Legitimacy 
does not require actual participation, however, but rather the opportunity for participation. 
Participation can take several forms, most prominent (1) orally in person; (2) through a 
representative; or (3) in writing (Sainsbury 1999: 459). A common requirement within 
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theories of procedural and natural justice is for an oral hearing (e.g. Mashaw 1985: 52, 
Mulcahy 1999: 76, Solum 2004: 73).  
There are several important aspects to the participation criterion. Firstly, there are 
symbolic aspects of respect and dignity, which provide a proceduralist justification. 
Secondly, there are instrumental advantages, as the appellant gets the opportunity to provide 
additional and clarifying information to the case (Sainsbury 1999: 459). As such, it is related 
to the criteria of quality and accuracy, as these require that sufficient and correct information 
is provided in the decision-making process; hence there is also a consequentialist justification 
for this criterion. This group of criteria will be referred to as voice in the further discussion.  
 
3.7.4 Accuracy and quality 
The two criteria accuracy, suggested by Leventhal, Solum and Dolan et al., and quality, 
mentioned by Sainsbury, also represent a common feature. The quality of decision-making is 
obviously important, but also almost impossible to measure without specification of the 
criteria that constitute high quality. Sainsbury (1999: 455-456) underlines this: “Assessing the 
quality of decision making at any level of adjudication is fraught with difficulties.” However, 
as a discussion of the decision process is meaningless if the quality of the decision is not taken 
into account, proxies for measuring this criterion are suggested. While the quality of the 
decision itself is a part of distributive justice, what is attempted measured here are aspects of 
procedures likely to lead to high-quality decisions. Leventhal (1980: 41) points to the need for 
good and sufficient information in order to attain accuracy and quality of decisions. This 
dimension is referred to as quality in the further discussion. The justification of this criterion 
is consequentialist, because certain aspects of procedures are expected to produce a high-
quality outcome.  
 
3.7.5 Openness and transparency 
Openness, as conceived by the Franks Committee, and transparency, suggested by Dolan et 
al., both refer to the publicity of procedures, access to relevant information during the case 
processing, as well as the requirement for a statement of the reasoning behind the final 
decision. According to Swain (2009: 87), an important constituent of procedural justice is “the 
right to be provided with reasons for the decision by the decision-maker so that the reasoning 
involved is both ‘open and unashamed’.” Transparency is also indicated by Solum, in that he 
includes the right to notice and information as a part of the participation principle. Brewer 
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(2007: 551) argues that the skewed status between public bureaucrats and welfare claimants 
regarding the access to important information and understanding of policies and procedures 
implies that any positive discrimination of welfare claimants contribute to a higher degree of 
justice. Openness and transparency will be adjoined in the term transparency. The 
transparency criterion has a proceduralist justification as it contributes to the participation and 
equality of the citizens, as well as a consequentialist justification in that transparency 
increases the opportunities to monitor and check the process.  
 
3.7.6 Timeliness 
Regarding the speed or timeliness aspect suggested by both Nel et al. and Sainsbury, there is 
evident a possible trade-off between quick responses and the quality of the decision. It is hard 
to argue that a quick decision is of value if the decision-making process is of low quality. 
However, as Sainsbury (1999: 457) points out: “What is not in dispute is the widespread 
dissatisfaction in recent years with the length of time taken to clear social security appeals.” 
This criterion can be justified instrumentally, as the timeliness of procedures promotes some 
factors other than the outcome that citizens value.  
 
3.7.7 Criteria left out from further discussion 
From the discussion above, several criteria are arguably less systemic elements, but rather 
interactional or personal characteristics. These are respect and trust, as emphasized by Tyler. 
Although important factors in citizens’ overall justice assessments, they are not purely 
procedural criteria, and are thus beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate.  
Five mentioned criteria remain. Leventhal proposed correctability, corresponding to 
Dolan et al.’s reversibility criterion. These criteria point to the need for mechanisms for 
complaint and appeal. They constitute the basis for the entire discussion, and consequently 
will not be discussed as criteria for complaints procedures per se. The fairness criterion of the 
Franks Committee is wide in its coverage, and badly suited for empirical operationalization. 
The criterion contains such aspects as users’ knowledge of their own rights and their 
opportunity to present their case. These factors are already captured within the transparency 
and voice criteria. Much the same can be said of the ethicality criterion, suggested by 
Leventhal. This refers to general moral values, which ranges widely and needs 
operationalization through more specific concepts. Finally, Sainsbury mentions value for 
money. This refers to the requirement for efficiency, which is sometimes seen more as a trade-
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off value for justice rather than a component of justice itself. This is discussed in section 
3.8.2.  
 
3.7.8 Adding another criterion: Financial risk 
Another matter which needs to be raised is the financial risk of the complainant. This criterion 
is suggested by Solum as a part of the participation criterion, namely that the complainant 
ought to be provided with an adequate legal representative if necessary, and additionally that 
such fees should be bearable to the complainant. An important component of the financial 
question is thus whether free legal aid or other expert help is offered. In order to benefit from 
all the other procedural safeguards discussed, the access to external complaints organs must 
not be hindered by a claimant’s lack of economic and other resources. From the perspective of 
welfare claimants, we have to consider that complaints procedures can only be seen as 
effective if they are also available to the “ill-educated, the inarticulate and the long-suffering 
who are normally afraid to complain or feel disentitled” (Seneviratne and Cracknell 1988: 
191). This points to a classic problem stressed by Reich (1965: 1246), who claims that welfare 
clients are often ignorant of their rights, lack adequate representation and lack the resources to 
fight a large bureaucracy, and by Knut Dahl Jacobsen (1973: 179), who argues that welfare 
clients are left with the responsibility to check the decisions of public officials, even though 
these decisions are often very complicated. The result is that the well-informed and eloquent 
are rewarded, while the ignorant and quiet are punished. This implies that special 
consideration must be taken when discussing the legal protection of welfare claimants. The 
systems of complaint and redress must be available to everyone, and the ones who need it the 
most might be the ones least capable of utilizing them. Some kind of legal aid or expert help 
is often regarded as of key significance in achieving justice (Harlow and Rawlings 2009: 490, 
Young, Wikeley and Davis 1999: 293). What is needed is not only representation at actual 
hearings, but also assistance with drafting the complaint itself (Lister 1975: 179). The 
financial aspect is important as the lack of free legal aid and high financial risks may 
undermine all the other procedural safeguards.  
 
3.8 How are the criteria related to each other? 
The criteria are derived from normative arguments about what constitutes an ideal of 
procedural justice. Hence, there is necessarily room for disagreement. There is firstly a 
question of whether the criteria should be weighted in order to form an index of measurement 
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for procedural justice. This methodological question is raised in the following section. Next, 
there are competing values at stake between general values of justice and other values, but 
also trade-offs between the concrete criteria.  
 
3.8.1 Weighting of the criteria 
Because there are several criteria of procedural justice, it is important to consider whether the 
different principles should be weighted relative to each other (Tyler 1988: 105). Although 
Leventhal (1980: 46) assumed that principles of procedural justice were weighted differently, 
he did not offer specific predictions about the weighting of these procedural rules (Folger and 
Greenberg 1985: 147). He asserted that there is no research to substantiate the rule weight, 
and consequently “only the most general statements can be made about the relative 
importance of different rules in different situations” (Leventhal 1980: 46). Dolan et al. (2007: 
161) suggest that the relative importance of different elements of procedural justice is likely 
to be highly context-specific. Hence it is difficult to weight the different criteria on a general 
basis. However, some new research on the topic has been produced since. The consistency 
criterion has proved especially important, and consistency across people is seen as more 
important than consistency across time (Tyler 1988: 105). Quality and voice are also seen as 
particularly important (Tyler 1988: 106). No attempt will be made in this thesis at specific 
weighting or aggregation of scores, in contrast to the approach adopted by Nel et al. (2000: 
12). Rather, the criteria chosen are all regarded important and will be discussed on their own 
premises.  
 
3.8.2 Trade-offs  
In evaluating concrete systems in light of values drawn from justice theory, it is important to 
be aware of the inherent trade-offs between justice and other fundamental values. This thesis 
follows Sainsbury (1999) in that the evaluation of complaints systems is seen from a 
perspective that seeks to protect the interests of welfare claimants. According to Sainsbury 
(1999: 445), this “is an approach that can be contested since it essentially places a higher 
value on the individual rights of claimants than, for example, on the legitimate concerns of a 
public administrative organisation to operate at the lowest possible cost.” However, given the 
weak position of welfare claimants in society at large, a focus on protection of welfare 
claimants can be justified. Even so, what claimants want is only part of the question; the 
welfare state is not only consumer-based. The public services must also answer to a wider 
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public, such as voters and taxpayers (Sainsbury 1999: 455). As such, there are possible trade-
offs between justice for the individual claimant and system efficiency.  
Wade (1963: 64) states that: “There is always this profound and insoluble dilemma 
between judicial procedure and administrative efficiency.” This is so because an over-concern 
with justice may lead to a reduction in the efficient production of resources and welfare (Bell 
and Schokkaert 1992: 251). Lyster (1999: 391) argues that it must be remembered that 
efficiency tends to require “the speedy production of outcomes, rather than their correctness, 
with the consequent danger of elevation of the means (efficiency) over ends (legislative 
goals).” This implies that efficiency arguably can be considered less important than justice 
and high-quality decisions. Further, Rothstein (2011: 30) asserts that there is a case for 
arguing that impartial administration may enhance efficiency. The same is argued by 
Seneviratne and Cracknell (1988: 192), who claim that formal complaints procedures 
contribute to efficient administration because “it channels grievances, encourages openness 
and contributes to rational decision-making.” There are also several arguments in favor of 
prioritization of justice based on the connection between micro assessments of justice and 
macro effects on state legitimacy, as discussed in section 3.4.2.  
Even with a main focus on the individual citizen, however, a possible trade-off exists 
between justice and freedom. As a theory of justice is meant to be a foundation for certain 
basic institutions which force individuals to behave in a certain way, it can be regarded as 
contrary to individual freedom (Bell and Schokkaert 1992: 251). Finally, there is in reality a 
trade-off between what welfare claimants may need, and what is practically attainable 
(Redlich 1971-1972: 94, Swain 2009: 86). 
It is also important to consider more specifically how the different criteria are related, 
and whether there are inherent trade-offs between them and between any of the criteria and 
other important values (Tyler 1988: 106). The following sections present the most severe 
tensions between the procedural justice criteria.  
 
Timeliness versus quality and voice 
Timeliness may be in conflict with the quality of a decision, as a speedy consideration of a 
case necessarily reduces the achievable degree of accuracy and precision. Wade (1963: 88) 
argues that: “You cannot reduce the price of an article and speed up production without 
lowering the quality.” An example of a measure taken to reduce the time spent on a decision 
is to dispose of oral hearings and instead rely only on written information. This is likely to 
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have negative consequences for both the voice criterion and the quality criterion (Swain 2009: 
86). Nevertheless, timeliness is a criterion of procedural justice that has to be taken into 
account, as there cannot be excessive periods of waiting for claimants in need.  
 
Consistency versus quality 
A trade-off between the criteria of consistency and quality can also appear, because the 
quality of a single decision may be higher if allowed judgment by individual criteria (Tyler 
1988: 107). However, the consistency principle arguably has such importance for the 
administration of justice as a system in the long run that it has to take precedence over justice 
in an individual case (Scherer 1992: 13).  
 
Independence versus values of local democracy 
There is a trade-off between the independence criterion and the value of local democracy 
(Braye and Preston-Shoot 1999: 237) when a welfare benefit is administered at the local level, 
while independence requires a state-level or judicial complaints organ. The degree to which a 
complaints body has the opportunity to check the decision of the administrative body is an 
important criterion for complaints handling to have real consequences, but at the same time 
collides with the value of local democracy. While it can be argued that state-level complaints 
organs for municipally administered welfare benefits threaten the values of local democracy, 
an objection to this critique can be found in the consistency criterion. The municipalities are 
still a part of one nation-state with national welfare goals (Eskeland 1992: 79), and thus it is 
unfair if citizens of different municipalities are offered different assessments of their 
applications for welfare benefits.  
Serious trade-offs are thus apparent between the criteria themselves and between the 
criteria and other values. Absolute justice is arguably unattainable, and there are necessarily 
tensions between different criteria when considering what procedures are closest to the ideal 
of procedural justice (Swain 2009: 86). Nevertheless, this is an inherent aspect of normative 
theories, and an attempt to overcome this barrier is made here by utilizing prior research in 
argumenting for a set of criteria. According to Sen (2009: preface), “the necessity of 
reasoning and scrutiny is not compromised in any way by the possibility that some competing 
priorities may survive despite the confrontation of reason.” 
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4. Methods: In-depth study of Norway and Germany 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explain and discuss the research design. The choice of a 
qualitative case study is justified. Further, the selection of cases, namely complaints systems 
within the Norwegian and German welfare state, is explained. The research design implies 
empirical application of normative theory. This, as well as the comparative aspect of the 
research design, offer several advantages but also challenges. Next, the data applied in the 
thesis, which consists mainly of public documents, existing research, as well as expert 
interviews, is discussed. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the validity and 
reliability of the findings.  
 
4.2 Qualitative case study  
This thesis follows the assumption of King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 6) that “it is possible 
to have some knowledge about the external world but that such knowledge is always 
uncertain.” Hence, the thesis can be placed within the naturalist camp, as opposed to the 
constructivist camp.
9
  
The research design is a qualitative case study. This implies that focus is on (1) 
analytical description rather than statistical generalization, (2) a flexible rather than structured 
approach, and (3) details and relevance rather than simplification and precision (Grønmo 
2004: 129-132). There are several trade-offs in the choice between a qualitative and a 
quantitative approach (Gerring 2007: 37-63). In this thesis a qualitative approach is preferable 
because existing knowledge of the phenomenon under investigation, welfare complaints 
systems, is scarce. Qualitative studies enjoy a natural advantage in research of an exploratory 
nature where existing data is incomplete (Gerring 2007: 39, 57-58). Furthermore, qualitative 
research tends to offer opportunities for more intensive investigation (Gerring 2007: 48-49). 
In this context it seems more useful to investigate few cases in depth in order to acquire some 
detailed knowledge, rather than to compare many cases superficially. The comparison of 
welfare complaints systems in a procedural justice perspective also requires attention to 
context and equivalence, which is more difficult to achieve in quantitative approaches.   
                                                             
9
 See Moses and Knutsen (2007: 2-10), Ryen (2002) and Silverman (2006: 57) for discussions of the major 
research paradigms and their implications. Ryen (2002: 96) also explains how qualitative approaches can follow 
the naturalist paradigm, in opposition to the traditional distinction between naturalism and constructivism as 
parallel to the distinction between quantitative and qualitative research.  
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A case study (see Yin 2009: 18 for a definition) is appropriate whenever “how” and 
“why” questions are posed, when there is little investigator control over events, thus 
excluding an experimental approach, and the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within 
a real-life context (Yin 2009: 2). This thesis asks whether different complaints systems secure 
procedural justice for welfare claimants, and hence addresses present conditions within a real-
life context that cannot be controlled by the researcher. Although there are different opinions 
as to what constitutes a case study regarding the number of cases, this thesis follows Yin 
(2009: 53) and George and Bennett (2005: 18) and considers the study of a few cases, in this 
context two cases, to fall within the methodological framework of a case study.  
The analysis will consist of both within-case analysis of two single cases and 
comparison of the cases. George and Bennett (2005: 18) state that: “there is a growing 
consensus that the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a 
combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study.” Yin 
(2009: 53) also recommends multiple-case studies over single-case studies, even when this 
only implies adding a second case to the original case. This is so because the evidence from 
multiple cases “is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore 
regarded as being more robust” (Yin 2009: 53).  
 
4.3 Case selection and external validity 
The cases selected for study are complaints systems within the Norwegian and German 
welfare states. Within NAV, two units of analysis are chosen, namely the complaints systems 
of the two welfare benefits social assistance (administered at municipal level) and disability 
pension (administered at state level). This implies that there are two embedded units of 
analysis within the Norwegian case (Yin 2009: 59). In the German case, only the complaints 
systems of the Hartz IV benefit, i.e., the fusion of long-term unemployment benefit and social 
assistance, is studied. The different choice for the two countries is meant to cover the varieties 
within the Norwegian case, while such differences are not present in the German welfare 
administration; all social security and social assistance cases are subject to the same 
complaints system in Germany. The cases are situated in developed welfare states, 
representing two different welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990). Both welfare states have 
recently implemented large reforms. Consequently, both countries have modernized their 
organization and systems of basic social security and social assistance. The complaints 
systems are very different in Norway and Germany, and the case selection thus follows the 
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strategy promoted by Creswell (2007: 75) to pick cases that display different perspectives of 
the problem under investigation, in other words, to maximize variation.  
A central aim of this thesis is to illuminate the two cases in a theoretically led manner, 
rather than to identify a causal chain. The goal is thus descriptive inference, which is a 
premise for causal inferences. Description often comes before explanations as we must know 
something about the world and what needs to be explained before we can develop causal 
explanations (King et al. 1994: 34). 
According to Gerring (2007: 85), every case study must state what constitutes the 
broader population of the cases studied. This concerns the external validity of the study, i.e., 
whether the findings of a study are generalizable beyond the cases studied (Yin 2009: 43). 
Generalization is a standard goal of quantitative research and is normally achieved by random 
sampling (Silverman 2006: 303). Random sampling procedures are, however, normally not 
appropriate within qualitative research. The cases selected here are instead based on purposive 
sampling, which means that the cases are not representative of a larger universe of cases. This 
implies that while quantitative studies rely on statistical generalization, the mode of 
generalization relevant to qualitative studies is analytic generalization (Yin 2009: 43). 
Analytical generalization entails that “the investigator is striving to generalize a particular set 
of results to some broader theory” (Yin 2009: 43). The potential for generalization is 
theoretical rather than statistical; the thesis will include a discussion of what is the 
“normatively” best system, and thus a framework for comparison and study of other cases as 
well as a foundation to consider reforms to strengthen the legal protection of welfare 
claimants.  
Theoretically, the framework and discussions of this thesis address a population that 
includes all modern welfare states. Empirically, however, no generalization beyond the 
Norwegian and German cases can be made from this thesis. Nevertheless, an overview of 
comparable cases contributes to situate the cases under investigation in relation to a larger  
population. Table 1 includes data on the complaints systems of nine other Western 
democracies
10
 – Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Australia, France and Austria.  
 
                                                             
10
 These serve as examples, but do not exhaust the population. Cases from Esping-Andersen’s three different 
welfare regimes are represented, and there are also countries from both common law and civil law traditions.  
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Table 1: Complaints systems in nine Western democracies 
                                                             
11 There will be made changes to the system of United Kingdom during 2013.  
Country Structure of social security and social assistance complaints system Oral hearings or written procedure Sources 
Sweden 1. Optional internal review 
2. The Administrative Court  
3. The Administrative Court of Appeal 
4. The Supreme Administrative Court 
Mainly documentary treatment, but 
hearings are held upon request by the 
claimant or the court.  
Försäkringskassan 2013, Socialstyrelsen 
2013, Sveriges Domstolar 2013 
Finland 1. Obligatory internal review 
2. The Social Security Appeal Board or the Unemployment Appeal Board 
3. The Insurance Court (social security matters only)  
4. The Supreme Administrative Court 
The procedures are mainly written, but 
oral hearings must be held whenever 
necessary or any part to the case 
request a hearing.  
Kela 2013, Ministry of Justice, Finland 2013, 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 
Finland 2013 
Denmark 1. Obligatory internal review 
2. The Social Complaints Board or the Employment Complaints Board 
3. The National Social Appeals Board 
Case proceedings are written in their 
entirety.  
Ankestyrelsen 2013, Statsforvaltningerne 
2013 
United States Social security  
1. Obligatory internal review 
2. Administrative law judge hearing 
3. Appeals Council Review 
4. The Federal Court 
Social assistance 
1. Local Boards 
2. The State District Court 
Oral hearings are a substantial part of 
both complaints systems. 
Minnesota Department of Human Resources 
2013, Social Security – The Official Website 
of the U.S. Social Security Administration 
2013 
United Kingdom
11
 1. Obligatory internal review 
2. The Social Security and Child Support Tribunal 
3. The Upper Administrative Appeals Chambers 
Oral hearings are obligatory with few 
exceptions, and are always held when 
requested by claimant.  
Justice UK 2013, The Official Home of UK 
Legislation 2013 
Ireland 1. Optional internal review 
2. The Social Security Appeals Office 
3. The High Court 
Oral hearings are not obligatory, but 
can be requested (and most likely 
granted) already in the first stage.  
Flac 2012 
Australia 1. Two-tiered obligatory internal review: original decision-maker and  
    authorized  review officer 
2. The Social Security Appeals Tribunal 
3. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
4. The Federal Court 
Oral hearings are held from stage two.  Administrative Appeals Tribunal 2013, 
Social Security Appeals Tribunal 2013 
France 1. The Appeals Board of the Courts 
2. The Social Security Court 
3. The Social Chamber of the Court of Appeal 
4. The Council of State 
Oral hearings in the courts.  Le Nouvel Observateur 2013, Service-
Public.fr 2013 
Austria Social security 
1. Provincial Court for Labour and       
-   Social Affairs 
2. Higher Regional Court 
4. The Supreme Court 
Social assistance 
1. Local District Administrative                 
-   Authority 
2. Independent Administrative Panel 
Oral hearings in the courts.  Austrian Social Security 2013, Federal 
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and 
Consumer Protection 2013, Unidoit – 
International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law 2013 
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With this background, Norway and Germany stand out as “extreme cases” (Gerring 
2007: 89) in some aspects. Firstly, the Norwegian and German cases capture the tribunal-
court distinction. While the Norwegian system is based on administrative tribunals, the 
German system consists of specialized courts. Of the nine other countries, two systems consist 
of courts, two have pure tribunal systems, while five systems combine tribunals and courts.
12
 
Secondly, only Denmark is similar to Norway with a complete absence of oral hearings. Five 
countries have obligatory oral hearings and the remaining three cases have mainly written 
procedures with oral hearings held only upon request. In this sense, the Norwegian case can 
be placed on the one extreme together with Denmark, and Germany can be found on the other 
end of the scale with obligatory oral hearings in all court instances. Thirdly, Norway is an 
outlier with regards to different complaints systems for social assistance and social security. 
Only the United States and Austria display a similar division. The Norwegian and German 
cases hence exhaust much of the variation present in other cases and serve to illuminate 
important analytical dimensions.  
 
4.4 Empirical application of normative theory 
Empirical and normative research is often presented as difficult to reconcile. This thesis, 
however, follows the advice of Rothstein (1998), as well as Kildal and Kuhnle (2005b: 3), and 
suggests that a combination of normative and empirical analysis may be an especially useful 
research strategy. Empirical research can say something relevant that have real-world 
implications and illuminate practical limits of normative arguments. Normative research, on 
the other hand, implies acknowledgement of inherent values, and give structure and purpose 
to the empirical investigation. Rothstein (1998: 2) justifies his combined approach through 
Ricci’s (1984) criticism of contemporary political science, namely that while classical 
political science was dominated by normative concepts like justice and rights, contemporary 
political science, termed “descriptive empiricism”, has “sacrificed its political relevance and 
urgency on the altar of empirical precision and statistical generalization” (Rothstein 1998: 2). 
A frequent critique of a normative approach, on the other hand, is that “it cannot be 
scientifically demonstrated that certain normative standpoints are more correct (in the sense 
closer to the truth) than others” (Rothstein 1998: 4). The goal, however, is to find solid 
argument that “certain conclusions follow logically from certain basic principles - principles 
                                                             
12
 Tribunals can, however, be more or less court-like and more or less independent of the administration. Such 
differences are not apparent in this superficial overview of the complaints systems.  
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over which, we can reasonably hope, far-reaching agreement can be reached” (Rothstein 
1998: 4). This relates to the operationalization of normative criteria for empirical evaluation. 
According to Westerståhl (1993: 281-282), operationalization is about trying to bridge the gap 
between “should be” and “is”. He states that the building material of this bridge must be 
found in an authoritative debate, and that most people must accept the operationalization. 
Without this acceptance, the operationalization is useless as a measure of a certain value.  
 
4.5 Comparison across countries 
The comparative aspect of this thesis has several advantages. The least cross-national 
comparison can do is to reveal and point to “possible exaggerations within the parochial 
scientific discourse”, which implies putting national results into perspective (Brans 2007: 
296). Certain practical recommendations and new ideas about what constitute good structure 
and best practices can also be achieved through cross-country investigation. King et al. (1994: 
5) argue that comparison, which entails judgments of which phenomena are more or less alike 
in degree or in kind, is a fundamental part of all social science. The empirical discussion in 
this thesis is based upon the derived criteria of procedural justice. As these criteria are not 
measured in absolute terms, a comparative discussion will be even more meaningful than 
merely within-case analysis, as this provides an opportunity to discuss what is more or less 
just between the systems with regards to the criteria.  
A problem in comparative research is the question of issue or process equivalence. 
The question is whether “matched comparisons” that track the same phenomenon or process 
in different contexts are in fact “comparing apples with apples” (Locke and Thelen 1998: 9). 
Thus, in the empirical investigation one must be aware of the possibility that differences in 
the Norwegian and German welfare states might create different kinds of problems when it 
comes to the conceptions of procedural justice. Taking context into consideration can be 
critical to establish analytically equivalent phenomenon making comparison possible (Locke 
and Thelen 1998).  
A fundamental question in this discussion is whether justice principles are universal. 
Rothstein (2011: 19), in his analysis of QoG, argues that we need universal conceptualizations 
in order to avoid relativism that renders comparative approaches and common theories futile. 
According to a natural law approach, it is possible to establish and justify principles of justice 
that are independent of particular societies (Bell 1992: 118). Such an ideal could then form 
the basis for evaluation of the achievements of particular communities, “whose achievements 
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will never be more than approximations of the ideal” (Bell 1992: 118). While Greenberg 
(2001: 370) suggests that concerns about distributive justice may be universal, but that its 
operationalization is particularistic, he also asserts that beliefs about procedural justice are 
more universal in nature. In a comparison of administrative law within the United Kingdom 
and the United States, Wade (1963: 4) argues that the ideal of administrative justice is a 
connecting thread that holds the comparison together. The goal in this thesis is that the criteria 
for procedural justice applied can also be seen as such connecting threads.  
 
4.6 Data 
Data is drawn from different sources, most importantly from public documents, academic 
texts and expert interviews. Public documents include public information about the 
complaints systems, legal propositions, laws and reports. Data is also obtained from academic 
sources with information about the German and Norwegian welfare states and complaints 
procedures (e.g. Foster and Sule 2010, Kjønstad and Syse 2008, Refsdal 2009, Øie 2010). In 
addition, interviews with employees in the complaints systems in Norway and Germany 
provide primary data. Such interviews give opportunities for gaining further knowledge about 
facts of the complaint systems, and also to ask people with extensive knowledge on the topic 
about their opinion on the matter in question (Yin 2009: 107). Although interview accounts, 
like all other data sources, must be interpreted with caution, it can constitute an important part 
of data triangulation. Data triangulation implies that several different data sources are applied 
to shed light on the same facts or phenomena (Yin 2009: 115-116). The use of several sources 
of information will contribute to a more complete and accurate analysis. 
 
4.6.1 Public documents and existing research 
According to Yin (2009: 101), “documentary information is likely to be relevant to every case 
study topic.” This includes administrative documents and prior studies of the same cases 
and/or phenomena in question. Advantages with documents as sources of data are that they 
are stable, unaffected by the study, and have a broad coverage of topics (Yin 2009: 102). 
Ethical considerations are less important in work with existing documents than for many other 
data sources exactly because the sources are not affected by the research (Silverman 2006: 
306). Possible problems are bias in the documents because they are written for a certain 
purpose, as well as bias in the selection of documents (Yin 2009: 102). Regarding selection 
bias, broad coverage of existing research as well as relevant public documents from both 
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countries has been attempted obtained. There may, however, still be voids in the background 
material due to problems of irretrievability. A weakness of this thesis is a lack of complete 
overview of relevant documents written in German. Even though some documents in the 
German language have been included by the assistance of translation tools, a lack of 
proficiency in the German language has made the search for relevant sources a difficult task.  
 
4.6.2 Expert interviews  
There are several justifications for conducting interviews with employees in the relevant 
institutions. Firstly, there is a lack of available data regarding details of the complaints 
systems in both countries. Secondly, the interviews can provide a better basis for contextual 
understanding, and in the German case interviews with English-speaking officials contribute 
to overcoming the language barrier present regarding written documents. Further, by 
triangulating the interview data with other data sources, facts can be confirmed and clarified 
(Wroblewski and Leitner 2009: 240, Yin 2009: 102). The interviews are targeted at data 
covering all the criteria for procedural justice as well as detailed descriptive accounts of the 
complaints systems in both Norway and Germany.  
An interview can be considered an expert interview when the respondent is regarded 
expertise, i.e., in possession of interpretative and procedural knowledge of a particular field 
central to the area of research (Littig 2009: 107). In an expert interview, the expert will serve 
as an informant and possess knowledge which might otherwise not be accessible (Littig 2009: 
100). The interviews are conducted in accordance with Yin’s (2009: 107) “focused 
interview”. Although a variant of semi-structured interview, it follows a pre-specified set of 
questions. This implies a rather high degree of structure, while there is still room for follow-
up questions and alteration of the interview questions during the interview. This relatively 
high degree of structure is due to the aim of evaluation of specific criteria, and hence the need 
for information that cover these aspects. Moreover, the need for comparability between 
countries also requires stringency (Ryen 2002: 97). 
There are several challenges in the conduct of expert interviews. All kinds of 
interviews are prone to problems of bias, poor recall and inaccurate articulation (Yin 2009: 
108-109). Wroblewski and Leitner (2009: 241) assert that such problems are even more 
pronounced in expert interviews than in other kinds of interviews. The so-called “stakeholder 
problem” is a special problem for expert interviews (Wroblewski and Leitner 2009: 236). This 
problem occurs because the respondents are usually also participants in the organization or 
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institution being evaluated, that is, they are stakeholders. This means that they have a special 
interest in the results of the investigation. Hence the stakeholder might try to control and even 
withhold certain information. There are also methodological problems related to the fact that 
the expert is representing an institution because the information shared with the researcher 
could reflect the private opinion of the respondent rather than objective information about the 
institution (Abels and Behrens 2009: 140). This must be taken into consideration in the 
analysis and utilization of the interview accounts. 
 
Selection of respondents
13
 
The selection of respondents for qualitative interviews does not follow procedures for random 
selection common in quantitative studies, but rather relies on a strategic selection of 
respondents (Grønmo 2004: 98-99). When respondents are selected strategically, the 
important criteria to follow are that respondents are chosen according to what is advantageous 
to the research question and according to theoretical considerations (Grønmo 2004: 99). In 
this thesis, the respondents are chosen with the aim of gaining information and insights from 
experts in the relevant institutions in the German and Norwegian systems. The scope of a 
master’s thesis including available time limits the number of respondents. The choice is 
therefore to recruit one respondent from each of the institutional bodies deemed relevant to 
the research question.
 
This can be termed as a type of quota selection, as a certain number of 
respondents are selected within predetermined categories (Grønmo 2004: 99). Although Ryen 
(2002: 85) argues that it is less important how many people you interview than the 
information they provide, the limitations of a master’s thesis may still imply that a point of 
saturation, i.e., the point where another interview would not contribute with new information 
(Ryen 2002: 94), may not be reached, as the limits are set before the interviews are conducted.  
 
Ethical considerations 
There is a specific need to consider human subjects protection in case studies, as they address 
contemporary human affairs (Yin 2009: 73). An application to The Norwegian Social Science 
Data Services (NSD) for permission to collect personal information was necessary because 
personal data like names and positions of the Norwegian respondents are saved 
                                                             
13
 See appendix A for the list of respondents. 
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electronically.
14
 Further, informed consent from all respondents is required, as well as making 
sure they are protected from possible harm caused by the research project (Yin 2009: 73). 
Another question is that of confidentiality and anonymity. In this thesis, the respondents are 
not asked personal or sensitive questions. It would be preferable to publish the position and 
workplace of the interviewees because the source is relevant for the quality of the data 
obtained. There must, however, be given a consent for this (Silverman 2006: 320). According 
to Silverman (2006: 320), this is required even when “we are not dealing with matters that 
seem, on the face of it, to be particularly delicate or intimate.” With expert interviews 
anonymization can prove problematic because the experts are implicated into social 
hierarchies and associations. There are often few experts, and they take part in unique events 
(Obelené 2009: 197). In this thesis, the respondents are partially anonymized as their names 
are not provided. None of the respondents objected to this solution. 
 
Conducting the interviews
15
 
Whether or not to use a tape recorder was a practical matter to be considered prior to 
conducting the interviews. An advantage of using a tape recorder is that it yields a complete 
and accurate transcript of what is said (Peabody, Hammond, Torcom, Brown, Thompson and 
Kolodny 1990: 454). Woliver (2002: 678) argues, however, that tape recorders can be 
intrusive both for the interviewer and the interviewee. It could also cause the respondent to be 
more reserved in his or her answers (Peabody et al. 1990: 454). On the other hand, this should 
be less of a problem because the topics to be discussed are not sensitive or personal. The 
choice was made to ask the respondent whether he or she was comfortable with the interview 
being recorded. When this was accepted without hesitation, which was the case with all the 
interviewees, a tape recorder was utilized. Tape-recording and subsequent transcription can 
increase the reliability of the data (Silverman 2006: 287).  
Three of the interviews were conducted through e-mail and one by phone. These 
interview procedures have the advantages of being cost and time effective, as well as the lack 
of necessity to coordinate a common meeting point (Ryen 2002: 253). Challenges are mainly 
concentrated on how to ensure that the respondents actually answer, and that there is a lack of 
contextual understanding that comes as a bonus when interviews are conducted in the natural 
                                                             
14
 The project was approved by NSD and given the project number 31363.  
15
 See appendix B for the interview guides.  
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context (Ryen 2002: 255). The remaining six interviews were all conducted at the location of 
the institution in point. In the Norwegian cases this implied offices, and since the cases are 
mainly handled in writing, these are the places were assessments and judgments are made. In 
Germany, however, hearings take place in court rooms. When conducting the interview with a 
judge in Berlin Social Court, six hearings were also attended at this court. The fact that all 
interviews have taken place in the natural context has improved the contextual understanding 
and provided considerable additional knowledge about the different processes.  
The experience was that despite a fairly small number of interviews, the point of 
saturation was in fact reached both in the Norwegian and the German context. This can be 
explained by the rather limited aim of the interviews, namely to provide concrete information 
rather than opinions and different perspectives. A limitation of the data material is, however, 
that interviews were only conducted in some localities in Germany and Norway. In order to 
cover all possible local variations, interviews would have to be conducted within every 
Norwegian countty and every German state. This is an insurmountable task for a master’s 
thesis, and the limitation is less severe because the questions asked and the information 
obtained addressed formal procedural aspects which can be assumed to be similar within the 
two countries. The problem would have been much more pronounced in a study of the actual 
effects of the system.  
The stakeholder problem was clearly apparent in one interview. In this case, the 
respondent seemed uncomfortable with the interview setting and spoke from a position of 
defense of the institution in point. This may have resulted in an overly positive presentation of 
that institution, but as the questions were focused on facts and procedures, the consequences 
should not be too large. There is also a possibility that this problem was present in other 
interviews, although in a less obvious manner. This implies that the data obtained in the 
interviews much be handled with caution, and as far as possible these data are therefore 
triangulated with other sources of data.  
Transcription and coding was conducted according to thematic categories, including 
the criteria of procedural justice, but also more descriptive categories such as “about the Hartz 
IV benefit”.  
 
4.6.3 Alternative approach: User survey 
The focus of many approaches to justice, especially by social psychologists, is of the 
perceived justice, which implies investigating empirically how citizens feel. Following this 
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line, a survey of welfare complainants would have been a more viable approach. According to 
Sainsbury (1999: 454) and Harris (2007: 573), the user perspective is clearly important. The 
users’ evaluation of the system is relevant to the effectiveness of the complaints systems, and 
also for the broader system implications of legitimacy. However, there are important reasons 
to disregard this approach. Such surveys are not always very instructive because it may be 
difficult to attain knowledge of procedural elements through surveys. Nel et al. (2000: 27) 
suggest that although procedures are an important aspect of complaints handling, “it would 
seem that they are commented upon only when they break down.” Several studies show that 
the views of the complainants are affected by the outcome of their complaint, and that “their 
assessments of their experiences are made difficult by an incomplete knowledge of social 
security adjudication and alternative decision-making structures, and that their assessments 
are often based on low expectations of public bodies” (Sainsbury 1999: 454).  
 
4.7 Credibility 
A critical discussion of the credibility and quality of a study is important in order to illuminate 
possible strengths and weaknesses of the study and its conclusions. Such a discussion should 
be guided by the concepts of reliability and validity (Silverman 2006: 281). In the following 
sections the credibility of the results is discussed through these concepts. 
 
4.7.1 Reliability 
Reliability refers to the degree to which the findings of a study are independent of chance or 
errors in the data collection (Silverman 2006: 282), and implies the goal of minimizing errors 
and bias in the thesis (Yin 2009: 45). A common criterion for reliability is replicability. 
Replicability addresses the question of whether the study could have been repeated by another 
researcher with the same results (Silverman 2006: 282). The requirement for replicability 
applies not only to the data, but also to the reasoning process behind the conclusions (King et 
al. 1994: 26). Two ways to increase the reliability in qualitative research is through process 
transparency and theoretical transparency (Silverman 2006: 282). Process transparency can 
be achieved through describing the research strategy and methods in a sufficiently detailed 
manner, which is the overall purpose of this chapter. Theoretical transparency implies making 
the theoretical standpoint which guides the collection and interpretation of data explicit. The 
latter is attempted in the theory and operationalization sections.  
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Regarding the different data sources utilized in this thesis, documents are often 
considered a reliable source, because they exist prior to, and are thus unaffected by, the data 
collection. However, issues of reliability may arise in the categorization and interpretation of 
the data (Silverman 2006: 286). The reliability of the interviews, also discussed in section 
4.6.2, can be increased through the tape-recording of interviews, careful transcription of the 
interviews, as well as providing long extracts of data in the research report (Silverman 2006: 
287). Although there is no room for the latter in a master’s thesis, transcriptions and tapes of 
the interviews are stored and available upon request.  
 
4.7.2 Validity 
Validity refers to measuring what we claim to measure (King et al. 1994: 25). According to 
Yin (2009: 40), there are three types of validity, that is, construct validity, internal validity 
and external validity. Internal validity in Yin´s conception is not relevant here, as it refers to 
the truth of causal relationships investigated in the study. This type of validity is more 
relevant in experimental and quantitative studies (Grønmo 2004: 234). The external validity is 
discussed in section 4.3. 
 
Construct validity  
Construct validity implies identifying correct operational measures for the phenomena studied 
(Yin 2009: 40). Useful tactics to improve the construct validity are to use multiple sources of 
data seeking converging lines of evidence, and to establish a chain of evidence (Yin 2009: 
42). The advice to use multiple sources is followed by utilizing both primary and secondary 
sources of data. Yin (2009: 116) distinguishes between true data triangulation and the use of 
multiple sources of data that address different facts. Both approaches are followed in this 
thesis, as the interviews are meant both to validate existing information and as a supplement 
where information is lacking. Maintaining a chain of evidence implies keeping an explicit 
analytical line all the way from the research questions, through data and to the final 
conclusions (Yin 2009: 123). This latter tactic is also important to secure reliability, as it 
increases the transparency of the study, and thus possibilities for replication. The 
operationalization of procedural justice criteria is discussed in the following sections.  
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4.8 Operationalization of procedural justice criteria 
In order to apply the theoretical framework to real-world institutions, the criteria deducted 
must be operationalized, i.e., they must be made concrete and practically observable. While 
the approach to procedural justice adopted by most social psychologists is to study subjective 
justice, this thesis seeks more objective criteria of procedural justice. Objectivity is, however, 
nearly impossible to attain in discussion of normative issues. The term intersubjectivity, on 
the other hand, can refer to “agreement in the sense of having a shared definition of an object” 
(Gillespie and Cornish 2010: 19).  In this context intersubjectivity points to the desire to 
arrive at criteria which can be agreed upon by most people and that are applicable across time 
and space. According to Lind and Tyler (1988: 19), there are two main problems with this 
approach: (1) one must find a way to establish a standard for measuring the extent to which a 
procedure meets a given objective criterion, and (2) one must decide which criteria are 
important, and also consider possible trade-offs between different criteria. These tasks are 
attempted achieved through the thorough assessment of existing literature and previous 
studies, such as user surveys. The following sections contain the operationalization of the 
procedural justice criteria. 
 
Consistency 
The literature suggests that the most important aspect of consistency is across space rather 
than across time. Consequently geographical consistency within the nation-state will serve as 
a point of departure in the measurement of the consistency criterion. A reason not to consider 
consistency over time as a criterion for procedural justice is the fact that circumstances are 
changing over time, and procedural aspects may be reformed for the better; hence, 
inconsistency over time may not necessarily be negative for procedural justice. The questions 
to investigate empirically are how the complaints system is designed to mitigate any possible 
inconsistency in first-instance decisions, and whether the complaints treatment itself can be 
expected to be consistent considering systemic aspects. The question is what is done to secure 
uniformity in decision-making across geographical space and across different claimants in the 
same geographical areas.  
 
Independence 
Independence can be operationalized through the organizational distance from the former 
decision-maker (Sainsbury 1999: 459). Some relevant distinctions are: (1) whether the initial 
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decision-maker belongs to the same governmental level of the executive branch as the 
complaints organ, i.e. they are both municipal or both state-level, (2) whether the initial 
decision-maker belongs to a lower level of the executive branch than the complaints organ, 
that is they are from municipal and state level, or (3) whether the two instances belong to 
different branches of government, e.g. the executive and the judicial branch. These three 
possibilities imply increasing degrees of independence.  
 
Voice 
The voice criterion can be measured by the degree to which the complainant is allowed a part 
in the complaints process. Important questions are whether the complainant is invited to an 
oral hearing, and whether such a hearing is an obligatory part of the case procedure. If not, is 
there any other kind of contact between the decision-making agency and the complainant? 
 
Quality 
Procedures to increase the quality of decisions is a difficult component to measure. However, 
an inevitable requirement of the complaints procedure for a high-quality decision to be 
produced is the acquirement of relevant and sufficient case information. Accordingly, one 
question is how information is obtained. Given the procedures of the complaints agency, what 
are the chances of obtaining sufficient, high-quality and unbiased documentation? Further, the 
level of competence of adjudicators is highly likely to be related to the quality of the decision. 
Whether all adjudicators are trained within law and whether they are specialized within a 
specific area of welfare law can be expected to increase the procedural justice by raising the 
chances for high-quality decisions. This is so because important requirements of the decision-
makers are to grasp complicated facts, understand the rules, give fitting judgments and to 
have the competence to “declare the law” (Morton 1998: 173, Sainsbury 1999: 456). These 
are important aspects of an education within law. In addition to the competence of the 
individual decision-maker, a relevant aspect is how many adjudicators are involved in each 
case. A larger number of adjudicators will reduce the chances of wrong, biased or hasty 
decisions (Sainsbury 1999: 456).  
 
Transparency 
The indicators for the transparency criterion are how much information is provided to the 
complainant by the complaints agency, whether complainants are given updates on case 
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progress, and whether there are always given written reasons for decisions. A requirement is 
that persons affected by a decision are given “proper, adequate, intelligible reasons which deal 
with the substantive issues raised” (Swain 2009: 90).  
 
Timeliness  
The operationalization of the timeliness criterion is quite straightforward; how much time 
does the complaints agency spend on deciding a complaints case? A related question, which, 
depending on the answer, can mitigate or exacerbate the consequences of this criterion, is 
what happens to the complainant while he or she awaits a decision; what kind of financial 
support is the complainant given, keeping in mind that the benefit applied for is meant to 
provide basic subsistence? This overlaps with the financial aspects discussed separately. 
Although the indicators of measurement are straightforward, the judgments as to what is 
reasonable timeliness are not set. However, according to Flac (2012: 49-50), the assessment 
must be done keeping in mind that the “matter at stake” is access to economic means which 
constitutes the main or only source of income for the claimant. 
 
Financial risk 
The first operational indicator for this criterion is whether the complainant risks being charged 
with legal costs, and, secondly, what kind of economic support the complainant is provided 
with while the case is being considered. Next, is expert help, or legal aid, provided for free 
when this kind of assistance is regarded important?  
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5. The cases: Context and welfare benefits 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter lays out contextual characteristics about the cases that can be of importance to 
the discussion of procedural justice. The motivation behind this is to deal with the challenge 
of establishing equivalence in the comparison across countries, a problem discussed in section 
4.5. This chapter thus presents and discusses the history of the Norwegian and German 
welfare state, the two countries’ placement within Esping-Andersen’s regime theory, the 
conceptions of welfare rights, as well as the constitutional backgrounds and the welfare 
benefits in focus.  
 
5.2 Historical account of the welfare state 
The right to social security for people unable to provide their own income was introduced in 
Norway in the 20
th
 century (Hatland 2011b: 107). Social security deviated both from the 
former Poor Law of 1845 (Fattigloven), in that it gave much stronger rights, and from private 
insurance, because it was compulsory by law and administered by public agencies (Hatland 
2011b: 109). A statutory disability benefit was adopted in 1960, and in 1966 all existing social 
security benefits were gathered within the National Insurance Scheme (Folketrygden) 
(Hatland 2011b: 110-111). Since the establishment of the National Insurance Scheme, the 
basic characteristics of the Norwegian welfare state have remained stable. There is wide 
coverage of insurance against risks, and the complementary social assistance system is thus 
smaller than in most other welfare states (Hatland 2011b: 112, Lødemel 1989: 76, 147). The 
NAV reform, adopted in 2005 and carried out between 2007 and 2011, implied the decision to 
merge the administrations of social assistance, social security and the labor market agency. 
This has been characterized as the most comprehensive administrative reform in the modern 
history of the Norwegian welfare state (Hatland 2011b: 144).  
The basic characteristics of the German welfare state were established with Bismarck, 
who is generally viewed as the founder of the German welfare state, and still remain today. 
These are organizational fragmentation and social differentiation, as well as a heavy reliance 
on social insurance (Kuhnle and Kildal 2011: 16). Prominent characteristics of the German 
social insurance established in the 1880s are corporatism and selectivism. Although many of 
the original characteristics of the German welfare are intact, the Hartz reforms, which 
addressed the inefficient labor market organization, have contributed to important changes 
(Kemmerling and Bruttel 2005: 1). The reform package, which has been implemented since 
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2002, has been characterized as the most ambitious German reform project within social 
policy since World War II.  
Both countries have a long welfare state history, and they both possess encompassing 
schemes of social security. The basic structure of the welfare state has remained stable in both 
countries, despite comprehensive reforms during the past ten years. Hence the welfare state 
history and development should not cause problems of equivalence in the comparison 
between Norway and Germany; they both exemplify modern and developed welfare states.  
 
5.3 Welfare regime and welfare rights 
In Esping-Andersen’s terminology, the Norwegian welfare state belongs to the social 
democratic regime type
16
, with universalism as an important characteristic (Esping-Andersen 
1990: 27). This implies that people are entitled to welfare benefits due to residence, 
citizenship or participation in a work sector (Kuhnle and Kildal 2011: 18). The core of the 
welfare state is the public responsibility for income securitization, health and care. Positive 
welfare rights can be traced back to the introduction of social security laws in the 20
th
 century, 
and especially with the establishment of the National Insurance Scheme (NOU 2005: 164). 
The Norwegian social security legislation today is characterized by a comprehensive, 
formalized and standardized statutory system of rights. However, rights to social assistance 
are of more recent date and are still disputed (NOU 2005: 164). Although the law states the 
right to economic support at a reasonable minimum level through social assistance, the 
discretion of the municipal administration and individual professionals is wide, and the rights 
formulations require individual interpretations in welfare delivery (NOU 2005: 165). 
In Germany, the principle of the Sozialstaat, i.e., the requirement that the Federal 
Republic is a social state, “underpins the provision of social laws and the extensive 
involvement of the state generally in social welfare to provide the social element and balance 
or correct the unfortunate effects of a market economy” (Foster and Sule 2010: 187).  This 
implies a legally binding obligation for the state to provide social welfare to its citizens. There 
is an overwhelming academic consensus that the German welfare state is empirically very 
close to what Esping-Andersen termed the conservative regime type (Schiller and Kuhnle 
2007: 75). This regime type, also called the Continental model, is considered a product of 
Catholic and corporatist ancestry. Five distinguishing characteristics of the German welfare 
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 This regime type is sometimes referred to as the Scandinavian welfare regime (e.g. Kuhnle 2000).  
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state are: (1) high importance of social insurance, (2) few services in kind, and more money 
transfers, (3) social insurance contributions shared equally between employee and employer, 
(4) the aim of the welfare state is to maintain the former standard of living, and (5) a strong 
orientation towards the male breadwinner model (Schiller and Kuhnle 2007: 75).  
Norway and Germany are classified as different welfare regimes. In contrast to the 
equalizing aim of the Scandinavian welfare regime, the German corporatist consensus hold 
that social protection should be aimed at sustaining people’s economic status as set by the 
labor market. This implies that earnings should be maintained at previous levels (Goodin, 
Headey, Muffels and Dirven 1999: 74). However, these differences are less important to the 
comparison in this thesis than the fact that both the Norwegian and the German state have 
taken on considerable public responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. Both welfare states 
provide strong rights to economic welfare. Because this thesis addresses procedures of the 
administration of welfare benefits, rather than the distributive welfare schemes themselves, 
this latter aspect is important as it expresses equivalence regarding the need for mechanisms 
for enforcement of these rights.   
 
5.4 Constitutional background 
Norway has a unitary legislative system with one national law applying throughout the 
country. Although administrative decisions are made by public agencies on three 
administrative levels, namely the state, 19 counties and 429 municipalities, the counties and 
municipalities do not have legislative competence (Frihagen, Rasmussen and Bernt 2010: 37, 
Hagelien, Vonen and Advokatfirmaet Schjødt 1994: 11). The principal source of law, the 
Norwegian Constitution of 1814 (Grunnloven), states the separation of powers between the 
executive, legislative and judicial branch (Frihagen et al. 2010: 20, Hagelien et al. 1994: 11). 
The general court system is divided into three levels of jurisdiction (Stern 2008: 331). There 
are no specialized administrative or constitutional courts, and the ordinary courts have 
jurisdiction over administrative disputes. Administrative law in Norway implies the judicial 
control of administrative decisions (Frihagen et al. 2010: 42). Welfare legislation falls within 
the administrative law and is governed by the same general regulations. The highest 
administrative organ within this jurisdiction is the Social Security Tribunal (Frihagen et al. 
2010: 20). Few administrative cases, including welfare cases, are appealed to the ordinary 
courts (Bragdø 2005: 69). Consequently the courts play a minor role in the Norwegian 
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complaints system for welfare benefits (Kjønstad and Syse 2008: 193), and will not be 
discussed further in this thesis with regards to the criteria for procedural justice. 
Germany is a federally structured democratic state built upon the Rechtsstaat and 
social justice (Birkinshaw 2003: 136). The term Rechtsstaat indicates the supremacy of law 
(Recht) within the state (Staat); all power is bound by the law (Foster and Sule 2010: 178). 
The Rechtsstaatsprinzip further demands “a fixed and certain hierarchy of laws binding on all, 
the separation of powers, and the provision of accessible independent courts offering 
protection to the citizen, namely his basic rights” (Foster and Sule 2010: 187). The federal 
state is composed of 16 states, which have certain competences in legislation, administration 
and the judiciary (Kofler 2008: 203). Judicial power in Germany is divided into five areas: (1) 
ordinary jurisdiction, including civil and criminal courts, (2) jurisdiction in labor affairs, (3) 
administrative jurisdiction, (4) financial jurisdiction, and (5) social jurisdiction 
(Bundessozialgericht 2012). Social law is a part of public law, in contrast to civil law, because 
it deals with the relations between citizens and the state (Foster and Sule 2010: 310). This 
field is considered a special area within administrative law. The social law has its own 
hierarchy of courts regulated by the Social Courts Act (Sozialgerichtsgesetz) (Foster and Sule 
2010: 310). Courts play an important role in the German society, and there is a constitutional 
guarantee to have any administrative decision tried by an independent court (Respondent 9 
2012).  
The constitutional background is an important contextual factor because a significant 
dimension of the complaints systems regarding procedural justice effects is the difference 
between administrative and judicial adjudication. It is clear that the differences in 
constitutional background concur with the differences in degree of judicialization of these 
complaints systems. Courts play a larger role in the German society than the Norwegian, and 
there are stronger individual rights to judicial review of administrative decisions in Germany. 
This is likely to have caused different expectations in Norway and Germany regarding degree 
of formality and judicialization of complaints systems. There is also a difference between the 
courts systems in Norway and Germany, in that the German system is divided into five 
specialized jurisdictions while the Norwegian system contains only one common jurisdiction. 
These differences in tradition, and consequently citizens’ expectations, must serve as a note of 
precaution to the interpretation of the findings of this thesis, but the main goal of the thesis is 
to illuminate and discuss the differences in the complaints systems according to criteria of 
procedural justice rather than to explain their origin or to measure their empirical effects.  
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5.5 Benefits in question 
Social assistance constitutes the lowest safety net in the Norwegian welfare state, and aims to 
capture problematic economic conditions not solved through other social institutions (Hatland 
2011b: 143). The benefit is financed and administered at the municipal level. It is to a certain 
degree a continuation of the poor law (Helsetilsynet 2007: 10). In contrast to the poor law, 
however, formulations of social assistance as a right have become more apparent since the 
establishment of a new law on social assistance in 1964 (Kjønstad, Bernt, Kjellevold and 
Hove 2000: 46).  
Following the framework of Titmuss (1976: 130, see section 2.1), the nature of the 
benefit is discretionary. The rules of entitlement are based on economic need, and the main 
criterion for eligibility is that a person is not able to ensure his own subsistence through work 
or other economic rights (Hatland 2011b: 143). The determination of eligibility as well as the 
size of the benefit is based on extensive economic means-tests and the discretion of the local 
social worker based on guidelines from the local government (OECD 2010a: 6). The law does 
not state precisely who are eligible for social assistance and what level the benefits should 
have (Helsetilsynet 2007: 10). Although the government provides guidelines for the level of 
benefits, these are only advisory (Hatland 2011b: 143). This implies a heavy presence of 
discretion. Each administrative decision-maker has to make a judgment regarding what 
expenses are seen as necessary to secure a decent level of subsistence and to what degree the 
claimant is capable of reaching this level of income without social assistance (Helsetilsynet 
2007: 10). There is a legal claim for a welfare benefit when the law provides criteria for 
bestowal and measuring of a benefit (Helsetilsynet 2007: 13). For social assistance, a legal 
claim is present when criteria for the right to financial assistance are fulfilled. This implies 
that social assistance, when certain criteria are met, can be considered a positive right not 
dependent on the competition about scarce resources (Helsetilsynet 2007: 13). However, the 
right can be regarded as weak, because the ambiguity of the rights formulation makes it 
difficult to enforce (Kjønstad et al. 2000: 333). A special feature of the conceptualization of a 
right to social assistance is the tension between the right given by the state and the principle of 
local democracy (Kjønstad et al. 2000: 47). The principle of local democracy implies that the 
municipalities make decisions without interference in areas where they are granted 
administrative responsibility (Eskeland 1992: 69).  
The Norwegian disability benefit provides economic security for persons who are not 
able to enter the labor market, or who have to step out of the labor market before they are 
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eligible for retirement pension, due to disability or illness (Hatland 2011b: 125). The benefit 
is administered on state-level. The nature of the entitlement is an insurance principle, but all 
Norwegian citizens in employable age (18-67 years) are entitled to disability pension 
regardless of former participation in the labor market because Norwegian citizenship implies 
obligatory membership of the National Insurance Scheme (Kjønstad and Syse 2008: 295). The 
rules of entitlement are based on at least 50 per cent reduction in a person’s capacity for work 
due to some form of sickness or disability (Hatland 2011b: 126). Appropriate treatment must 
have been tried and work assessment must have been conducted before disability pension can 
be granted. The determination of eligibility for disability benefits is based on statements from 
medical experts, rehabilitation experts, information about former income, as well as 
administrative judgments (Kjønstad and Syse 2008: 304). Exactly what constitutes 
“appropriate treatment”, how lengthy this treatment must be, as well as how much resources 
should be devoted to rehabilitation before disability benefits can be approved are questions 
that offer much room for discretion in administrative decisions, as there are no clear-cut 
answers to these questions (Hatland 2011b: 126, Respondent 2 2012).   
According to Titmuss’ framework, then, the nature of the determination of entitlement 
is arguably legal as well as professional, while the rules of entitlement concern the loss of 
work capacity and completion of treatment and work ability assessment. Finally, the methods 
of determination are administrative judgment of different expert assessments, the reduced 
working capacity as well as former work experience in order to determine the eligibility for 
and the size of the benefit. Determination of the size of a disability benefit is quite clear-cut, 
and follows the same principle as retirement pension (Kjønstad and Syse 2008: 302), which is 
mainly based on former income. There is a relatively strong legal right to disability pension in 
the Norwegian context. There are certain clear conditions, like age and membership of the 
National Insurance Scheme, and the rules for measurement of the benefit size are clear and 
predictable (Kjønstad and Syse 2008: 106). However, there are judgments that have to be 
made by the decision-maker regarding the conditions necessary in order to be eligible for 
disability benefit (Kjønstad and Syse 2008: 106). Rights enforcement requires detailed 
information, often from several specialists, in order to determine whether the necessary 
criteria are fulfilled (Kjønstad and Syse 2008: 107). In sum, the right to disability benefits, 
given that certain criteria are fulfilled, is legally determined, but some of the criteria are vague 
and require professional insight within medicine and rehabilitation (Refsdal 2009: 42-43).  
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The German Hartz IV benefit
17
 was established as one of four acts in the Hartz reform 
(Kemmerling and Bruttel 2005: 3). The Hartz IV act was specifically aimed at reform of the 
unemployment benefit system (Kemmerling and Bruttel 2005: 5). The unemployment system 
is divided into two benefits, Unemployment Benefit I and Unemployment Benefit II. 
Unemployment Benefit I is contributions-based and limited to 12 months, with a six months 
extension for people over 55 years. After this period, jobseekers move to Unemployment 
Benefit II, which is the Hartz IV benefit. The benefit level of Hartz IV is fixed at the level of 
the former social assistance and is independent of previous income (Kemmerling and Bruttel 
2005: 6).  
  The conditions for receiving the Hartz IV benefit are: (1) age between 15 and 65 years, 
(2) working capacity of minimum three hours per day, (3) residence in Germany, (4) foreign 
nationals must have permission to work, and (5) need (OECD 2010b: 3). There are no 
requirements of former contributions. A goal with the Hartz IV benefit was to construct an 
easily administered benefit, through flat-rate payments and hence no need for income 
assessments (Respondent 8 2012). However, the administration of the benefit has proved 
extremely difficult (Respondent 5 2012). The main complexities lie in the needs criterion and 
assessments of special cases, such as children being involved, illness, as well as the 
contribution for house rent, which is not flat-rate. The needs criterion requires a means-test 
which asks: (1) how much money the claimant has to live for, and (2) how much he or she 
needs. Claimants with children will generally receive more than claimants without children, 
and if there is illness involved, the claimant may have the right to extra money to cover 
medicines or a special diet (Respondent 5 2012). Finally, the rent depends on where the 
claimant lives and what kind of residence he or she possesses (Respondent 5 2012). As such, 
there are several discretionary judgments that have to be made both in the determination of 
eligibility and benefit level.  
Following the framework of Titmuss, the nature of the entitlement is contractual, 
discretionary, as well as legal. The aim of the benefit is to provide a minimum subsistence 
level for job-seekers (Respondent 4 2012). The contractual element relates to the fact that 
every employable needy have to sign an integration agreement binding himself to certain 
obligations such as active search for jobs and participation in labor market activities in order 
to achieve eligibility (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2013: 10), while the 
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 This benefit is also termed “the basic income support for job-seekers”.  
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discretionary element regards the needs criteria, and the legal nature points to the legal rights 
of a benefit when criteria for eligibility are fulfilled (Respondent 4 2012). The rules of 
entitlement are based on age, country residence, working capacity and need. Finally, the 
methods employed in determination of access are working ability assessments as well as a 
means-test regarding need.  
Although the benefits chosen for study in the Norwegian and German cases are not 
similar, there are several reasons why a comparison of the benefits is feasible. Firstly, they are 
all benefits aimed at securing a basic level of income for people with insufficient income from 
employment, and they are in most cases directed towards people who have been unemployed 
for a while. Secondly, the administration of all three benefits includes elements of 
administrative discretion. Thirdly, the benefits have a substantial amount of recipients relative 
to the population. This would for instance not be the case for social assistance in Germany, 
which in 2010 was received by approximately 250.000 citizens, i.e., 0.3 per cent of the 
population, to give an example.
18
 This is so because most former recipients of social 
assistance are now absorbed by the Hartz IV benefit. For comparison, at the time of 
introduction of the Hartz IV benefit in 2006, 2.750.000 people received social assistance. 
Fourth, these three benefits together exhaust the different welfare complaints systems of the 
two countries. Finally, positive rights are present for all these benefits, and the requirements 
of a complaints systems regarding procedural justice is thus equivalent.   
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 Data in print-out from respondent 8, obtained from Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden (2012).  
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6. The complaints systems 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides detailed presentations of the Norwegian and German complaints 
systems. Such empirical accounts are scarce in existing literature, and provide a necessary 
foundation for the further discussion. The information cover all the criteria of procedural 
justice, but systematic discussion regarding the criteria is provided in chapter 7. Figure 1 
displays the basic structures of the complaints processes. The Norwegian institutions in grey 
are formally part of the complaints system, but nevertheless not frequently utilized.   
 
Figure 1: The complaints processes in Norway and Germany  
 
6.2 Norway 
In the Norwegian case, both the complaints systems of social assistance and disability benefits 
are chosen for study in order to illuminate the internal disparities within the Norwegian 
welfare system. NAV contains municipal and state-level benefits. This has led to a two-
tracked complaints system (Refsdal 2009: 35). Complaints on the municipal benefit social 
assistance are handled by the County Governors (CG), with the further possibility to appeal to 
the ordinary courts. Complaints on the state-level social insurance benefits, including 
disability benefits, are handled by NAV Appeals Unit (NAV AU), with the option of further 
appeal to the Social Security Tribunal (SST) and lastly to the ordinary courts.  
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review 
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Common for the CG, NAV AU and the SST is that the law of 1980 about free legal 
aid (Rettshjelpsloven) applies. The arrangement implies that anyone living alone with an 
income below 246.000 NOK or living with a partner with a total income of less than 369.000 
NOK, and holds wealth below 100.000 NOK, has the right to free legal aid. When free legal 
aid is granted, the appellant must pay a fee of 25 per cent of the costs if he or she has an 
income above 100.000 NOK per year (Øie 2010: 40). 
Table 2 shows the organizational affiliation of the Norwegian complaints institutions 
as well as the administration of disability benefits and social assistance.  
Level of Government Branch of Government 
 Executive Legislative Judicial 
State - Disability benefits: first 
_decision and internal _    
_review 
- The County Governors 
- NAV Appeals Unit 
- The Social Security 
_Tribunal 
- The Parliamentary     
_Ombudsman 
 
- District Courts 
- Courts of Appeal 
- The Supreme Court 
Municipal - Social assistance: first 
_decision and internal 
_review 
  
 Table 2: The organizational affiliation of the Norwegian institutions 
 
6.2.1 Social assistance: The CG  
An application for social assistance can for instance concern support for food, rent, electricity 
or clothing. It is the rejection or limitation of the economic contribution for these purposes 
which are the objects of a complaint (Helsetilsynet 2007: 3-4). A complaint on a decision 
regarding the eligibility for, as well as size and form of, social assistance must be directed 
towards NAV Local Services, which will then review the case (NOU 2004: 62). The first-
instance is obliged to consider the complaint, but a completely new assessment of the case is 
not required (Kjønstad et al. 2000: 214). If NAV Local Services rejects the complaint, the 
case is sent to the CG. NAV Local Services prepares a case file for the CG. This file must 
contain the application, the decision, the complaint, a case recital and other necessary 
documentation, such as a medical statement (Respondent 3 2012). These documents are 
normally sent to the complainant for information (Helsetilsynet 2007: 16).   
The CG is the representative of the government in each county, and is thus part of the 
executive branch. Organizationally and financially, the CG is subordinate to the Ministry of 
Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs (Fornyings-, administrasjons- og 
kirkedepartementet). The CG has authority to review all aspects of a decision except for the 
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purposive discretion of the municipal agency (NOU 2004: 62). The exercise of discretion can 
only be overruled if it is deemed “obviously unreasonable”. However, the judicial discretion 
can be reviewed, and this is often the basis for reversal or abolishment (Respondent 3 2012). 
There are three possible outcomes of a complaint to the CG: (1) the case can be abolished and 
sent back to NAV Local Services because there is not enough information to make a final 
decision, (2) the decision can be changed, or (3) the decision can be affirmed (Helsetilsynet 
2007: 11). The reason for abolishment or reversal can be procedural errors, misapplication of 
the law or clearly unreasonable discretionary considerations (Helsetilsynet 2007: 12).  
There are 19 counties in Norway holding 18 CG agencies (Oslo and Akershus have a 
joint CG). Empirical investigations have shown clear differences between the agencies of the 
CG both regarding the outcomes of complaints and the reasons given for decisions in 
complaints cases (Helsetilsynet 2007: 4). This indicates different interpretation of the law, 
administrative practices or exercise of discretion. The border between legal and administrative 
discretion, the latter not subject to review by the CG unless obviously unreasonable, may not 
be sufficiently clear (Helsetilsynet 2007: 11). This can in itself contribute to inconsistent 
treatment of complaints by the CGs. The argument is that the complaints cases to a large 
degree are determined by the competence and conscientiousness of each CG, and that this can 
lead to considerable disparity between different CGs (Helsetilsynet 2007: 16-17). Although 
there is generally a high level of legal competence within the CG agencies, a problem 
regarding consistency is the lack of a nation-wide complaints agency (Kjønstad and Syse 
2008: 97). There is, however, an overarching agency with professional responsibility for all of 
the CGs, namely the Norwegian Board of Health Supervision (Helsetilsynet) (Respondent 3 
2012). This agency provides supervisors for the CGs and works to maintain high quality and 
consistency between the different CGs. The Norwegian Board of Health Supervision also 
arranges seminars in order to exchange experiences and contribute to development of skills 
among the workers of the CGs (Respondent 3 2012).  
The profession and competence of the CGs comprise jurists, social workers, social 
scientists, child welfare officers and social educators (Respondent 3 2012). This varies 
between the different agencies. A minimum of two decision-makers are involved in each case 
(Respondent 3 2012).  
There are different considerations regarding the time aspect in each case. This is due to 
the urgency of some cases, namely the emergency aid (“nødhjelp”). These cases, which imply 
that the claimant is supposedly lacking money for food or other necessities, are handled when 
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they arrive, independent of regular cases (Respondent 3 2012). The timeliness is, however, 
considered a general problem. The requirement for treatment of regular cases, set by the 
Government and the Norwegian Board of Health Supervision, is that a case should be handled 
in three months (Respondent 3 2012). For the ten agencies with available data for 2011, this 
limit was generally kept and used as a guiding standard.  
As a main rule, there is little or no contact between the complainant and the CG. The 
complainant can contact the agency in order to get an update on the case, and also has the 
opportunity to make comments to the case recital that is sent to the CG from the local agency. 
Such comments are normally made in writing, and must be sent within two weeks. Other 
material from the complainant can also be sent to the CG during the case proceedings, but 
normally only in documentary form (Respondent 3 2012). The complainant is informed when 
the complaint is received by the CG, and is also provided with the estimated time of the case 
proceedings. When a decision is made, the complainant receives a written document with 
reasons for the decision (Respondent 3 2012). A difference between the CGs is whether they 
address the letter to the local NAV agency or to the complainant. The letter is always sent to 
both parties, but the formulations differ. The document contains the facts on which the 
decision is based, the relevant legal rules, the assessment of the local NAV agency, as well as 
the assessment made by the CG (Respondent 3 2012).  
Some complainants use legal help during the complaints process. This is in principle 
not necessary (Respondent 3 2012). The main reason to use legal help is for the formulation 
of the complaint. There are several voluntary providers that offer some free legal aid, and this 
is often sufficient to write down the complaint. If the complainant has expenses on legal help 
during the process, these are covered in cases where the decision is reversed or abolished by 
the CG. There are no other expenses of the process for the complainant (Respondent 3 2012). 
Although it is claimed unnecessary to have help from a lawyer, the respondent from the CG of 
Oslo and Akershus states that they only look at the aspects of the case that the complainant 
points to. This implies that the complainant must himself have knowledge about the legality 
or treatment of his case, something that might be difficult without the involvement of a jurist. 
A complaint to the CG does not have a postponing effect, i.e., the decision already made will 
still be in force following a complaint (Kjønstad et al. 2000: 216). This means that if a 
claimant has lost his welfare benefit, this decision will be valid while a complaint is 
processed. 
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Decisions made by the CG cannot be appealed further through the administrative 
channel (Kjønstad et al. 2000: 210), but it is possible to bring the case before the District 
Court (Tingretten). This is, however, very unusual (Respondent 3 2012). A more frequently 
used organ for further appeal is the Parliamentary Ombudsman (Sivilombudsmannen). 
Although the Parliamentary Ombudsman does not have authority to change a decision, his 
recommendations are followed by the CG as a custom.  
 
6.2.2 Disability benefits: NAV AU and the SST 
Determination of disability benefits are prepared by NAV Local Services and decided by 
regional NAV Agencies (NAV Forvaltning) (Kjønstad and Syse 2008: 304). The decision can 
be complained to NAV AU and appealed to the SST, after a reassessment by the original 
decision-making instance. If the complaint is rejected in the internal review, the case is 
forwarded to NAV AU. NAV Local Services has an obligation to assist the complainant in the 
formulation of a complaint (Refsdal 2009: 51).  
 
NAV AU 
NAV AU was established after the NAV reform in 2005 (Refsdal 2009: 1). Previously cases 
were decided by the Local Social Security Office (Trygdekontoret). The case could be 
complained to the County Social Security Office (Fylkestrygdekontoret) and further appealed 
to the SST (Refsdal 2009: 36). NAV AU comprises six regional agencies. Some welfare 
benefits are gathered within one regional unit in order to increase competence and equality of 
treatment (Refsdal 2009: 36). This is not the case for the disability benefit, which is handled 
in all six offices. However, there has been a continuous movement towards centralization in 
order to achieve a higher degree of geographical consistency as well as satisfactory levels of 
competence. The number of offices within NAV AU dealing with disability complaints cases 
is planned to be reduced to three during 2013 (Respondent 2 2012).  
NAV AU is subject to NAV Central Agency, which has budgetary and instructional 
authority. The complaints unit is at the same time organized lateral to the NAV Agencies, and 
cannot instruct these offices. NAV AU does, however, have full authority in the complaints 
cases it deals with. The unit has authority to fully review a case, including the review of 
discretionary assessments (Refsdal 2009: 12). A decision can be affirmed, abolished and sent 
back to the initial decision-maker, or changed fully or partially. The case is prepared by the 
NAV Agency making the initial decision, which is also obligated to forward all documents to 
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NAV AU (Respondent 2 2012). If the case is not sufficiently informed, the decision is 
abolished and the case is sent back to the NAV Agency for a new treatment. The average time 
of case processing in 2011 was ten weeks, but there is variation over time depending on the 
amount on cases. The case file sent to NAV AU is also sent to the complainant, who has an 
opportunity to add remarks. Except for this, the main rule is that there is no direct contact with 
the complainant, unless documentation is missing or the complainants contact the complaints 
agency themselves (Respondent 2 2012). The case proceedings are written. Written reasons 
are given for all decisions. 
Although the complaints agencies can function to reduce disparities between different 
NAV Agencies across the country (Refsdal 2009: 12), a problem of geographical 
inconsistency exists today (Respondent 2 2012). The Office of the Auditor General of 
Norway states in a report that there is great variation in the reversal rate between the six NAV 
AU agencies (Riksrevisjonen 2011-2012). This indicates differences in regular case practices 
between the counties or different practice in the complaints handling between the regional 
complaints offices. The cooperation across municipalities and regions is claimed to be low, 
contributing to diversity (Riksrevisjonen 2011-2012: 12). A different account is given, 
however, by the respondent from NAV AU. The claim is that there is a relatively high degree 
of cooperation between the regional offices, and a national network is established for each 
benefit (Respondent 2 2012). From 1.1.2013 these networks were replaced by monthly video 
conferences between the different agencies (Respondent 2 2012). 
Help from a legal expert is not considered necessary in principle because NAV Local 
Services is obliged to help the complainant in the formulation of the written complaint. 
However, it could make a difference to the outcome of the complaint (Respondent 2 2012). 
Although the complaints agency reviews the entire case regardless of the complaints 
formulation, legal experts might add relevant arguments to the case (Respondent 2 2012). 
There are no arrangements for temporary disability benefits, an option which existed 
prior to the NAV reform (Respondent 2 2012). It is, however, possible to extend the 
maximum time of the complainants’ former benefit, which is usually Work Assessment 
Allowance (Arbeidsavklaringspenger), with a total of eight months. If the complainant does 
not have any other rights to welfare benefits after this period, the only remaining option is 
social assistance. This requires possession of little or no economic assets, and hence implies 
the draining of accumulated economic resources before such eligibility occurs.  
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Most people working in the complaints agencies are trained lawyers, with a minimum 
requirement of 70 per cent lawyers in each office. Other groups are also represented, however, 
such as sociologists and political scientists, and this vary between the six offices. The 
development is towards higher proportions of jurists (Respondent 2 2012). In addition, at least 
one advisory medical expert is affiliated with each agency. In each case, a minimum of two 
decision-makers are involved in the decision, and when it is regarded necessary, medical 
experts and professional leaders can be involved additionally (Respondent 2 2012).  
 
The SST  
A complaints case about disability benefits rejected by NAV AU can be appealed to the SST 
within six weeks. The establishment of the SST in 1967 implied the unification of several 
appeal systems for benefits within the National Insurance Scheme (Kjønstad 2002: 10), and as 
such contributed to systemic integration. The SST is an independent administrative body 
which cannot be instructed (NOU 2004: 83). The tribunal is a court-like institution, but is not 
part of the regular court system. The agency has authority to review all aspects of a case, 
including the administrative discretion, judgment of evidence, application of law and case 
procedures, and as a main rule makes a final decision (NOU 2004: 44, Trygderetten 2007). 
The SST cannot, however, change the initial decision in disfavor of the appellant. There are 
three possible outcomes of a decision: (1) the decision is affirmed, (2) the initial decision is 
changed, fully or partially, or (3) the decision is abolished and the case referred to the 
responsible agency for a new treatment (Trygderetten 2011: 11). The latter happens when the 
SST finds that the case has not been sufficiently informed (Respondent 1 2012).  
NAV AU prepares the case through a letter presenting the case and all relevant 
documents, which is also sent to the appellant for information (Respondent 1 2012). The case 
procedure is documentary, and there is normally little contact between the appellant and the 
SST (Respondent 1 2012). The appellants can, however, contact the tribunal at their own 
initiative in order to get information about the case proceedings or provide the tribunal with 
additional case information. The SST has an independent responsibility for making the 
necessary inquiries and securing sufficient information (Øie 2010: 82). Oral hearings may 
exceptionally be conducted. This is, however, considered too demanding on the institution’s 
resources to be general practice (Respondent 1 2012). The arguments against more oral 
hearings are lack of resources and the time aspect (Øie 2010: 90). Arguments in favor of more 
oral hearings are the need to secure legal protection, to the obtainment of proper information 
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of the case and to increase transparency of the SST’s proceedings (Øie 2010: 90). Oral 
proceedings are used more in terms of training of personnel aiming at a carrier within the 
regular court system than as a legal guarantee for the appellant (Respondent 1 2012). 
Consequently, cases for oral proceedings are picked according to their suitability for these 
purposes, not upon request from the appellant.  
Although there is asserted to be no need for legal representation in order to appeal to 
the SST (NOU 2004: 88), there are certain indications that legal representation increase the 
chances of successful appeals because trained lawyers may be able to see what kind of 
additional information is required and provide statements that can promote the case of the 
appellant (Respondent 1 2012). Fees are not charged for the proceedings in the SST, but the 
appellant must bear the costs of legal representation himself unless he is eligible for free legal 
aid. All expenses are transferred to the opponent if the appellant’s case succeeds.  
The case processing time is shorter than in the regular courts. The requirement from 
the responsible ministry is that 75 per cent of all cases should be closed within six months, 
that the average time spent on a case should be less than four months, and that no cases should 
be at the SST for more than nine months (Trygderetten 2011: 7). The average time spent on a 
case in 2010 and 2011 was four months, and 90 per cent of the cases in 2011 were closed 
within six months (Trygderetten 2011: 9). The timeliness has been a problem for the SST in 
the past. This led to suggestions about simplification of procedures, which would have the 
potential of weakening the legal protection of appellants (Kjønstad 2002: 12). As an example, 
an important means to increase efficiency has been to open up for simplified reasons for 
decisions in some cases. However, the establishment of NAV AU in 2005 contributed to a 
reduction in the number of cases reaching the SST, and has consequently reduced problems of 
capacity and decreased arrears (Respondent 1 2012).  
How the SST is composed in each case depends on the nature of the case (Respondent 
1 2012). The employees of the SST include legal, medical and rehabilitation experts 
(Trygderetten 2011: 6). Each tribunal consists of two or more persons, depending on the 
complexity of the case. When a tribunal is appointed, their decisions cannot be instructed 
neither by the ministry nor by internal leaders. 
Until 2004, there was not a clear requirement of the SST to give reasons for every 
decision. The main rule is now that reasons must be given for all decisions (Trygderetten 
2011: 11). There is, however, an opportunity to give simplified reasons in some cases. 
Decisions with simplified reasons are made in cases where it is clear that the appeal will not 
66 
 
be sustained, and the case is considered not to have any wider interest beyond this specific 
case (Respondent 1 2012, Øie 2010: 109). Fully reasoned cases are publicly available through 
the internet source Lovdata. It is a stated goal of the SST to provide high-quality and 
sufficient information to appellants and the public in general (Trygderetten 2011: 15). The 
electronic journal “Innblikk” is published four times a year, containing cases considered of 
general interest.   
The decisions made by the SST generally set precedence and guidelines for further 
administration in NAV (Respondent 1 2012). Given that the SST covers the entire country, 
the potential for contributions to increased geographical unity in handling of disability cases is 
large, but of course limited to the cases that actually reach the institution. Although decisions 
made within the SST are generally regarded as guiding for NAV, the welfare administration 
can disagree with these decisions. In these instances, the question is sent to the responsible 
ministry, which consequently must specify the legislation (Respondent 1 2012). Clarification 
and improvement of geographical unity is nevertheless the result in these cases too.  
The SST is administratively and financially subject to the Ministry of Labor (Øie 
2010: 25). The SST is not, however, part of the regular administrative hierarchy, as it cannot 
be instructed by the ministry. The organization of the SST, as an administrative tribunal 
which functions much like a regular court in practice, was disputed prior to its establishment, 
and has also been brought up at regular intervals since (e.g. Kjønstad 2002). The committee 
preparing the establishment of an appellant body suggested it was given a court status. Due to 
a general reluctance within the law profession against specialized courts, the SST was 
nevertheless organized as an administrative body. Another argument not to give the tribunal 
court status was that court proceedings would be too complex and intricate for the claimants 
(Øie 2010: 19). Kjønstad (2002: 13), on the other hand, argues that a social court should be 
established in Norway. According to him, this would imply several improvements to welfare 
claimants, including more oral proceedings and better legal assistance.  
In reality, the SST is the last instance of appeal. Although cases can be brought before 
the Appeals Court, which is part of the regular court system, this is rare (Respondent 1 2012). 
In 2011, 57 decisions were made by the Appeals Court in cases appealed from the SST, out of 
a total of 2561 cases, including all social security matters, handled by the SST.  
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6.2.3 The Parliamentary Ombudsman 
Since 1962, the Parliamentary Ombudsman has been Norway’s administrative ombudsman 
institution with a general mandate (Stern 2008: 332). The Ombudsman’s responsibility covers 
all public administration, including the welfare administration (Respondent 6 2012). Anyone 
who believes that they have been subjected to injustice by the public administration may bring 
a complaint to the Ombudsman (Stern 2008: 334). Although not part of the specialized 
welfare complaints systems, such cases can be treated at the Ombudsman after other 
institutions for complaint have been exhausted. Complaints cases from NAV constitute the 
largest number of complaints dealt with by the Ombudsman (Respondent 6 2012). The 
Ombudsman, in contrast to the other complaints systems considered in this thesis, also deals 
with complaints regarding service treatment. Because the Ombudsman is the representative of 
the Parliament, the institution is independent of the executive (Stern 2008: 333).  
The only formal requirements of a complaint to the Ombudsman are that the grounds 
for the complaint and the decision in point are stated (Respondent 6 2012). The Ombudsman 
can obtain the necessary documents from the relevant public agency, and also offers 
assistance in formulating the complaint (Sivilombudsmannen 2012a). Making a complaint is 
free of charge and there is no need for a lawyer. An appeal to the Ombudsman must be 
promoted within one year from the final decision was made. Information about the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman and the procedures for complaint is published on their websites. 
The normal processing time of a complaint is four to ten weeks (Sivilombudsmannen 2012b).  
The Ombudsman can make recommendations to the public administration agency in 
question, but does not have authority to change or abolish a decision. However: “If the 
opinion finds in favour of the complainant and the case results in censure of the 
administration, the administration will normally comply with the findings of the 
Ombudsman” (Sivilombudsmannen 2012b). The Ombudsman has only limited powers to 
criticize discretionary decisions. A characteristic that differentiates the Ombudsman from the 
other complaints organs is that the Ombudsman is not obliged by law to treat all complaints 
received. However, all cases are assessed and all complainants are given a written answer 
(Respondent 6 2012). The complainant always receives a confirmation of a received 
complaint as well as a written decision with reasons. The level of competence of the 
employees is very high. All employees are trained within law, but for most employees the 
experience and knowledge is general to public administration rather than specialized on 
welfare administration (Respondent 6 2012).  
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6.3 Germany  
Table 3 displays the organization of the German Social Courts and the Hartz IV benefit in 
terms of level and branch of government.  
 
Level of Government Branch of Government 
 Executive Judicial 
Federal  The Federal Social Court 
State - Hartz IV: First decision and  
_internal review 
The Higher Social Courts 
Local The Local Social Courts 
Table 3: The organizational affiliation of the German institutions 
 
6.3.1 Internal review 
Before challenging an administrative act in the Social Courts, welfare complainants must file 
an administrative appeal (Widerspruch) against the decision within the initial decision-making 
body, which is the local Jobcenter, within one month (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs 2012: 127). The initial complaint must be written down or recorded at the competent 
body, but there are no standardized forms for complaints (Respondent 4 2012). This first 
complaints handling is administrative, and includes a review of the lawfulness and expediency 
of the decision (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2012: 127). If the initial 
decision is fully or partly maintained by the Jobcenter, the welfare claimant can file a 
complaint at the Social Court within one month.  
 
6.3.2 About the Social Court system  
The Social Courts Code of 3 November 1953 established the social jurisdiction 
(Bundessozialgericht 2012). The implementation of the Social Courts Code implied that 
judicial power was entrusted to an independent judiciary. The court structure consists of three 
levels: (1) the Local Social Courts (LSC), (2) the Higher Social Courts (HSC) and (3) the 
Federal Social Court (FSC) (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2012: 127). The 
Social Courts are responsible for disputes involving social insurance matters, i.e., health, 
disability, occupational accident and pension insurance. Since January 2005, the Social Courts 
are also the courts of responsible jurisdiction for disputes about Hartz IV benefits and social 
assistance (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2012: 127).  
The judges of the Social Courts can only decide within the claim. This implies that 
they cannot make decisions for the worse of the claimant, making the risk of complaining 
small, because there is nothing to lose by complaining. The judges at the Social Courts are 
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trained in law and in addition to this specialized within one area of welfare law. Because the 
court procedures are led by the inquisitorial principle, the court is not restricted to evidence 
submitted by the parties of a case (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2012: 128, 
Respondent 5 2012). There is no compulsion of legal protection before any of the Social 
Courts (Foster and Sule 2010: 126). However, even if self-representation is possible in 
principle, Foster and Sule (2010: 128) argue that: “the complexity of both the material and 
procedural law makes representation virtually a necessity.”  
The courts are formally independent from the administration through the separation of 
powers declared in the German constitution (Respondent 4 2012, Respondent 5 2012). 
Reasoned decisions in writing are obliged by law in every case in all three court instances 
(Respondent 5 2012). In the LSCs and HSCs interim orders are made when necessary to 
secure the claimant financially during the case proceedings. Temporary Hartz IV benefits are 
provided in cases where there is a likelihood that the claim will succeed and there is an urgent 
need for money (Respondent 8 2012).  
 
6.3.3 The Local Social Courts 
There are 75 LSCs in Germany (Respondent 8 2012). Each first-instance court is divided into 
a number of chambers, based on specific areas of social law. This implies that some judges 
are experts on the Hartz IV benefit and only deal with such cases (Respondent 5 2012). A 
chamber comprises a professional presiding judge and to lay assistant judges (Federal 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2012: 127). Complaints to the LSC must state the 
remedy sought, and provide fact and evidence supporting the complaint (Federal Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs 2012: 127). The LSC can help the claimant file a complaint 
(Respondent 5 2012).  
Every complainant has the right to an oral hearing in the LSC. In Berlin Social Court, 
30 minutes is scheduled for each hearing, but the hearing may take more or less than this time. 
The judge can decide to have a documentary treatment of the case, but only if the complainant 
agrees. If the complainant requests an oral hearing, such a hearing must be held (Respondent 
5 2012). The Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2012: 128) presents the 
proceedings of the LSC in this way:  
 
“Social court proceedings generally include one oral hearing. In advance of the oral 
hearing, the presiding judge can request papers, electronic documents and health 
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records. The presiding judge can also request information, hear witnesses, including 
expert witnesses, commission written opinions from expert witnesses, summon others 
to appear at the hearing, and discuss the matter in person at a meeting with the parties 
so that the dispute can be dealt with if possible in a single hearing. The oral hearing is 
public and chaired by the presiding judge. (…) The presiding judge next presents the 
facts and the dispute as they stand. Any evidence is then taken and heard as necessary, 
and the complainant and respondent state their case. Once the dispute has been heard, 
the presiding judge declares the oral hearing closed.”  
 
Reasons for holding oral hearings are at least twofold: (1) the hearing is meant to clear up 
matters in an efficient way, and it is assumed easier to agree on facts and ensure that all 
parties understand the facts of the case when the parties and the judge are present in the same 
room, and (2) the fact that all parties have to prepare for the hearing means that everyone 
must read the case documents at a certain time leaving out the option of postponing these 
tasks (Respondent 5 2012). The oral hearings of the LSC in Berlin are informal, and the 
session has more a character of discussion or arbitration between the representative of the 
Jobcenter and the complainant, as well as the judge explaining the legal aspects to the 
complainant, rather than a formal hearing. This is in opposition to the general claim that court 
proceedings make it very difficult for the claimants to present and defend their case, and that 
court proceedings are complicated and esoteric. The court proceedings normally end with a 
decision, announced at the end of the oral hearing. A written document stating the reasons for 
the decision is always given. The facts and the case are also explained to the complainant in 
the hearing. This gives the complainant the opportunity to ask questions and get answers if he 
does not understand the decision, increasing the chances of the complainant leaving the court 
with “peace at heart” (Respondent 5 2012). Respondent 5 (2012) argued that a lawyer is not 
necessary but that the written complaints are “obviously much more professional-looking 
when such assistance is utilized.” Furthermore, the lawyers may be able to see legal aspects of 
the case not perceptible to the welfare claimant (Respondent 5 2012).  
The LSCs handle cases by degree of urgency. Urgent cases are scheduled for hearings 
after approximately a week (Respondent 5 2012). These are cases where the claimant would 
not have any money to live for if he is right in his claim. In order to have a case treated as 
urgent, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) there must be a good possibility that the 
complainant is right in his claim, and (2) there must be a true urgent need (Respondent 5 
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2012). Regular cases can take up to two years. The time aspect is generally considered a 
problem within the German Social Court system (Herbert 2003: 10). This is connected to the 
large number of cases the LSCs have to deal with. According to respondent 5, some of the 
cases reaching the court should have been filtered out at a lower level as they do not concern 
aspects of law but rather straightforward misunderstandings of factual matters. This would 
have improved the capacity and timeliness problem. The administration of the Hartz IV 
benefits as well as the internal review would thus have to be improved (Respondent 5 2012, 
Respondent 8 2012). There are some different models to the internal review in the German 
states. In Saarland, they have an oral hearing or discussion already at the level of the internal 
review (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2012, Respondent 8 2012). Another model, applied in some 
Jobcenters in Schleswig-Holstein, is to provide the claimant with a thorough written 
explanation of their first decision when an internal complaint is filed. This can contribute to 
solve complaints cases at an early stage because the initial letter with the decision is very 
brief, and the claimant may not understand the reasons from the decision (Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit 2012, Respondent 8 2012). 
At the lower court levels there are not necessarily unifying effects of complaints unless 
the law is strict and easy to apply, and this is not the case with the Hartz IV benefit 
(Respondent 5 2012). The LSC can advise the Jobcenters, but the Jobcenters are not obliged 
to follow this guidance (Respondent 5 2012). In areas of the law with particular lack of 
clarity, there may even be different rulings within the same LSC. This implies that even if the 
courts follow the same guidelines and their common goal is the correct application of law, the 
degree to which consistency is reached depends much upon the law (Respondent 5 2012).  
 
6.3.4 The Higher Social Courts 
There are 14 HSCs. The HSCs take on appeals against the decisions of the LSCs. Their 
senates correspond to the chambers of the LSCs, and comprise a presiding judge, two 
additional professional judges and two lay judges (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs 2012: 127). Two types of appeal to the HSC are possible: (1) an appeal on the merits 
of the case and (2) an appeal on a point of law (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
2012: 128). The former can be claimed against any decision of the first-instance court, but the 
amount at dispute must exceed 750 Euro. In such appeals, the HSC can review all factual and 
legal aspects of the case. The fact that the second-tier court can provide a de novo review is 
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different from many other comparable courts (Skoler and Weixel 1981: 277). The court can 
obtain further information, send the case back to the lower court, or make its own decision.  
The case proceedings differ from the LSC’s by the fact that there is already a court 
decision that has to be taken into account. This implies that if the decision of the LSC seems 
correct at first sight, the judge must ask the complainant why he or she brings the case further 
(Respondent 9 2012). The starting point of the court assessment is thereby different. The HSC 
has the option to gather more facts from all relevant parties. There is also held a hearing in 
each case, similar to the hearings in the LSCs. The hearings are kept in an informal manner so 
that complainants attending without a lawyer also have a chance to present their case and 
express what they wish to say (Respondent 9 2012). A quote from respondent 9 can illustrate 
the degree of formality of the hearings: “So we try to create an atmosphere that makes it easy 
for people to talk and tell us what they want, and in the end we have to deal with it anyhow, 
so…No use to make people feel bad when they come here.” Although a lawyer is not required 
in the HSCs, they appear more often higher in the court system. Because the procedure in 
court is based on an inquisitorial principle, the judge has the responsibility of informing the 
case sufficiently also in cases where the complainant is not represented by a lawyer 
(Respondent 9 2012).  
The average case takes between one and three years in the HSC (Respondent 9 2012). 
The timeliness depends on the amount of work at the court and the case itself. If medical or 
other expert statements must be obtained, it can delay the case severely. Large amounts of 
“emergency cases” also delay the regular cases (Respondent 9 2012).  
The respondent from the Berlin-Brandenburg HSC posited that different treatment of 
similar cases is apparent across judges rather than across LSCs (Respondent 9 2012). The role 
of the HSCs is thus to correct and guide the judges at the lower level. There is contact 
between the HSCs to discuss cases and legal questions, but not on a regular basis (Respondent 
9 2012). 
 
6.3.5 The Federal Social Court 
The FSC in Kassel acts as a court of appeal on points of law (Bundessozialgericht 2012). The 
duty of this court is first and foremost to secure legal uniformity and development of the law. 
In each case, the FSC consists of a presiding judge, two additional professional judges and 
two lay judges. The lay judges are selected for their particular experience as practitioners in 
the relevant areas of law (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2012: 127). The 
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Federal Court is divided according to benefits, which means that the judges are specialized in 
one or a few benefits (Respondent 8 2012).  
A decision made in a HSC can be appealed to the FSC on a point of law (Federal 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 2012: 128). An appeal can only be made if the HSC 
expressly gives leave to appeal. The basis for the decisions of whether to give leave for 
further complaint is determined within the law (Respondent 9 2012). However, if the HSC 
does not give leave to appeal, this decision can also be complained to the FSC (Respondent 5 
2012). The FSC deals with cases where there is a legal problem of general importance or that 
concern a large amount of cases which has not yet been solved. Complaints can also be made 
to the FSC when a claimant regards his procedural rights to have been disrespected, i.e., that 
the lower Social Courts have made procedural errors (Respondent 8 2012). In an appeal on a 
point of law, the court does not review the facts of the case, but only address the legal point at 
stake. The court is solely to look at the verdict of the HSC. If the facts are unclear, the case is 
sent back to the HSC (Respondent 8 2012). The rulings of the FSC are only binding for the 
lower courts in individual cases, but the rulings of the FSC generally form a guideline for 
future implementation of social law (Bundessozialgericht 2012). This implies that the 
decisions made here are of considerable significance. Each federal state (Land) is represented 
with a judge in the FSC, and the judges are expected to travel to their Land once a year and 
discuss legal problems with the HSCs in this Land (Respondent 8 2012). There is also a 
yearly event in Kassel where judges from the LSCs and HSCs have the opportunity to come 
together and discuss cases and benefits.  
Oral hearings are held in each case. The aim of these hearings is to discuss legal 
problems (Respondent 8 2012). Not every complainant wish to travel to Kassel, however, and 
in these cases all documents are sent to the lawyer, which is obliged to share them with his 
client (Respondent 8 2012). Hearings are normally ended with a verdict. Legal representation 
is seen as an absolute necessity in the FSC (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
2012: 128). As this could imply high costs for the complainant, a compensation must take 
place in some way in order to secure justice for the poorer members of society and equality of 
law (Foster and Sule 2010: 128). Two provisions address this need: the Legal Advice Act 
(Beratungshilfengesetz) and the Law on Legal Aid (Gesetz über Prozesskostenhilfe). The 
calculations for these arrangements are very complex, and the expenses for legal aid are 
relieved from the complainant according to a table. Lower net income implies that less, or 
none, of the legal costs will fall on the complainant. The net income is calculated from gross 
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income minus a number of deductions, such as taxes, child support, a certain amount for each 
child differentiated by age, expenses for accommodation, and so on (Federal Ministry of 
Justice 2012). The highest amount of wealth that can be possessed except for property is 2600 
Euro plus 256 Euro per child. There are no other costs of raising court action in the FSC, and 
if the complainant’s case is successful, the responsible Jobcenter must bear all financial costs 
(Respondent 5 2012, Sozialhilfe24 2012).  
For a case that goes through all the levels of the court system and ends up in Kassel, it 
may take several years before the final verdict is given (Respondent 8 2012). In 2011, a 
complaints case was ended within the average time of eight months from the case was 
received at the FSC (Respondent 8 2012). This implies quicker treatment in the FSC than in 
the other courts, but the FSC does not have to gather facts, such as the obtainment of expert 
statements, which can take up much time. Moreover, they do not deal with emergency cases, 
which also cause a delay on the regular cases because they move up first in line.   
 
6.3.6 The Parliamentary Petitions Office 
There is no equivalent to the Scandinavian Ombudsman in Germany, although a somewhat 
similar institution is the Parliamentary Petitions Office (Kofler 2008: 203-204). The Petitions 
Office started its work in 1949 after it had been given a constitutional basis by the new 
German Constitution (Kofler 2008: 204). This office deals with complaints on 
maladministration. The office handles complaints sent to the Bundestag. However, the 
Petitions Office differs from the typical ombudsman institutions in that the right to petition is 
first and foremost a political right of citizens to address proposals to their political 
representatives (Kofler 2008: 204). Citizens can also complain to the agency about a specific 
administrative act (German Bundestag 2007). The Parliamentary Petitions Office does not 
have authority to review court judgments, but can seek to influence the federal authorities 
involved in the court case. However, this institution is not used frequently in cases of 
individual problems; it is rather a tool to utilize for promoting changes in legislation 
(Respondent 8 2012). This is a rather different matter than what is dealt with in this thesis, 
and this institution is consequently not considered further with respect to criteria of procedural 
justice.  
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7. Procedural justice within and between the complaints systems 
7.1 Introduction 
Table 4 displays a summary of the data on the complaints systems in terms of the procedural 
justice criteria.  
Criteria Norway Germany 
Consistency - Different complaints systems for social  
assistance and disability benefits. 
- There are 18 CGs, six agencies of NAV AU, 
while the SST is nation-wide.  
- The system for social assistance lacks a 
nation-wide agency.  
- Institutionalized professional networks in 
NAV AU. 
- The same complaints system applies for all 
welfare benefits.  
- There are 75 LSCs, 14 HSCs and a nation-
wide FSC.  
- There may be problems with consistency in 
the LSCs and the HSCs, which is also related 
to the law formulation of Hartz IV.  
- The FSC has institutionalized arrangements 
for meetings with the HSCs.  
Independence - CG, NAV AU and SST are all part of the 
executive branch. 
- The Social Courts are part of the judicial 
branch. 
Voice - Written case proceedings and little contact 
with the complainant.  
- A right to oral hearing in all the court 
instances.  
Quality - The competence of adjudicators varies 
across instances and agencies.  
- Judges are trained within law and 
specialized within social law and one 
particular benefit.  
Transparency - Case files are sent to the complainant and 
written decisions are required in all cases, 
with the exception of the option for simplified 
reasons in the SST.  
- Decisions are usually announced at the end 
of the hearing or in a letter.  
- There is always given a written decision 
stating the reasons. 
Timeliness - Cases are handled within three months at the 
CGs, within ten weeks at NAV AU and by 
average within four months at the SST.   
- Cases take between one and three years in 
the LSC and the HSC, and in average eight 
months in the FSC.  
Financial risk - Legal help is not necessary in principle, but 
can make a difference.  
- An arrangement for legal aid exists, and 
there are no other expenses of the process.  
- Arrangements for interim benefits are poorly 
developed.  
- There is no compulsion for legal protection, 
but it can improve the case for the 
complainant, and is regarded a necessity in 
the FSC.  
- An arrangement for legal aid exists, and 
there are no other costs of raising a case.  
- Interim orders can be made. 
Table 4: Comparative table of the complaints systems  
 
This chapter contains a discussion of procedural justice within Norway and Germany, 
followed by a comparative discussion in section 7.4 and 7.5. 
 
7.2 Within-case: Norway 
7.2.1 Consistency 
A dimension of consistency not discussed in the theoretical literature is apparent in the 
Norwegian case. This is the lack of consistency of the system, i.e., between different welfare 
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benefits. Procedural justice is arguably violated if claimants of different welfare benefits are 
referred to different complaints systems implying different treatment. Moreover, system 
inconsistency contributes to confusion and a lack of user-friendliness. An argument in favor 
of such a division is that complaints on social assistance decisions are so urgent matters that 
they require a system able to respond quickly. On the other hand, Kjønstad and Syse (2008: 
195) and Kjønstad et al. (2000: 224) argue that this implies a continuation of the low-grade 
treatment of social assistance claimants stemming from the old poor law, because they are 
offered complaints mechanisms with lower legal protection than social security claimants. 
The variety of complaints mechanisms between benefits creates complexity and thus makes it 
more difficult for welfare claimants to operate in the systems and secure their own rights. 
Furthermore, it is a source of different treatment of welfare claimants within different benefit 
categories.  
The fact that the complaints system for disability benefits holds a nation-wide agency 
at the top of the complaints hierarchy - the SST – contributes to geographical consistency 
because decisions made here informally set precedence for further decisions within the 
administration. NAV AU is also organized in a relatively small number of regional offices 
dealing with these complaints, and they seek a development towards fewer and more 
specialized agencies. The problem of geographical disparities caused by factors such as 
different competence of employees and different organizational culture across agencies is thus 
acknowledged and a solution to the problem is sought. The monthly video conferences 
between the agencies also contribute to discussion of and awareness about different questions 
of law and judgment for conferment of welfare benefits.  
Geographical inconsistency is a problem with the social assistance complaints system. 
Firstly, the fact that the CG cannot review the purposive discretion of the first-instance 
implies a blurry division between legal and administrative discretion which in turn creates 
uncertainty and room for different interpretations by decision-makers. Secondly, the 18 
agencies of the CG hold different levels of competence and organizational culture. In this 
case, however, there is no opportunity for filing a further complaint to a nation-wide agency. 
The only measure against this problem of consistency is the guidance offered by the 
Norwegian Board of Health Supervision.  
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7.2.2 Independence 
The organizational placement of NAV AU causes several problems regarding the 
independence criterion. The complaints agency carries the same name and is part of the same 
administrative hierarchy as the agency on which a complaint is filed. This is likely to imply 
some kind of common organizational culture that inhibits an independent review. Impartiality 
in the complaints handling could be compromised because the adjudicator may not wish to 
overrule the decisions of colleagues. There is of course a question of whether there really is 
that kind of loyalty between different sections of such a large organization as NAV. The 
system nevertheless risks appearing biased and impartial to the users. The SST, on the other 
hand, to a much larger degree resembles an independent court, although not part of the 
judicial branch. The CGs are the government’s representatives in the counties, and hence 
belong of the executive branch, i.e., the CGs are part of the same branch as the welfare 
administration, although there is a different ministry in charge.  
In sum, all the Norwegian complaints agencies belong to the executive branch - the 
same governmental branch as the welfare administration whose decisions they are set to 
review. This leads to problems of independence, and especially for NAV AU, being internal 
to the same organizational hierarchy as the initial decision-making agency. 
 
7.2.3 Voice 
Common to all the Norwegian complaints organs is the use of documentary case proceedings. 
There is little direct contact with complainants. In the SST, oral hearings can be conducted, 
but as these are held mainly for educational purposes rather than upon the request of the 
complainant, this does not contribute to fulfillment of the voice criterion. The lack of oral 
hearings is an important difference between the SST and the regular courts (Øie 2010: 14-15). 
The main feature of the Norwegian complaints systems regarding the voice criterion is thus 
the fact that nearly all the case procedures are based on written communication. Viewing 
orality and participation by the complainant as premises for fulfillment of the voice criterion, 
the Norwegian systems thus perform poorly in this respect. In surveys conducted in 1986 and 
2001, 67 and 52 per cent of the respondents who had received a reasoned decision answered 
that they would have preferred oral proceedings, while 73 and 71 per cent of the respondents 
receiving a decision without reasons expressed the same preference (Øie 2010: 153). 
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7.2.4 Quality 
An organizational framework fostering high-quality decisions must be based on competent 
employees. As a main task of the complaints agencies is to interpret and apply the law, a high 
proportion of jurists employed is arguably important. In NAV AU most employees are 
lawyers, and there is a lower threshold of 70 per cent jurists among the employees in each 
agency. There are, however, differences between agencies. For the CGs, the competence also 
varies between agencies. In contrast to NAV AU and the CGs, all employees at the SST are 
experienced jurists, except for medical and rehabilitation experts. Common for NAV AU, the 
SST and the CG is that they apply the inquisitorial principle, i.e., the unit has an independent 
responsibility for informing the case; the evidence of the case does not rest on what is 
provided by the involved parties. All agencies base their decision on preparations from the 
former decision-making body. The fact that all agencies have two or more adjudicators in 
each case, and that decisions are hence never made by one person alone, increases the chances 
of high-quality decisions.  
 
7.2.5 Transparency 
The case file received from the former decision-making instance is also sent to the 
complainant in all three complaints agencies. This increases the transparency of the decision-
making process because the complainant is given an opportunity to oversee the information 
the decision will be based on. The complainant also has a chance to correct possible errors or 
deficiencies in the case file. Additionally, the complainant is informed about the reception of 
the case and about the expected date of a decision in all three agencies. Written statements of 
the reasons for the decisions are provided in all cases. The fact that some of the CGs send 
these letters addressed to the NAV Local Services can be problematic in the sense that the 
letter may be incomprehensible to the complainant as it is not addressed to him. The SST has 
the option to give simplified reasons. This implies that in these cases the transparency 
criterion may be jeopardized. Although simplified reasons can only be given in cases that are 
obvious not to succeed, the question remains whether this is always as clear to the 
complainant as it is to the adjudicators. By publishing verdicts in Lovdata and Innblikk, the 
transparency of the SST is improved in a wider sense because it provides an opportunity for 
the general public to inform themselves about and check the work of the SST.  
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7.2.6 Timeliness 
Cases are closed within an average of three to four months in all the Norwegian instances of 
complaint. This cannot be considered an unduly long waiting period, taken into consideration 
that a thorough review is expected. For the SST, the time perspective was considerably longer 
before the establishment of NAV AU, which thus functions as a filter for cases to the SST.  
 
7.2.7 Financial risk 
None of the complaints organs charge fees for the complaints process. Charges for legal help 
are nevertheless placed on the complainant unless he falls below a certain threshold of 
income. If the complainant wins the case, the costs are transferred to the opposing 
administrative unit. There seems to be some disagreement as to whether it is necessary for a 
complainant to hire a lawyer. Although NAV Local Services are obliged to help the claimant 
to formulate a complaint, reluctance to make use of this opportunity by the complainant may 
be present as this is the agency towards which he or she is filing a complaint. The employees 
may also show reluctance or indifference to this task as it would not be considered in their 
interest to formulate a complaint against their own agency. Although there is no need for legal 
assistance in theory, it could nevertheless make a difference because it is difficult for the 
complainant to know and present all relevant arguments of his or her case. The fact that free 
legal aid is available to complainants falling below a certain threshold of income and wealth 
reduces the financial risk considerably for complainants with such eligibility.  
There are no special arrangements for interim decisions in social assistance cases, but 
urgent cases are handled within a short period of time. For disability cases, the complaints 
process can last for a longer time than arrangements for temporary benefits are in force. 
Complaints do not have a postponing effect, i.e., a denied benefit is cut off immediately, and 
interim decisions cannot be made for an indeterminate time period. Applications for social 
assistance may thus become necessary to secure income while the complaints case is handled. 
This means that saved money and other assets must be exhausted before receiving any money, 
something that arguably impose negatively on procedural justice.  
 
7.2.8 Does the Ombudsman increase procedural justice? 
The Parliamentary Ombudsman can be regarded as a supplement to the ordinary complaints 
system for welfare claimants. The Parliamentary Ombudsman is an independent agency 
because it is part of the legislative branch rather than the executive. Complaining to the 
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Parliamentary Ombudsman has a low financial risk, as there are neither legal costs nor a 
requirement for a lawyer. The transparency of procedures is high, with information about the 
process published on the websites, and confirmation that the case is received as well as 
written decision with reason is provided in each case. The large disadvantage, however, is that 
the Parliamentary Ombudsman does not have any real authority, but rather rests on the 
confidence that the initial decision-making instance will follow their advice. Further, the 
mandate of the Parliamentary Ombudsman is general rather than specific for welfare 
complaints, and is only accessible when all other opportunities of complaints are exhausted. 
The Ombudsman provides many advantages with regards to procedural justice compared to 
the other complaints agencies. However, the agency does not have formal authority, is not 
part of the formal complaints system, and thus a small number of cases reach this instance.  
 
7.2.9 Summary of the Norwegian case 
Looking at the Norwegian case overall, the fact that the complaints system is two-tracked is 
obviously a complicating factor in the discussion. Allover, the Norwegian systems appear to 
satisfy the transparency criterion with reasons given in all cases and sufficient information 
being provided to the complainant. In the case of the SST, public transparency is also sought. 
The timeliness seems reasonable in all the complaints organs. Further, the financial risk is 
low, with no charges for the process and arrangements for free legal aid, but with poorly 
developed arrangements for interim benefits. There are problems of both systemic and 
geographical consistency, and the degree of satisfaction of the quality criterion varies between 
the different agencies. No oral hearings or meetings with complainants are held on a regular 
basis in neither of the agencies, imposing negatively on the voice criterion. Finally, the 
independence is low as the complaints agencies belong to the same governmental branch as 
the initial decision-maker.  
 
7.3 Within-case: Germany 
7.3.1 Consistency 
The complaints system in Germany is consistent across different welfare benefits, i.e. the 
German case satisfies systemic consistency. The degree of geographical consistency varies for 
different levels of the judicial hierarchy – the lower levels have a larger number of courts. 75 
LSCs imply considerable chances of different practice across the country. Unless the law is 
strict and easy to apply, as is not the case with the Hartz IV benefit, there is not necessarily 
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any unifying effects of the decisions of the LSCs relative to the Jobcenters’ decisions, 
although each LSC covers several Jobcenters. The 14 HSCs do, however, supervise the LSCs 
as well as overruling their decisions in cases brought before these courts. Contact between the 
different courts may improve the consistency when uncertain cases are discussed between 
courts. This happens more frequently at the level of the HSC, but such practices of discussion 
and collaboration are not institutionalized. The FSC, however, does have unifying effects. The 
duty of this instance is primarily to secure legal uniformity and development of the law, and 
decisions made here constitutes a basis for later decision-making in the lower courts and the 
welfare administration. Further, the fact that each Land has a representative in the Federal 
Court who travels back to his Land on a regular basis opens for further discussion and 
corrections of the practice of lower-level courts. There is also a yearly event in Kassel where 
judges from different Social Courts meet to discuss social law and other professional 
questions. The downside is of course that few of the large number of cases that enter the court 
system reach the FSC. On the other hand, for benefits and points of law with much 
uncertainty, cases are more often brought up to this level. The Hartz IV benefit has been an 
example of this.  
 
7.3.2 Independence 
The Social Courts display formal independence from the initial decision-maker in the welfare 
administration, as it is part of the judicial rather than executive branch of government. The 
independence of the Social Courts is also obvious to the complainants, as it is clearly not a 
part of the administration they are complaining against. 
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7.3.3 Voice 
Many resources are used to satisfy the voice criterion in the German system. At all levels of 
the Social Courts there is a right to an oral hearing in each case. Informality of these hearings 
are sought both at the LSCs and the HSCs, in order to foster a discussion between the three 
parties of the case – the complainant, the Jobcenter and the judge – and to make self-
representation possible. In the LSCs and HSCs, the aims of these hearings are to clarify facts, 
                                                             
19
 There have been raised critique of the assumption that formal, or de jure, judicial independence implies de 
facto judicial independence (see for instance Melton and Ginsburg 2012). In the German case, however, Seibert-
Fohr (2006) argues that there is strong judicial independence with regards to structural, personal and substantive 
aspects.  The main concern here is with the independence and distance of the courts from the initial decision-
making body. This is satisfied through the structural, i.e., organizational, independence of the executive.   
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to present of the case from the standpoint of involved parties, to discuss the case and to end 
with a decision from the judge. In the FSC, only legal matters are of interest. This 
institutionalized right to oral hearings and consistently high degree of inclusion of 
complainants implies that the system performs well on the voice criterion.  
 
7.3.4 Quality 
All judges of the Social Courts are specialized within social law, and in most cases further 
specialized on one particular welfare benefit. The Hartz IV cases are organized in separate 
sections of the Social Courts. At the LSC, a chamber comprises a professional presiding judge 
and two lay assistant judges, while a chamber in the HSC is constituted by a presiding judge, 
two additional professional judges and two lay judges. The FSC consists of a presiding judge, 
two additional professional judges and two lay judges in each case. There is also a de novo 
review of the case both in the LSC and in the HSC. This implies a thorough review of the case 
by an impartial and independent agency. The inquisitorial principle applies in all three 
instances. This implies that it is the responsibility of the judge, not the opponents, to provide 
sufficient facts about the case to make a decision. The German system can thus be argued to 
perform well with respect to the quality criterion.   
 
7.3.5 Transparency 
Written decisions with reasons are required in all cases in the Social Courts. Additionally, the 
decision is often announced at the end of the hearing in the LSC and HSC. The hearings 
provide transparency because the facts on which the decision is based are clarified, and the 
complainant has the opportunity to ask questions if he wishes to do so. Moreover, the 
procedures of the courts and their case treatment are clearly stated in the law and available to 
the public. In sum, the information accessible to the complainant both about the system in 
general and about their case specifically provides a large degree of systemic transparency. 
 
7.3.6 Timeliness 
The timeliness is an obvious weakness of the German system in terms of procedural justice. 
In 2011 the average time for a decision to be made in an internal review, i.e., before the case 
enters the legal system, was 2.3 months. Cases are handled by degree of urgency in the LSCs 
and the HSCs. This implies that some cases can be dealt with within one or two weeks. 
However, regular cases take between one and two years in the LSCs. In the HSC, regular 
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cases take between one and three years, adding to the time spent in the internal review and the 
LSC. If the case proceeds to the FSC, the case will be in the system for several years before 
the final decision of the FSC is made. These are unreasonable amounts of waiting time, and 
the timeliness criterion cannot be said to be fulfilled for the German complaints system.  
 
7.3.7 Financial risk 
Help from a legal expert is considered a necessity at the FSC, but not at the LSCs and the 
HSCs. However, legal representation may contribute to a successful outcome for the 
complainant in these instances as well. In theory, the use of the inquisitorial principle should 
lessen the need for a lawyer, because the judge has an independent responsibility for 
illuminating the case. Free legal aid is offered when the complainant falls below a certain 
threshold of income and all costs are covered by the welfare administration if the 
complainant’s case is successful. Interim decisions can be made in the LSCs and the HSCs in 
order to secure the complainant an income while the case proceeds. Such benefits are granted 
in cases where the complaint is considered likely to be successful.  
 
7.3.8 Summary of the German case 
The German case displays systemic consistency, but there are both pros and cons with respect 
to geographic consistency; the vague law formulation of the Hartz IV benefit and the lack of 
consistency in the LSCs and the HSCs are negative factors. The FSC greatly contribute to 
unity, however. The German system can, in sum, be argued to satisfy the criteria of 
independence, voice, quality, transparency and financial risk. The timeliness criterion is 
clearly a problem.  
 
7.4 Between-case comparison and discussion 
The following sections contain the comparative discussion. Firstly, more general 
characteristics of the complaints systems, i.e., the presence of internal review and the court-
tribunal distinction, are discussed. Further, the systems are evaluated on each procedural 
justice criteria. The chapter is closed off by a summary of the comparative discussion. 
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7.4.1 General about the systems 
Internal review 
The systems are similar in that an internal review is a required first step in all cases. An 
advantage of required internal review is that it can give a quick solution if obvious mistakes 
have been made in the initial decision (Harris 1999: 46, Redlich 1971-1972: 62). However, if 
one considers this as the first stage of the complaints process, it must be judged by the same 
criteria as other phases of the complaints process. An internal review obviously does not 
satisfy requirements of independence and impartiality (Harlow and Rawlings 2009: 457). 
Internal review can also be seen to block the immediate access to an external complaint 
(Harris 1999: 47, Swain and Bigby 2009: 342). If the position of the initial decision-making 
agency is clear, internal review may be a waste of time and energy for both the agency and the 
welfare claimant (Redlich 1971-1972: 63), thus imposing negatively on the timeliness 
criterion as well. A further question is whether the case is sent directly to the next instance if 
the complaint is rejected, or whether the complainant must file another complaint. In the latter 
case, there may be problems with “appeal fatigue” (Harris 1999: 53). This applies to the 
German system, where the complainant must file a new complaint to the Social Court. In the 
Norwegian complaints systems, on the other hand, complaints are sent directly to the next 
instance if rejected in the internal review. Internal review has an important role to play as a 
filter to the complaints agencies, viz. that cases with obvious mistakes or factual 
misunderstandings are weeded out. If this function is fulfilled, the capacity and hence 
timeliness and quality of the complaints agencies can be improved.  
 
Court versus tribunal 
The most apparent difference between the Norwegian systems and the German system is that 
administrative tribunals are central in Norway, while specialized courts play the main role in 
Germany. Compared to courts, tribunals are often cheaper and speedier, freer of technicalities 
and more accessible. However, there may be problems with lack of real independence from 
the administrative unit that made the initial decision. Although a common criterion for 
tribunals is that they are independent from the agency making the first decision, this is not 
always the case, as is apparent with NAV AU. If the tribunal is simply an agency higher in the 
same administrative hierarchy, problems related to independence, such as lack of impartiality 
and neutrality may be present. Another aspect is that the qualifications of adjudicators in 
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tribunals tend to be lower and less standardized than in the courts, where all judges are trained 
within law. 
A great advantage of court proceedings is the clear structural independence from the 
administration. The courts are independent of the administration regarding the four aspects 
accountability, financial responsibility, appointments and managerial responsibility. The 
qualifications of the judges are generally high, and this is particularly the case with 
specialized courts, where the judges are trained lawyers in a particular legal area. This is 
likely to contribute to high-quality decisions. A third advantage with courts is the effect on 
consistency, as the final court instance covers the entire country and decisions made here 
generally provide benchmarks for future decisions. Financially, however, there is often a 
higher risk for the complainant, as well as a greater need for professional help, which may or 
may not be covered by the state. The aspect of time is also normally a large problem with 
judicial review compared to tribunals.  
One of the main goals with welfare complaints systems is the opportunity to control 
discretion. As such, the complaints organs arguably should be of a judicial character.
20
 
Selznick (1980: 15-16) claims that the objective of judicial discretion is to “find a rule or a 
rule-set that will do justice in a special class of situations.” Administrative discretion, on the 
other hand, also takes into account questions of diagnosing and classification of the world: 
“The aim is not justice but accomplishment, not fairness but therapy” (Selznick 1980: 15-16). 
While judges may also have room for discretion, the central point is that a judicial decision is 
self-contained; if the parties want questionable facts taken into account, they must face the 
“gauntlet of the opposing cross-examiner” (Wade 1963: 122). An administrative decision, on 
the other hand, is different because it is based on executive policy and “any facts that may 
feed the policymaker’s fancy” (Wade 1963: 122).  
The participation of complainants is usually stressed to a larger degree within courts 
than administratively based complaints organs. At the same time, however, the participation 
may become difficult in a legal setting as the procedures and rules are complex. Titmuss 
(1971: 122) asserts that: “as the hearings became more “legal” (i.e., as the presence of lawyers 
at the hearings increased) the content became more esoteric and mystical to clients.” 
                                                             
20
 An objection to this is that it implies «judicialization» of politics, because review of discretionary decisions by 
the judiciary can be argued to imply stepping into the political sphere, as most of these decisions concern 
prioritization of scarce resources (Bragdø 2005: 88, Feiring 2006). However, when clear, positive rights to 
welfare are formulated by law, a counter-argument is that there is no longer a question of competition about 
scarce resources, but rather about administration of these rights.  
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In the following sections, the complaints systems will be discussed with regards to the 
concrete criteria for procedural justice. The overall system structures show a difference 
between Norway and Germany related to the first principle, namely the lack of systemic 
consistency in the Norwegian case compared to the German system which is unified across 
welfare benefits.  
 
7.4.2 Consistency 
Systemic consistency 
The German complaints system is more consistent and perspicuous than the Norwegian. In 
contrast to the Norwegian case, the complaints system is consistent across all welfare benefits. 
An argument presented in favor of the Norwegian division is that there are differences 
between benefits and degree of urgency. However, in the German system, although a unified 
system dealing with all welfare benefits, cases are treated differently according to 
characteristics such as degree of urgency. Even within the Norwegian complaints system 
dealing with social assistance, cases are differentiated based on the degree of urgency. Hence, 
this argument is not sufficient to support the inconsistent Norwegian approach. Perhaps a 
more important argument for the two-tracked system is the split responsibility of benefits 
between state and municipal authorities, namely that social assistance is administered by the 
municipalities and the disability benefits by the state, and that these benefits consequently 
need different complaints systems. This affects the procedural justice negatively because it 
makes the system difficult to comprehend for welfare claimants, and because it implies 
different treatment across different benefits which could be argued to maintain the old 
differentiation between “deserving” and “undeserving” claimants.   
 
Geographical consistency 
The German system and the Norwegian complaints system for disability benefits both hold a 
nationwide agency at the top of the complaints hierarchy. In both cases the decisions made at 
this agency have informal authority beyond the individual cases they deal with. Hence the 
effect for geographical consistency and equal treatment of equal cases is considerable, despite 
the lack of formal precedence. The lack of a nationwide agency is a main critique of the 
Norwegian complaints system for social assistance. The 18 CGs practice their roles 
differently. The same is the case for the LSCs and the HSCs of Germany. Although the CG is 
supervised by the National Board of Health, there is no institutionalized cooperation between 
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agencies aimed at increasing consistency. This is similar for the LSCs and the HSCs. 
However, the FCS in Germany contribute to lower-level consistency by a yearly gathering, as 
well as regular visits to the states by Federal Court Judges. NAV AU also come out strongly 
in this respect, as a national professional network of employees working with disability cases 
exists and is utilized on a regular and institutionalized basis.  
There is, however, an important complicating factor in this discussion. The 
formulation of the law regulating the eligibility for the welfare benefits in point might be as 
important as the complaints system to the fulfillment of this criterion. This is apparent in the 
German case, where judges in Berlin LSC and Berlin-Brandenburg HSC point out that 
differences exist between judges in the same courts as much as between courts. This is due to 
the lack of clarity in the law about the Hartz IV benefit. The same applies to the Norwegian 
CGs. The law formulation of social assistance leaves room for much discretion, and this is 
deteriorated by the blurry division between legal and administrative discretion – the latter not 
being subject to the review of the CG while the former is.  
In sum, the Norwegian and German systems seem to perform equally well with 
regards to geographical consistency, with an exception for the system for the Norwegian 
social assistance, which lacks a nation-wide agency. 
 
7.4.3 Independence 
This second criterion divides the two countries, first and foremost as a consequence of the 
administrative-judicial cleavage. NAV AU can to a large degree be regarded as an agency 
internal to the same organizational hierarchy as the initial decision-maker. Furthermore, it is 
not hierarchically superior, but lateral to the agency which decisions it is established to 
review. The SST is much more independent than NAV AU, but is also subordinate to the 
Ministry of Labor. Although the responsible ministry does not have instructional authority, all 
organizational functions are determined by the ministry. Similar to the two other agencies, the 
CG is part of the executive branch of government, although subordinate to a different ministry 
than the initial decision-making agency. In contrast, the German complaints system belongs 
completely to the judicial branch of government, and the independence from the welfare 
administration providing the initial decision is thus much clearer. The separation of powers 
ensures the independence of the courts. The consequences are that decisions in the Norwegian 
complaints systems risk being hamstrung by organizational culture and loyalty, and in 
addition risk causing distrust and repugnance among the complainants.  
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7.4.4 Voice  
The German system relies on oral hearings in all the Social Courts. This contrasts with the 
Norwegian system where all cases are handled mainly or completely in writing. The argument 
in the Norwegian case is that oral hearings are too resource demanding and expensive. This 
may, however, be mitigated by its virtues. If the chances that the complainant leaves with 
“peace at heart” are increased, this has several advantages both regarding procedural justice 
and efficiency considerations. An oral hearing is important to satisfy the voice criterion and 
procedural justice because it allows the complainant to participate, to present his case and to 
be informed about the case. Moreover, the complainant will more easily settle with the 
solution and comply with the decision if he has had the chance to present all his evidence to 
the judge. Thus the case may not be further pursued within the complaints system, and the 
welfare claimant may also be more inclined to accept future decisions from the agency. The 
legitimacy of the system as a totality is increased, which again feeds into a positive circle.  
Oral hearings also contribute to the satisfaction of other criteria. Firstly, transparency 
may be increased by more open procedures and explanations, as well as the opportunity for 
the claimant to ask questions. Secondly, the quality criterion will be improved because of 
lower risk of misunderstandings and because it is easier to clarify facts and other components 
of the case. There is a large catch to this, however. The conduct of oral hearings seems to 
impose negatively on the timeliness criterion. 
Whether the procedures of the complaints agency are based on the adversarial or 
inquisitorial principle has been discussed as a component of the quality criterion. This 
dimension is also, however, relevant to the voice criterion. Much critique against court 
procedures rests on the assumption that the procedures are based on the adversarial principle 
which leaves the task of providing the relevant evidence and facts to the involved parties 
while the judge has a passive role. The adversarial principle to a greater degree than the 
inquisitorial allows the complainant to present his or her case orally, which offer more process 
control for the disputants (Thibaut and Walker 1978: 546), but at the same time, more 
responsibility for enlightenment of the case is laid on the complainant. This raises financial 
aspects because there may be a need for legal assistance. However, the Norwegian and 
German complaints agencies are all based on the inquisitorial principle. The responsibility of 
case enlightenment is hence placed on the judge or decision-maker, in principle reducing the 
need for a lawyer. The German system based on oral hearings and the inquisitorial principle 
may thus be claimed to be particularly strong with regards to the voice criterion.  
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7.4.5 Quality  
The competence of workers is different both between the Norwegian agencies and between 
these and the German courts. In Germany, all judges are trained within law and specialized 
within welfare law and one specific benefit. The decision-makers at the Norwegian CG have 
competence that range from jurists to social scientists and social workers. NAV AU seeks to 
employ a substantial share of jurists. However, social scientists and other professionals are 
also employed. The SST resembles the German Social Courts in that only experienced jurists 
are employed as judges. Given the assumption that being a jurist is superior to these other 
educations, the German courts and the SST performs better than the other agencies with 
regards to this criterion.  
All the complaints agencies in Norway and Germany apply the inquisitorial principle. 
Another relevant aspect in obtaining good and sufficient information is whether the 
complaints agency performs a de novo or on the record consideration. The distinction 
between these two modes is often clearer in theory than practice (Shapiro 1980: 646). It has, 
however, consequences for the quality criterion, as a de novo reconsideration constitutes a 
more thorough case treatment and increases the chances that the decision is based on correct 
and sufficient facts. A de novo review is made in all Norwegian complaints agencies, except 
in cases brought into the regular courts. The LSC and HSC also perform de novo 
considerations, although the HSC also take the decision made in the LSC into consideration. 
The FSC only reviews the legality of a case in an on the record assessment.  
The number of adjudicators involved in each decision is also relevant to this criterion. 
In the Norwegian cases, at least two people are involved in each case, with opportunities to 
increase the number of adjudicators in special cases. In Germany, there are three judges in the 
LSC and five judges in the two upper Social Courts. Although Germany performs somewhat 
better in this respect, none of the agencies leave decisions to one decision-maker alone. This 
is important to reduce chances of wrong and biased decisions.  
 
7.4.6 Transparency 
The transparency criterion seems to be rather well satisfied by both the Norwegian and 
German systems. The procedures are clearer in the German case, as the system is more 
consistent and clearly regulated by the law. Written statements of decisions and the reasons 
for the decision is standard and required by law in all agencies, with the minor exception of 
the SST, where there is an option of giving simplified reasons in some cases. Oral case 
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treatment may, however, contribute to higher transparency in Germany. The process becomes 
more available to the complainant, and there is also more likely that the complainant will 
understand the decision and the reasons behind it when he is presented with this orally and 
has a chance to get clarifications. The SST stands out when it comes to informing the public 
in general, as all cases with reasons are published in the Internet source Lovdata and they 
regularly publish an electronic journal with cases regarded of general interest. 
 
7.4.7 Timeliness 
What constitutes a fair amount of time spent on a single case is more easily discussed 
comparatively between systems rather than assessing the individual systems in isolation. The 
average time spent on complaints cases in the Norwegian and German institutions is displayed 
in table 5. 
Norway Germany 
CG NAV AU SST LSC HSC FSC 
3 months 3 months 4 months 1-2 years 1-2 years 8 months 
Table 5: The average time spent on complaints cases 
 
There is a large difference between the Norwegian and German systems with regards 
to this criterion. In the German system, disregarding emergency cases dealt with within a few 
weeks, the counting of time is in years rather than months. This could be seen as an obvious 
downside to the use of oral hearings, given the assumption that this is the reason for the long 
waiting period in the German system. Other factors could of course also be of relevance, such 
as the large number of cases reaching the Social Courts. This could again be traced back to 
German attitudes of bringing a case to court and a dysfunctional internal review process. The 
implication of inadequate internal review is that many cases involving simple factual 
questions or obvious mistakes made by the initial decision-maker are brought before the 
Social Courts, consuming time and resources.    
 
7.4.8 Financial risk 
Legal help is, in principle, not necessary in neither of the Norwegian complaints agencies nor 
in the German LSCs or HSCs. Legal aid can nevertheless improve the chances of success for 
the complainant. This may especially be so in the Norwegian case, where it is the 
responsibility of the initial decision-making agency to assist in filing a complaint. In contrast, 
employees at the LSC, rather than the Jobcenter, can help the claimant formulate their 
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complaint in Germany. Only at the FSC in Germany is a lawyer in practice required. The 
Norwegian and German cases show similarity in the existence of legal aid available to 
complainants with low income, but the arrangements differ. The generosity of these 
arrangements is difficult to compare due to different levels of income and prices in the two 
countries, and because the German arrangement does not provide one single lower threshold, 
but imply individual calculations. The Norwegian system, in contrast, offers clear and simple 
rules with a lower threshold for income and wealth. No fees are charged for the process itself 
in neither of the cases. In Germany, it is possible to make temporary decisions allowing 
complainants welfare benefits while a case is processed in the Social Courts. There are no 
such arrangements in Norway. With regards to social assistance, quick decisions by the CG 
are meant to ensure that a claimant does not go without any income. For claimants of 
disability benefits, their former benefit can be extended for up to eight months, but this is 
often insufficient to cover the entire complaints process. In such cases, the complainant is 
referred to social assistance. An important criterion for receiving social assistance is that own 
accumulated resources are exhausted. The complainant thus risks having to use saved-up 
money. This clearly imposes a larger financial risk on the complainant compared to the 
German solution.  
 
7.4.9 System supplement: The Ombudsman 
The Norwegian Parliamentary Ombudsman and the German Parliamentary Petitions Office 
cannot be considered equal supplements to the ordinary complaints system. The Norwegian 
institution is to a larger degree directed towards helping individual complainants and 
functioning as a safeguard against mistakes in the administration, and can thus be appraised 
for increasing the overall procedural justice of the Norwegian system. A weakness is that if 
the Ombudsman upholds a complaint, he can only recommend remedial action (Thompson 
1999: 466). However, the Ombudsman has the advantage that he can bring publicity to issues 
he criticize (Wade 1963: 103). Such a supplementary institution may not be necessary in the 
same way in the German case because complaints go through three instances of specialized 
courts rather than administrative complaints agencies as in the Norwegian case. The 
Ombudsman can to some degree be seen as improving the limitations of administrative 
adjudication in the Norwegian complaints systems, but nevertheless plays a marginal role in 
the overall system.  
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7.5 Summary of the comparative discussion 
The comparative discussion has revealed strengths and weaknesses of the Norwegian and 
German complaints systems with regards to the ideal of procedural justice. The aspects that 
clearly stand out from the discussion are that the Norwegian system is better in terms of 
timeliness, while the German system is closer to the ideal of procedural justice regarding 
voice and independence, as well as systemic consistency. The question remains whether some 
of these criteria are incompatible; is it impossible to satisfy timeliness and sufficient voice and 
independence simultaneously? For the Norwegian case, a unification of the complaints 
systems for social assistance and disability benefits would contribute to increase the 
procedural justice. Further, it would be desirable to improve the voice criterion by introducing 
oral hearings and to increase the independence of the complaints agencies, but without ending 
up with the same timeliness problem as Germany. By considering how the timeliness of the 
German case could be improved while retaining the oral hearings and the independent judicial 
system, a complaints systems closer to the ideal of procedural justice might become visible. It 
is possible that a more functional review stage could reduce the arrears of the German system. 
A common suggestion to reduce the time spent on each case is to remove the oral hearings. 
The opposite answer to the timeliness problem would be the introduction of orality at an even 
earlier stage in the process, namely in the internal review. The question remains, however, 
whether this is achievable in practice. Further, if these aspects are not possible to attain 
simultaneously – which criteria should be prioritized? The answer depends on weighting of 
procedural justice criteria. The current situation reveals that timeliness is regarded most 
important in the Norwegian system, while independence and voice are prioritized in 
Germany.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
In this final chapter, the findings of the thesis are summarized, the contributions, implications 
as well as the limitations of the thesis are discussed, and, finally, suggestions are made for 
further research.   
 
8.1 Findings and contributions of the thesis 
The goals of this thesis have been to contribute to existing research with knowledge about the 
welfare complaints systems of Norway and Germany, and to discuss these systems in terms of 
an ideal of procedural justice. A concomitant task has been the systematization of procedural 
justice theory and subsequent derivation of criteria for the purpose of discussing empirical 
institutions. This systematization and operationalization of procedural justice provides a 
contribution to the theoretical field. Procedural justice was operationalized through the criteria 
consistency, independence, voice, quality, transparency, timeliness and financial risk. Put 
together, the content of these criteria can be argued to constitute an ideal of procedural justice. 
They assert that a fair complaints procedure must secure (1) similar treatment across 
geographical context and different categories of welfare claimants, (2) an impartial and 
complete review, (3) that the complainant gets a chance to present his case, (4) that the 
adjudicators have sufficient competence and appropriate methods for obtaining case 
information in order to maximize the number of right decisions according to the law, (5) 
openness and knowledge about the case, (6) that a decision is reached within a reasonable 
time, and (7) that the system of complaint is accessible to everyone.  
A main difference between the Norwegian and German complaints systems is between 
the dominance of administrative or judicial procedures. Some similarities between the 
Norwegian and German systems are apparent, and the main divergences with regards to 
procedural justice are found in the criteria of voice, independence and timeliness. The German 
system performs considerably better on voice and independence, while the Norwegian 
systems are better with respect to timeliness. The answer to the research question, i.e., to what 
extent the complaints systems secure procedural justice for welfare claimants, is firstly, that 
the Norwegian case cannot be said to fulfill the ideal of procedural justice with regards to 
geographical and systemic consistency, nor the criteria of independence and voice. The 
Norwegian case secures procedural justice when it comes to timeliness and to a large degree 
also quality, transparency and financial risk. Secondly, as for the German case, the ideal of 
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procedural justice is to a large degree secured with respect to systemic consistency, 
independence, voice, quality and transparency. The answers to the criteria of geographical 
consistency and financial risk are more ambivalent, while the timeliness is far from attaining 
the ideal of procedural justice.  
A sub-question raised was whether different ideals and goals are prioritized in Norway 
and Germany. The answer to this can be seen in the evaluation of the procedural justice 
criteria; while timeliness appear as an important prioritization in the Norwegian case, voice 
and independence are prioritized in Germany - at the expense of timeliness. It was further 
asked what consequences these differences have for procedural justice. Because weighting of 
the procedural justice criteria is difficult and implies a risk of arbitrary assessment, the 
conclusion cannot automatically be drawn that the German case secure procedural justice to a 
larger degree than the Norwegian case. There are strong reasons to argue that efficiency 
should not come at the expense of quality or the chance of claimants to present their case. On 
the other hand, although the German arrangement for interim benefits makes cases less 
urgent, waiting periods of several years cause injustice. Hence, the question remains whether 
there is an inherent practical trade-off in the fulfillment of these criteria. Prioritizations of 
some aspects of procedural justice on behalf of others might prove inevitable and perfect 
attainment of procedural justice thus infeasible.  
This thesis nevertheless contributes to opportunities for informed system evaluations 
by highlighting how the system designs have consequences for procedural justice. Although 
comprehensive changes are difficult to attain, and unlikely to happen due to cultural and 
historical paths, certain system changes are attainable in both countries and could lead the 
systems closer to the ideal of procedural justice. In the words of Sen (2009: preface): “What 
moves us, reasonably enough, is not the realization that the world falls short of being 
completely just – which few of us expect – but that there are clearly remediable injustices 
around us which we want to eliminate.” 
The most important change of the Norwegian system would be the establishment of an 
independent, nation-wide social court or tribunal for all welfare benefits with stronger rights 
to oral hearings. For the German system, the timeliness would have to be improved. This 
could be attained by higher quality of the first administrative review, thus diminishing the 
number of cases that reach the court and increasing the efficiency of the courts.  
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8.2 Limitations of the analysis 
The thesis seeks to illuminate mainly systemic or institutional characteristics, consequently 
disregarding the empirical effects of these formal traits, with the exception of data on 
timeliness. This limits the scope of the findings. Further, there are inherent challenges in the 
application of normative theory on empirical systems. The criteria derived from procedural 
justice theory imply certain assumptions about what is normatively best. Complete agreement 
about such assumptions is not possible, and competing goals and insolvable trade-offs will 
continue to exist. Goals of economy and efficiency can stand in opposition to several criteria 
of procedural justice. Further, the requirement of independent complaints agencies clash with 
values of local democracy, and can be argued to imply judicialization of politics.  
As for the geographical scope, the findings only apply to the two countries under 
investigation. The theoretical framework should nevertheless be applicable to similar cases. 
The overview of nine other cases in table 1 suggests some overarching characteristics of other 
complaints systems which could be elaborated further. This leads to the next topic, namely 
suggestions for further investigation.  
 
8.3 Suggestions for future research 
Broader knowledge can be obtained by larger comparisons of more cases within the same 
universe. The theoretical framework could for instance be extended to other Western 
democracies, e.g. the countries suggested in table 1. Such analyses could reveal whether there 
are patterns consistent with the judicial-administrative cleavage with regards to criteria of 
procedural justice. The empirical effects of the complaints systems, such as the number of 
complaints, the reversal rate and the amount of economic resources are spent on the systems, 
should also be further investigated, implying the acquisition of more knowledge in depth. 
Moreover, investigations covering all geographical units of the countries would provide more 
adequate and reliable data. It would be particularly interesting to look deeper into the 
suggested trade-off between satisfaction of the voice and timeliness criteria. Is it really so that 
it is the oral hearings that cause the long time lags in the German system, or can the lack of 
timeliness be explained by other factors such as a large number of complaints, insufficient 
internal review or some kinds of system rigidities other than the oral hearings?  
This thesis has dealt with procedural aspects of the welfare state, taking the 
substantive aspects, i.e., the formulation of welfare rights and benefit eligibility, as given. 
96 
 
However, this constitutes an important foundation of the procedural rights. The material rights 
of economic welfare to a large degree set the agenda for the procedural execution, and 
according to Mashaw (1985: 5), these questions of substance and process are functionally 
inseparable. Hence, this deserves more attention. The law formulations contribute to the 
degree to which procedural justice can be achieved. This is for the most part disregarded in 
this thesis in favor of the systemic characteristics, but is nevertheless apparent in the cases 
discussed. For social assistance in Norway, the weak rights formulations leave much room for 
discretion, and the additional provision that the complaints agency is only allowed to review 
the judicial, in contrast to the administrative, discretion further blurs the administration of 
these benefits. The law formulation on disability benefits is much clearer, but contains vague 
eligibility criteria in the definition of disability. In Hartz IV cases, consistency between 
different decision-makers has proved difficult to achieve due to the complicated assessments 
left open by the law formulation. Focus on and development of these aspects could improve 
the conditions for the just implementation of welfare benefits, especially with respect to 
consistency and timeliness.  
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Appendix A: List of interview respondents 
Respondent 
number 
Country Position and institution Date of 
interview 
Place of interview 
Respondent 1 Norway Judge at the Social Security 
Tribunal 
02.10.2012 The Social Security 
Tribunal, Oslo 
Respondent 2 Norway Nationally professional 
responsible for disability cases, 
NAV Appeals Unit 
17.10.2012 NAV Appeals Unit, 
Bergen 
Respondent 3 Norway Head of section, the County 
Governor of Oslo and Akershus 
26.10.2012 The County Governor 
of Oslo and Akershus, 
Oslo 
Respondent 4 Germany Employee in the German 
Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs 
05.11.2012 E-mail correspondence 
Respondent 5 Germany Judge in Berlin Local Social 
Court 
12.11.2012 Berlin Local Social 
Court, Berlin 
Respondent 6 Norway Head of section, the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman 
16.11.2012 Phone interview 
Respondent 7 Germany Committee Staff  Member, the 
Petitions Parliamentary Office 
14.11-
16.11.2012 
E-mail correspondence 
Respondent 8 Germany Judge in the Federal Social 
Court 
19.11.2012 The Federal Social 
Court, Kassel 
Respondent 9 Germany Judge in Berlin-Brandenburg 
Higher Social Court 
20.11.2012 The Berlin-
Brandenburg Higher 
Social Court, Potsdam 
Respondent 10 Germany Official at Berlin Pankow 
Jobcenter 
20.11.2012 E-mail correspondence 
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Appendix B: Interview guides 
 
Interview guide for the Norwegian complaints agencies and the German Social Courts 
(Respondents 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 and 9) 
Descriptive 
1. Formally, how is an appeal promoted before your institution?  
2. Can you describe the complaints handling from your reception of a complaint? 
3. What is the main goal of your institution? What are your main priorities?   
4. What can be achieved with a complaint? Can you only review the decision of the former 
decision-maker or can you make a de novo assessment of the case? 
 
Consistency 
5. What is done to secure geographical consistency in the treatment of cases? 
6. Does your institution contribute to consistent decisions? 
7. Do you communicate with other courts/agencies at the same level as yours or higher/lower? 
 
Independence 
8. Do you see your institution as completely independent from the rest of the welfare 
administration? 
9. Organizationally, who are you accountable to? Financially, employment, etc.  
 
Voice  
10. How does the complainant present his case for you? Is there an oral hearing?  
11. Does the complainant need legal expert help in order to achieve a successful result? 
 
Quality of decisions 
12. How do you gather all necessary case information?  
13. What is the level of competency of people working with adjudication in your institution? 
 
Transparency 
14. Is there openness about your procedures?  
15. How is the complainant informed during the case process? 
16. Are written statements with reasons for your decisions always given? 
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Timeliness 
17. What is the average time spent on each case? And what is your maximum time limit? 
18. How is the complainant secured financially in the mean time? 
 
Financial aspects 
19. Are there any expenses falling on the complainant of the process itself? 
20. How are arrangements for legal aid?  
 
Evaluation of system 
21. Have there been any changes for your agency since the Hartz/NAV reform?  
22. What would you say is the main weakness of the system as it is today? 
23. What are the greatest advantages with the system? 
24. Have any other kind of organization of the system been discussed? 
 
Questions asked respondent from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, e-mail 
interview (Respondent 4) 
1. How is an initial complaint made? Does it have to be in writing; are there standardized 
forms? 
2. What is the average time used to make a decision on a complaint? 
3. If the complaint is rejected, does the citizen have to make a new complaint in order to bring 
the case to the Social Court, or is the case sent directly to the Social Court for consideration if 
the complaint is rejected? 
4. Is the information about the case easily available to the claimant? 
5. Are there given a written statement of reasons for decisions that are made in the 
Jobcenters? 
6. How detailed are the formal regulations of this benefit regarding who is eligible for the 
benefit, and regarding how much one is entitled to if eligible? 
 
Interview guide for the Parliamentary Ombudsman, phone interview (Respondent 6) 
1. What is the role of the Parliamentary Ombudsman in the complaints system for claimants 
of disability benefits and social assistance? 
2. What does the process of complaints look like at the Ombudsman? 
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3. Which aspects of the case do you review? 
4. How do you gather the necessary information about each case? 
5. Do you have any contact with the complainant, and if so, is this in writing or orally? 
6. What competency is required to work at the agency of the Ombudsman? 
7. Is it necessary with legal help in order to file a complaint? 
 
Questions asked respondent from the Petitions Parliamentary Office, e-mail interview 
(Respondent 7) 
1. What role does the Parliamentary Petitions Office have in the total complaints system for 
Hartz IV claimants? Do you handle such cases? Which aspects of the cases do you handle? 
2. What is the main goal of the Parliamentary Petitions Office? 
3. How are complaints handled at your agency? 
4. Do you have any direct contact with the welfare claimant; if so, orally or in writing? 
5. What is the competence required to work at the Parliamentary Petitions Office?  
6. Do welfare claimants need help from a lawyer in order to raise a complaint before your 
agency? 
7. Are any fees charged for lodging a complaint before the Parliamentary Petitions Office? 
 
Questions asked respondent from Berlin Pankow Jobcenter, e-mail interview 
(Respondent 10) 
1. Practically, how does a Hartz IV claimant lodge a complaint on a decision made at the 
Jobcenter? 
2. What are the procedures of the Jobcenter for handling such complaints? Is there an internal 
review of the decision first?  
3. If so, and if the decision is upheld, what do the claimant has to do in order to get the case 
tried in the Social Courts? 
4. Do the officials at the Jobcenter help the welfare claimant in lodging a complaint?  
5. How is the case presented before the Local Social Court? What is the role of the Jobcenter 
when a case is handled in the Social Court? 
6. Are the procedures for complaint open and easily accessible to the welfare claimant? 
7. When a case is sent to the Social Court, how is it decided what kind of economic 
contributions the welfare claimant gets while he awaits a decision in the Social Court? 
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8. Do you regard the rules of the Hartz IV benefit as clear, or are there difficult assessments 
that have to be made in each case? 
